Political lies need to be fact checked in a way that bridges different political truths, not silences them

In June, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the pro-life Susan B. Anthony List organization which had challenged the legality of an Ohio law that banned candidates from lying during political campaigns. Given the prevalence of lies in politics, does the practice need to be protected by law? Suzanne Dovi writes that given how effective lies can be, Americans may be tempted to turn to government to make their politicians more honest. She argues that this temptation should be resisted, as lies can be necessary, such as in matters of state security. Banning political lying, she says, would also prevent us from doing more to bridge the seemingly irreconcilable differences between those of different political opinions who often have deep disagreements over what is true

Women “doing” the judiciary: rethinking the justice argument for descriptive representation

In this paper, we explore how political scientists can improve the study of gender diversity in the judiciary by drawing on the normative and theoretical literature on representation generally, and on descriptive representation specifically. In particular, we examine an undertheorized argument within the literature on descriptive representation, namely, the justice argument. Using Nancy Fraser's discussion of two justice frameworks, specifically, the recognition and redistribution frameworks, we argue that political scientists should evaluate the justice effects of a diverse judiciary usingmultipleconceptions of justice. In this way, we use normative theory to generate new research directions in the study of judicial diversity.18 month embargo; published online: 21 July 2020This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]