Climate Forcing by the Volcanic Eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Revised edition

We determine the volcano climate sensitivity and response time for the Mount Pinatubo eruption. This is achieved using observational measurements of the temperature anomalies of the lower troposphere and the aerosol optical density (AOD) in combination with a radiative forcing proxy for AOD. Using standard linear response theory we find sensitivity = 0.18 +- 0.04 K/(W/m2), which implies a negative feedback of -1.0 +- 0.4. The intrinsic response time is 5.8+-1.0 months. Both results are contrary to the conventional paradigm that includes long response times and positive feedback. In addition, we analyze the outgoing longwave radiation during the Pinatubo eruption and find that its time dependence follows the forcing much more closely than the temperature, and even has an amplitude equal to that of the AOD proxy. This finding is independent of the response time and feedback results.Comment: 22 pages, including 4 figures. Revised version of a paper [Douglass D. H. and R. S. Knox (2005), Climate forcing by the volcano eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Geophys. Res. Lett. 32, L05710.doi: 10.1029/2004GL022119]. Revision is based on subsequent comments and replies to appear in the same journal. Quantitative results have only minor change

La evolución de las economías en el transcurso del tiempo

Nuevos enfoques en la historia económica de España y de América Latina. Homenaje a Robert W. Fogel y Douglas C. North, Premios Nobel de Economía 1993Editada en la Universidad Carlos IIIPublicad

Federal Securities Law—Fraud—Supreme Court Affirmation of the Birnbaum Rule—Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)

This note will examine the historical background and development of the Birnbaum rule and will consider the Supreme Court\u27s reasoning in its first examination of that rule. Taking the position that the Birnbaum rule is generally a useful one, this note nevertheless suggests that the rule should be applied more flexibly in the future in order to achieve its twin objectives of admitting valid claims and excluding nuisance suits. Particularly questioned will be the Court\u27s failure to delineate and consider separately the validity of the substantive portion of the Birnbaum rule; the Court\u27s wholehearted acceptance of the rule, which casts doubt upon most of its exceptions; and the fact that many deserving plaintiffs will be foreclosed from maintaining 10b-5 actions by the Court\u27s position in Blue Chip

Why Some Countries Are Rich and Some Are Poor

Professor North describes the difficulties encountered in promoting development: although economists are well aware of the conditions that promote productivity and creativity, only formal rules can be easily changed. Formal rules are but one part of a set of institutions in which people operate: informal norms of behavior and the enforcement mechanisms for both formal and informal rules have profound effects on human thought and activity. Economists have traditionally endeavored to impose simplistic sets of formal rules on developing countries; this model is largely ineffective because it ignores the role of culture and beliefs in shaping behavior. The difficult but effective alternative requires study of a society\u27s culture to understand ways in which the formal rules may be changed—consistent with the culture and belief system—to encourage productive and creative activity

A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History

Neither economics nor political science can explain the process of modern social development. The fact that developed societies always have developed economies and developed polities suggests that the connection between economics and politics must be a fundamental part of the development process. This paper develops an integrated theory of economics and politics. We show how, beginning 10,000 years ago, limited access social orders developed that were able to control violence, provide order, and allow greater production through specialization and exchange. Limited access orders provide order by using the political system to limit economic entry to create rents, and then using the rents to stabilize the political system and limit violence. We call this type of political economy arrangement a natural state. It appears to be the natural way that human societies are organized, even in most of the contemporary world. In contrast, a handful of developed societies have developed open access social orders. In these societies, open access and entry into economic and political organizations sustains economic and political competition. Social order is sustained by competition rather than rent-creation. The key to understanding modern social development is understanding the transition from limited to open access social orders, which only a handful of countries have managed since WWII.

Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational Deliberations

All of social science is based on the assumption that people act rationally, in a logical, unemotional fashion. This is true for all disciplines in social science, including both economics and law. Neoclassical price theory assumes that producers and consumers are rational actors, while the reasonable person in law is the rational cousin to the economic actor. New institutional economists were among the first scholars to examine economic issues by modifying rational choice theory. Today, a large and growing body of scholarship exhibits a willingness to modify the rationality assumption by using cognitive science, behavioral psychology, and experimental economics. This Essay shares that perspective. In the Essay, we reexamine the way judges make decisions by using contemporary theories from cognitive science and concepts from the new institutional economics

Limited access orders in the developing world :a new approach to the problems of development

The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low-income developing countries today, like all countries before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally different way. In limited access orders, the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order. This paper lays out such a framework and explores some of its implications for the problems of development today.Corporate Law,Labor Policies,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,E-Business,Disability