50 research outputs found

    Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

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    Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise

    Procedural and declarative knowledge: an evolutionary perspective

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    It appears that there are resemblances in the organization of memory and the visual system, although the functions of these faculties differ considerably. In this article, the principles behind this organization are discussed. One important principle regards the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge, between knowing that and knowing how. Declarative knowledge is considered here not as an alternative kind of knowledge, as is usually the case in theories of memory, but as part of procedural knowledge. In our view this leads to another approach with respect to the distinction. Declarative knowledge has occupied more attention in (cognitive) psychological research than can be justified on the basis of the importance of procedural knowledge for behavior. We also discuss the question whether there are other brain faculties that reflect the same organizational characteristics. We conclude with some speculations about the consequent role of consciousness in such a tentative model

    Divide and Conquer

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