Oil and the Decision to Invade Iraq

What role did oil play in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003? We still do not know exactly why the Bush administration went to war against Iraq, and we may never know. Certainly, no compelling evidence, either in the form of declassified documents or participants’ memoirs, has yet emerged indicating that oil was a prominent factor or constant consideration in the thinking of decisionmakers within the Bush administration. But oil is nevertheless critical to understanding the decision to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. Oil did not make a U.S. war against Iraq inevitable. But it did much to set the stage for war, greatly increasing the incentives to topple Saddam, by any means possible. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the invasion of Iraq ever having occurred but for oil. Only by understanding the ways in which oil has infused the U.S. strategic calculus in the Persian Gulf can we fully make sense of the war

The Limits of ‘Rational Design\u27

“The Rational Design of International Institutions” (special issue of IO, Autumn 2001) makes a significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions. It is important, however, to recognize the limits of both the Rational Design project in its current form and the conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the project\u27s usefulness and validity. This article evaluates the project on its own terms, as a rationalist attempt to explain variation in international institutions. I identify three significant sets of limitations: those of the scope of the project, those of the analytical framework, and those of the efforts that are made to evaluate the framework through empirical analysis. Although the first set of limitations is largely a matter of choice, the last two raise questions about how much of an advance the special issue in fact represents. Nevertheless, these shortcomings are not absolute—they can be remedied through further theoretical and empirical research

What Are International Institutions

International institutions are a central focus of international relations scholarship as well as of policymaking efforts around the world. Despite their importance, our scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted definition of just what they are. Instead, scholars have employed a range of largely nonoverlapping conceptions, contributing to a fragmentation of the literature and hindering theoretical cumulation. This essay seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. It first reviews the principal ways in which international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcomings. It then develops a definition that promises to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms without losing analytical coherence. A final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that result from employing the new definition, both in improving existing scholarship and by suggesting valuable new avenues of research

The Return of Energy Insecurity in the Developed Democracies

During the past decade, concerns about energy security have reached levels not witnessed in the developed democracies since the 1970s and early 1980s. In good part because of such concerns, each of the largest of these countries – Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States – has conducted a major review of energy policy, initiated significant policy changes, or both. Also like the 1970s, recent years have seen a variety of proposals for international cooperation to promote energy security. This is where the similarities with the past largely end, however. In contrast to the earlier period, when the principal sources of concern in these countries were high oil prices and uncertain oil supplies, recent worries about energy security have been much more diverse. This paper describes these differences and explores their implications. It argues that the disparities in today\u27s energy security concerns and policy preferences in the major developed democracies are due in part to the divergent policies pursued in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s. It also argues that the present differences will make meaningful cooperation by these countries to promote energy security, which was never easy in the past, yet more difficult

South Korea’s National Energy Plan Six Years On

In 2008, South Korea adopted ambitious targets for reducing its dependence on energy imports and its carbon emissions simultaneously. The first National Energy Plan called for cutting energy intensity by nearly half and reducing the country’s dependence on imported fossil fuels by more than one quarter by 2030. Fossil fuels would be replaced by nuclear power and renewable sources of energy, which together would meet nearly 40 percent of South Korea’s energy needs. The achievement of these targets has been impeded by a number of obstacles, however. In response, the government has adjusted its goals, most recently with the adoption of a second national energy plan in January 2014. But especially in the critical area of nuclear power, the targets remain highly ambitious, and there are still reasons to question their feasibility. As a result, South Korea may have to moderate further its energy ambitions or redouble its efforts to achieve them

“Oil and the Iraq War: How the United States Could Have Expected to Benefit, and Might Still

This article elaborates on the potential oil-related benefits to the United States of regime change in Iraq, especially as they might have appeared prior to the final decision to go to war in late 2002 and early 2003. It first describes the importance of Persian Gulf oil to world oil markets. It then discusses the nature of the threat posed by Iraq under Saddam Hussein to the other oil-producing states in the region. In a third section, it identifies the constraints that had hobbled Iraqi oil production and the potential benefits of removing those constraints. The conclusion considers the implications for U.S. policy in Iraq

Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism

During the past decade, a growing number of scholars have turned to cultural approaches to account for the foreign and security policies of states. Surprisingly, however, these scholars have devoted little attention to the concept that boasts the most venerable tradition in the field of political science, that of political culture, as a possible source of state behavior. This neglect is unjustified. Like other cultural variables, political culture promises to explain phenomena that are enigmatic from the perspective of leading noncultural theories, such as neorealism. Yet it applies to a broader range of cases than do the many alternative cultural concepts, such as strategic culture and organizational culture, that have been employed. I begin by describing an important puzzle in the international relations literature that suggests the need to consider culture as a variable: the failure of neorealism to predict German security policy after unification. I then assess the various cultural approaches used in recent years to explain state behavior. After noting the similarities in these approaches, I discuss the important differences that mark them and identify the reasons for the greater utility of political culture. Finally, I illustrate the explanatory power of the political culture approach by applying it to the case of German security policy since 1990

Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum

Review of book: Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum