Does Non-Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Situational Awareness and Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness

In this paper, we set out to test empirically an idea that many philosophers find intuitive, namely that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. Many philosophers find it intuitive that moral agents are responsible only if they know the particular facts surrounding their action. Our results show that whether moral agents are aware of the facts surrounding their action does have an effect on people’s attributions of blame, regardless of the consequences or side effects of the agent’s actions. In general, it was more likely that a situationally aware agent will be blamed for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. We also tested attributions of forgiveness in addition to attributions of blame. In general, it was less likely that a situationally aware agent will be forgiven for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. When the agent is situationally unaware, it is more likely that the agent will be forgiven than blamed. We argue that these results provide some empirical support for the hypothesis that there is something intuitive about the idea that non-moral ignorance can exculpate

Early death and later suffering

In this chapter I sketch an account of the misfortune of death for which I have previously argued (the Time-Relative Interest Account) and defend it against objections advanced by John Broome in his contribution to this book. I then consider other objections and suggest the beginnings of responses to them. The general conclusion I draw is that issues about our continuing to exist cannot be separated from issues about our beginning to exist and that we therefore cannot fully understand certain issues raised by death without understanding certain deeply intractable issues in population ethics. I suggest, in particular, that a promising way forward is to accept a view about harming and benefiting that has its source in population ethics (either the familiar Asymmetry about procreation or, more plausibly in my view, a Weak Asymmetry) and to restrict the scope of the Time-Relative Interest Account so that it applies only to the conferral of what I call noncomparative benefits and not to the infliction of suffering or other intrinsic harms

Правда коммунизма. 1972. № 067

This chapter examines how social- scientific research on public preferences bears on the ethical question of how those resources should in fact be allocated, and explain how social-scientific researchers might find an understanding of work in ethics useful as they design mechanisms for data collection and analysis. I proceed by first distinguishing the methodologies of social science and ethics. I then provide an overview of different approaches to the ethics of allocating scarce medical interventions, including an approach—the complete lives system—which I have previously defended, and a brief recap of social-scientific research on the allocation of scarce medical resources. Following these overviews, I examine different ways in which public preferences could matter to the ethics of allocation. Last, I suggest some ways in which social scientists could learn from ethics as they conduct research into public preferences regarding the allocation of scarce medical resources