Indeterminacy of Citizen-Candidate Equilibrium

In a citizen candidate equilibrium, there are n candidates each of whom announces a policy in a policy space of dimension d. Thus the policy equilibrium lives in a space of dimension nd. We show, in a canonical example, that the equilibrium manifold is generically of dimension nd. In particular, the set of equilibria contains an open set in T^n .Citizen-candidate equilibrium, Political equilibrium

Distribution and Politics: A Brief History and Prospect

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium

Value and Politics

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium

Egalitarianism against the Veil of Ignorance

J. Rawls and R. Dworkin have each used veils of ignorance to justify equality (Rawls) or to compute what equality entails (Dworkin). J. Harsanyi has also derived a distributive ethic from a veil of ignorance argument, which, although not egalitarian, is believed by Harsanyi to be not excessively inegalitarian. Harsanyi's analysis does not determine a unique social choice function, but rather a family of such functions. Here, by appending more information to Harsanyi's environment, and an Axiom of Neutrality, I uniquely determine a social welfare function by extending Harsanyi's argument. I show that this function is strongly inegalitarian, in that it recommends resource transfers from disabled to able individuals. Some concluding remarks are offered against using the veil of ignorance in studying the distributive ethics.Harsanyi, Dworkin, Rawls

Validation of back-calculation equations for juvenile bluefish (Pomatomus saltatrix) with the use of tetracycline-marked otoliths

In recent years, a decrease in the abundance of bluefish (Pomatomus saltatrix) has been observed (Fahay et al., 1999; Munch and Conover, 2000) that has led to increased interest in a better understanding the life history of the species. Estimates of several young-of-the-year (YOY) life history characteristics, including the importance and use of estuaries as nursery habitat (Kendall and Walford, 1979) and size-dependant mortality (Hare and Cowen, 1997), are reliant upon the accuracy of growth determination. By using otoliths, it is possible to use back-calculation formulae (BCFs) to estimate the length at certain ages and stages of development for many species of fishes. Use of otoliths to estimate growth in this way can provide the same information as long-term laboratory experiments and tagging studies without the time and expense of rearing or recapturing fish. The difficulty in using otoliths in this way lies in validating that 1) there is constancy in the periodicity of the increment formation, and 2) there is no uncoupling of the relationship between somatic and otolith growth. To date there are no validation studies demonstrating the relationship between otolith growth and somatic growth for bluefish. Daily increment formation in otoliths has been documented for larval (Hare and Cowen, 1994) and juvenile bluefish (Nyman and Conover, 1988). Hare and Cowen (1995) found ageindependent variability in the ratio of otolith size to body length in early age bluefish, although these differences varied between ontogenetic stages. Furthermore, there have been no studies where an evaluation of back-calculation methods has been combined with a validation of otolithderived lengths for juvenile bluefish

What We Owe Our Children, They Their Children,...

Egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated equalizing some objective measure of individual well-being, such as primary goods, functioning, or resources, rather than subjective welfare. This discussion, however, has assumed, implicitly, a static environment. By analyzing a society that survives for many generations, we demonstrate that equality of opportunity for some objective condition is incompatible with human development over time. We argue that this incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for welfare. Thus, 'subjectivism' seems necessary if we are to hope for a society which can both equalize opportunities and support the development of human capacity over time.Justice, development, dynamic programming, optimal taxation

Racism and Redistribution in the United States: A Solution to the Problem of American Exceptionalism

The two main political parties in the United States put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race. We argue that redistributive politics in America can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues, and the effects of political competition upon the multi-dimensional party platforms. We identify two mechanisms through which racism among American voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain. Many authors have suggested that voter racism decreases the degree of redistribution due to an anti-solidarity effect: that (some) voters oppose government transfer payments to minorities whom they view as undeserving. We point to a second effect as well: that some voters who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti-redistributive party (the Republicans) because that party's position on the race issue is more consonant with their own, and this, too, decreases the degree of redistribution. We call this the policy bundle effect. The effect of voter racism on redistribution is the sum of these two effects. We propose a formal model of multi-dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects, and estimate the model for the period 1976-1992. We numerically compute that during this period voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11-18 percentage points; the total effect decomposes about equally into the two sub-effects. We also find that the Democratic vote share is 5-38 percentage points lower than it would have been, absent racism.racism, distribution,endogenous parties, party unanimity Nash equilibrium, anti-solidarity effect

Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory

Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in the nonnegative orthant in two-dimensional Euclidean space. He/she must choose an allocation in the set, constrained only by Nash's axioms, in the sense that a penalty is paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T which is inconsistent, according to one of the axioms, with a utility allocation chosen at some earlier date. Penalties are discounted with t, and the Judge chooses any allocation, at a given date, that minimizes the penalty he/she pays at that date. Under what conditions will the Judge's chosen allocations converge to the Nash allocation over time? We answer this question for three canonical axiomatic bargaining solutions: Nash's, Kalai-Smorodinsky's, and the 'egalitarian' solution, and generalize the analysis to a broad class of axiomatic models.Axiomatic bargaining theory, judicial precedent, dynamic foundations, Nash's bargaining solution

ENDOGENOUS PARTY FORMATION AND THE EFFECT OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION ON POLICY

We develop a model of spatial political competition with ideological parties and uncertainty. The political issue is the income tax rate and the amount of a public good. The ideology of each party is determine endogenously. We show that the tax rate does not coincide with the ideal policy of the median voter. Moreover, the tax rate is not increasing in the difference between the mean income and the median income.Party formation, redistribution, growth.