4 research outputs found

    Information, media and elections: incentives for media capture

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    Media play an essential role in democracy by making available valuable information for electoral decisions. In a framework of political economy of mass media, I inquiry the possibility of capture by rent-seeking o cers in a heterogeneous electoral environment. This allow me to discuss when relevant information is traded, when government captures media and what e ect this has on political outcomes. I nd media capture to be a pervasive phenomenon which implies minimum costs on politicians' side. However, incentives to corruption decrease if the possibility of being detected is introduced, leading to a more intermediate result with respect to the one obtained by Besley and Prat (2006). I show that information is a fundamental element for electoral choices and that any attempt to increase quality of news and to reduce information's costs can have positive effects on the selection of politicians

    Quality competition and entry: a media market case

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    The present paper provides an analysis of quality competition and entry in the context of two-sided media platforms. We provide a full characterization of a duopoly equilibrium in terms of advertising levels, subscription fees, and endogenous quality provision. Furthermore, we investigate the role of competition by considering potential entry. We show how the threat of entry shakes the equilibrium configuration by inducing lower quality differentiation. Finally, we describe the conditions under which a deterrence strategy in the form of a “limit quality” is feasible and profitable for the incumbent platform

    Broadcasters competition on quality: a welfare perspective

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    The present paper provides a vertical di¤erentiated model of a broadcasting market with a two-sided approach. We calculate the equilibrium in terms of advertising levels, subscription fees and qualities provision, both in monopoly and in duopoly where the market is uncovered. Furthermore, welfare considerations are made for all market structure by considering viewers' surplus

    Quality competition among platforms: a media market case

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    We provide a two-sided model in a vertical di¤erentiation context. We solve the model and we calculate the equilibrium in terms of advertising levels, subscription fees and qualities provision, both in duopoly - two platforms of di¤erent quality - and in monopoly case. We would like to investigate how competition among platforms and the entry deterrence behavior might affect the equilibrium, with particular focus on quality provision
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