The psychic life of fragments: splitting from Ferenczi to Klein

The present paper starts from the reflection that there is a curious “phenomenological gap” in psychoanalysis when it comes to processes of splitting and to describing the “life” of psychic fragments resulting from processes of splitting. In simpler terms, we are often in a position to lack a precise understanding of what is being split and how the splitting occurs. I argue that although Melanie Klein’s work is often engaged when talking of splitting (particularly through discussions on identification, projection and projective identification), there are some important phenomenological opacities in her construction. I show that by orchestrating a dialogue between Melanie Klein and Sándor Ferenczi, we arrive at a fuller and more substantive conception of psychic splitting and of the psychic life of fragments which are the result of splitting. This is even more meaningful because there are some unacknowledged genealogical connections between Ferenczian concepts and Kleinian concepts, which I here explore. While with Klein we remain in the domain of “good” and “bad” objects—polarised objects which are constantly split and projected—with Ferenczi we are able to also give an account of complicated forms of imitation producing psychic fragments and with a “dark” side of identification, which he calls “identification with the aggressor”. While attempting to take steps toward imagining a dialogue between Klein and Ferenczi, I note a certain silent “Ferenczian turn” in a late text by Melanie Klein, “On the Development of Mental Functioning”, written in 1958. In particular, I reflect on her reference to some “terrifying figures” of the psyche, which cannot be accounted for simply as the persecutory parts of the super-ego but are instead more adequately read as more enigmatic and more primitive psychic fragments, resulting from processes of splitting

Infant observation research: What have we learned so far?

This paper reviews published literature in the field of psychoanalytic infant observation research, and asks, how much has so far been achieved by this work? It identifies themes, theoretical ideas, techniques, and applications which have been explored and developed in this literature. How far has the distinctive method which characterises naturalistic infant observation proved capable of generating new hypotheses, or locating hitherto unrecognised phenomena in the field of mother-infant relationships, and family dynamics more generally? The writer identifies a number of areas where significant development has taken place. His view is that a greater measure of reflection and review of research publication in infant observation and indeed child psychotherapy, would strengthen these research programmes. It would also support writing being increasingly undertaken for doctoral and masters programmes

What punishment expresses

In this article, I consider the question of what punishment expresses and propose a way of approaching the question that overcomes problems in both psychosocial and philosophical expressivist traditions. The problem in both traditions is, I suggest, the need for an adequate moral – neither moralizing nor reductive – psychology, and I argue that Melanie Klein’s work offers such a moral psychology. I offer a reconstruction of Klein’s central claims and begin to sketch some of its potential implications for an expressive account of punishment. I outline a Kleinian interpretation of modern punishment’s expression as of an essentially persecutory nature but also include depressive realizations that have generally proved too difficult for liberal modernity to work through successfully, and the recent ‘persecutory turn’ is a defence against such realizations. I conclude by considering the wider philosophical significance of a Kleinian account for the expressivist theory of punishment