Harmful monitoring

Abstract We show that there may be circumstances in which a principal prefers not to observe the project choice of an agent that acts on her behalf. The ability of the agent is private information. Projects differ with respect to the amount of risk. If the principal can observe the project choice of the agent, the latter will use that choice as a signal. In the separating equilibrium, an agent with high ability then chooses a project that is too risky. If more difficult projects require more effort, there are two opposite effects. The shirking effect implies that the agent chooses a project that is too safe. The signaling effect implies that he chooses a project that is too risky. The net effect is ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for promotion policies.

The Commitment Effect of Choosing the Same Bank

In a model where firms use external funds to finance R&D investments, we show that they may prefer to borrow from the same bank, rather than going to competing banks. A monopolist bank will capture more of firms' operating profits. But, these profits will also be higher, since having the same bank serves as a commitment device not to spend too much on R&D. In our model, the latter effect dominates.

Who pays the taxes?

The European Union is legally entitled to the revenue from (1) agricultural and sugar levies, (2) customs duties, (3) a 1 percent rate on each Member States' value added tax base, and (4) a resource on the basis of GNP. Currently, the Union is actively involved in the search for a fifth own revenue source. Therefore, the European Commission (DG XIX) has invited the authors to trace 'who pays the taxes'. As requested, our report gives a general account of methods to investigate impacts of taxation. More specifically, we have estimated the incidence of national tax systems (Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom), and the incidence of present own resources and prospective new (tax) resources of the European Union. Up till now, such information was not (readily) available.tax incidence in the European Union, prospective new EU tax resources

Who pays the taxes?

The European Union is legally entitled to the revenue from (1) agricultural and sugar levies, (2) customs duties, (3) a 1 percent rate on each Member States' value added tax base, and (4) a resource on the basis of GNP. Currently, the Union is actively involved in the search for a fifth own revenue source. Therefore, the European Commission (DG XIX) has invited the authors to trace 'who pays the taxes'. As requested, our report gives a general account of methods to investigate impacts of taxation. More specifically, we have estimated the incidence of national tax systems (Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom), and the incidence of present own resources and prospective new (tax) resources of the European Union. Up till now, such information was not (readily) available.tax incidence in the European Union, prospective new EU tax resources

The distribution of effective tax burdens in four EU countries

National policymakers are increasingly aware that their tax policy options are constrained by international tax competition. Important features of national tax systems - notably the tax mix, tax rates and rules which define the tax base - will influence decisions of firms and individuals regarding the location and (re)structuring of economic activities. The aim of the present paper is twofold: Firstly, we detail the tax mix of four member states of the European Union (Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom). Secondly, the paper aims to trace the distribution of the tax burden over rich and poor households in these four countries. Although tax mix and tax rates differ considerably among the four countries included in the study, the distribution of tax burdens proves to be amazingly similar.Distribution of tax burden, European Union; tax mix of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom

Morphological Classification of Local Luminous Infrared Galaxies

We present an analysis of the morphological classification of 89 luminous infrared galaxies (LIRGs) from the Great Observatories All-sky LIRG Survey (GOALS) sample using non-parametric coefficients and compare their morphology as a function of wavelength. We rely on images obtained in the optical (B- and I-band) as well as in the infrared (H-band and 5.8$\mu$m). Our classification is based on the calculation of $Gini$ and the second order of light ($M_{20}$) non-parametric coefficients which we explore as a function of stellar mass ($M_\star$), infrared luminosity ($L_{IR}$) and star formation rate (SFR). We investigate the relation between $M_{20}$, the specific SFR (sSFR) and the dust temperature ($T_{dust}$) in our galaxy sample. We find that $M_{20}$ is a better morphological tracer than $Gini$, as it allows to distinguish systems formed by double systems from isolated and post-merger LIRGs. The multi-wavelength analysis allows us to identify a region in the $Gini$-$M_{20}$ parameter space where ongoing mergers reside, regardless of the band used to calculate the coefficients. In particular when measured in the H-band, this region can be used to identify ongoing mergers, with a minimal contamination from LIRGs in other stages. We also find that while the sSFR is positively correlated with $M_{20}$ when measured in the mid-infrared, i.e. star-bursting galaxies show more compact emission, it is anti-correlated with the B-band based $M_{20}$. We interpret this as the spatial decoupling between obscured and un-obscured star formation, whereby the ultraviolet/optical size of a LIRGs experience an intense dust enshrouded central starburst is larger than in the one in the mid-infrared since the contrast between the nuclear to the extended disk emission is smaller in the mid-infrared. This has important implications for high redshift surveys of dusty sources. [abridged]Comment: ( 18 pages, 12 figures, Accepted for publication in A&A

The distribution of effective tax burdens in four EU countries

National policymakers are increasingly aware that their tax policy options are constrained by international tax competition. Important features of national tax systems - notably the tax mix, tax rates and rules which define the tax base - will influence decisions of firms and individuals regarding the location and (re)structuring of economic activities. The aim of the present paper is twofold: Firstly, we detail the tax mix of four member states of the European Union (Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom). Secondly, the paper aims to trace the distribution of the tax burden over rich and poor households in these four countries. Although tax mix and tax rates differ considerably among the four countries included in the study, the distribution of tax burdens proves to be amazingly similar.Distribution of tax burden, European Union; tax mix of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom