The Real Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation

This paper summarizes the effects of deregulation of restrictions on bank entry and expansion on the real economy. The evidence suggests that following state-level deregulation of restrictions on branching, state economic growth accelerated. This better growth performance was especially pronounced in the entrepreneurial sector. In addition to faster growth, macroeconomic stability improved with interstate deregulation that allowed that banking system to integrate across state lines. This deregulation reduced the sensitivity of state economies to shocks to their own banks’ capital.

The real effects of U.S. banking deregulation

Banks and banking ; Bank supervision ; Banking law

Commentary on "Risk and return of publicly held versus privately owned banks"

This paper was part of the conference "Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms," cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School, October 2-3, 2003.Bank stocks ; Bank supervision ; Bank capital ; Risk

Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

This paper argues that banks have a unique ability to hedge against systematic liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide a natural hedge for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, one dimension of bank “specialness” is that banks can insure firms against systematic declines in market liquidity at lower cost than other financial institutions. We provide supporting empirical evidence from the commercial paper (CP) market. When market liquidity dries up and CP rates rise, banks experience funding inflows, allowing them to meet increased loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from pre-existing commercial paper backup lines without running down their holding of liquid assets. Moreover, the supply of cheap funds is sufficiently large so that pricing on new lines of credit actually falls as market spreads widen.

Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Acceptance Rates

This paper shows that securitization reduces the influence of bank financial condition on loan supply. Low-cost funding and increased balance-sheet liquidity raise bank willingness to approve mortgages that are hard to sell (jumbo mortgages), while having no effect on their willingness to approve mortgages easy to sell (non-jumbos). Thus, the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the impact of local funding shocks on credit supply. By extension, securitization has weakened the link from bank funding conditions to credit supply in aggregate, thereby mitigating the real effects of monetary policy.

How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans

We examine empirically how legal origin, creditor rights, property rights, legal formalism, and financial development affect the design of price and non-price terms of bank loans in almost 60 countries. Our results support the law and finance view that private contracts reflect differences in legal protection of creditors and the enforcement of contracts. Loans made to borrowers in countries where creditors can seize collateral in case of default are more likely to be secured, have longer maturity, and have lower interest rates. We also find evidence, however, that ?Coasian? bargaining can partially offset weak legal or institutional arrangements. For example, lenders mitigate risks associated with weak property rights and government corruption by securing loans with collateral and shortening maturity. Our results also suggest that the choice of loan ownership structure affects loan contract terms.

Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking

This paper shows that bank performance improves significantly after restrictions on bank expansion are lifted. We find that operating costs and loan losses decrease sharply after states permit statewide branching, and--to a lesser extent--after states allow interstate banking. The improvements following branching deregulation appear to occur because better banks grow at the expense of their less efficient rivals. By retarding the "natural" evolution of the industry, branching restrictions reduced the performance of the average banking asset. We also find that most of the reduction in banks' costs were passed along to bank borrowers in the form of lower loan rates.

Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets

This paper tests how competition in local U.S. banking markets affects the market structure of non-financial sectors. Theory offers competing hypotheses about how competition ought to influence firm entry and access to bank credit by mature firms. The empirical evidence, however, strongly supports the idea that in markets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets where banking is more competitive.

Small business lending and bank consolidation: is there cause for concern?

Small banks are a major source of credit for small businesses. As banking consolidation continues, will a resulting decline in the presence of small banks adversely affect the availability of that credit?Bank loans ; Bank mergers ; Small business

The benefits of branching deregulation

When the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act went into effect in June 1997, it marked the final stage of a quarter-century-long effort to relax geographic restrictions on banks. This article examines an earlier stage of the deregulatory process-the actions taken by the states between 1978 and 1992 to remove the barriers to intrastate branching and interstate banking-to determine how the lifting of geographic restrictions affect the efficiency of the banking industry. The analysis reveals that banks' loan losses and operating costs fell sharply following the state initiatives, and that the cost declines were largely passed along to bank borrowers in the form of lower loan rates. The authors argue that these efficiency gains arose because better performing banks were able to expand their market share once geographic restraints were erased.Branch banks ; Interstate banking ; Banking law