16 research outputs found

    Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

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    The sample complexity of auctions with side information

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    Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a continuum. For example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their annual income, their propensity to buy an item based on past behavior, or in the case of ad auctions, the click through rate of their ads. We introduce an alternate model that captures this aspect, where bidders are a priori identical, but can be distinguished based (only) on some side information the auctioneer obtains at the time of the auction. We extend the sample complexity approach of Dhangwatnotai et al. and Cole and Roughgarden to this model and obtain almost matching upper and lower bounds. As an aside, we obtain a revenue monotonicity lemma which may be of independent interest. We also show how to use Empirical Risk Minimization techniques to improve the sample complexity bound of Cole and Roughgarden for the nonidentical but independent value distribution case.link_to_OA_fulltex

    On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

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    Tight Approximation Bounds for Maximum Multi-Coverage

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    29 pagesInternational audienceIn the classic maximum coverage problem, we are given subsets T1,,TmT_1, \dots, T_m of a universe [n][n] along with an integer kk and the objective is to find a subset S[m]S \subseteq [m] of size kk that maximizes C(S):=iSTiC(S) := |\cup_{i \in S} T_i|. It is well-known that the greedy algorithm for this problem achieves an approximation ratio of (1e1)(1-e^{-1}) and there is a matching inapproximability result. We note that in the maximum coverage problem if an element e[n]e \in [n] is covered by several sets, it is still counted only once. By contrast, if we change the problem and count each element ee as many times as it is covered, then we obtain a linear objective function, C()(S)=iSTiC^{(\infty)}(S) = \sum_{i \in S} |T_i|, which can be easily maximized under a cardinality constraint. We study the maximum \ell-multi-coverage problem which naturally interpolates between these two extremes. In this problem, an element can be counted up to \ell times but no more; hence, we consider maximizing the function C()(S)=e[n]min{,{iS:eTi}}C^{(\ell)}(S) = \sum_{e \in [n]} \min\{\ell, |\{i \in S : e \in T_i\}| \}, subject to the constraint Sk|S| \leq k. Note that the case of =1\ell = 1 corresponds to the standard maximum coverage setting and =\ell = \infty gives us a linear objective. We develop an efficient approximation algorithm that achieves an approximation ratio of 1e!1 - \frac{\ell^{\ell}e^{-\ell}}{\ell!} for the \ell-multi-coverage problem. In particular, when =2\ell = 2, this factor is 12e20.731-2e^{-2} \approx 0.73 and as \ell grows the approximation ratio behaves as 112π1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi \ell}}. We also prove that this approximation ratio is tight, i.e., establish a matching hardness-of-approximation result, under the Unique Games Conjecture
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