Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments

We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect—the stronger the expected future competitor, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage and (2) an effort spillover effect—previous effort reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. We test our theory predictions using data from high-stakes tournaments. Empirical results suggest that shadow and spillover effects influence match outcomes and have been already been priced into betting markets.

Executive Compensation and Misconduct: Environmental Harm

We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and misconduct using the setting of environmental harm. We find that high powered executive compensation can increase the odds of environmental law-breaking by 40-60% and the magnitude of environmental harm by over 100%. We document similar results for the setting of executive compensation and illegal financial accounting. Finally, we outline some managerial and policy implications to blunt these adverse incentive effects

The Value of Corporate Citizenship: Protection

We explore the notion that corporate citizenship, as obtained through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), is used by managers to protect firm value, helping their firm better withstand negative business shocks. We formally explore two parallel mechanisms for such protection .one of building moral capital (CSR Contributions) and another of improving investor posteriors (CSR Investments). We find some theoretical and empirical support for both of these, but in different settings. In particular, we find that firms with higher CSR Investments enjoy an average of $1 billion of saved firm value upon an adverse event. In contrast, CSR Contribution firms lose value (on average) upon an event, possibly due to disingenuous contributions. Meanwhile, due to managerial moral hazard, firms with high levels of CSR Contributions face adverse events more often, whereas those with high levels of CSR Investments face them less often

A Learning Curve of the Market: Chasing Alpha of Socially Responsible Firms

This paper explores stock market reactions to corporate social performance. We find that a value-weighted portfolio based on the list of “100 Best CSR companies in the world”, published by Reputation Institute, yields statistically significant annual abnormal returns of 1.63% and 1.26%, by controlling for Carhart four factors and Fama-French five factors, respectively (2.39% and 1.84% respectively for an equal-weighted portfolio). Moreover, such abnormal returns decrease as time goes, especially after the inaugural publication of the CSR lists in 2013. The paper also indicates that companies with better social performance are more likely to have positive earnings surprises, and that their returns are more sensitive to earnings surprises. The results of this paper have three implications: firstly, CSR reputation contributes positively to a firm’s short-term superior equity performance; secondly, the CSR lists facilitate market correction of mispricing intangibles such as CSR reputation - abnormal returns decrease as the market gradually learns about the value of firms’ social performance; lastly, the paper contributes to the socially responsible investing (SRI) screens and provides guidance for investors who would like to do well financially by doing good socially

Performance and Relative Incentive Pay: The Role of Social Preferences

__Abstract__ Under relative performance pay, other-regarding workers internalize the negative externality they impose on other workers. In one form -increased own effort reduces others' payoffs- this results in other-regarding individuals depressing efforts. In another form punishment reduces the payoff of other workers- groups with other-regarding individuals feature higher efforts because it is more difficult for these individuals to sustain low-effort (collusive) outcomes. We explore these effects experimentally and find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the social preferences composition of a team of workers has nuanced consequences on efforts

Toxic Workers

While there has been a lot of research on finding and developing top performers in the workplace, less attention has been paid to the question of how to manage those workers who are harmful to organizational performance. In extreme cases, in addition to hurting performance, such workers can generate enormous regulatory and legal liabilities for the firm. We explore a large novel dataset of over 50,000 workers across 11 different firms to document a variety of aspects of workers’ characteristics and circumstances that lead them to engage in "toxic" behavior. We also find that avoiding a toxic worker (or converting him to an average worker) enhances performance to a much greater extent than replacing an average worker with a superstar worker

CSR as Reputation Insurance: Primum Non Nocere

We provide a theoretical framework showing how CSR activities can insure a firm against lost reputation in the face of adverse events. We offer evidence for this linkage through a case study and a multi-year analysis of stock price responses for S&P 500 companies following product recalls. We find that firms with better CSR ratings fare better than those that do not. Furthermore, a firm that is exceptional in both doing good and avoiding harm suffers virtually no reputational damage following events. Using the results of the study, we offer a guide to managers for determining the appropriate amount and mix of CSR to undertake

Misconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizations

We examine misconduct in financial services. We propose a theory in which experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm’s brand and their own skills. Using sales complaint data for insurance agents, we find that agents working exclusively for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of justified sales complaints, relative to smaller independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year

Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance