Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice

Heterogeneity or the presence of a variety of decision rules in a population has usually been ignored in voting research. A method for handling heterogeneous preferences using rank order data is developed and applied to a simple issue-voting model. The estimated average effect of partisanship is substantially higher when the assumption of homogeneity is relaxed, though many self-identified partisans also use ideological criteria to evaluate candidates and many independents rely on partisan criteria

Microeconomics and Macropolitics: A Solution to the Kramer Problem

Estimation of economic voting models is complicated by the possibility that voters treat certain economic conditions as "politically irrelevant" and do not attribute responsibility for such conditions to the incumbent party. Kramer (1983) suggested that this phenomena could account for the discrepancy between micro survey and aggregate time-series estimates of the economic voting model. Statistical methods are developed for testing the Kramer hypothesis and applied to presidential voting data from 1956 to 1984. With proper treatment, the estimated individual level income effect based on pooled cross-sectional surveys is as large as that found in aggregate time series data, Ordinary regression estimates are shown to be biased by a factor of approximately seven. It is also shown that ordinary regression estimates tend to overstate "sociotropic" or national level economic effects. Nonetheless, even using consistent estimation techniques, sociotropic effects are still found, though they are slightly smaller than the individual level effects

Congressional Roll Call Voting Strategies: Application of a New Test to Minimum Wage Legislation

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The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage

A widely noted empirical regularity of congressional behavior is that standing committees exert disproportionate influence on congressional choices. The observed phenomenon has a number of labels-committee influence, committee power, and (from the parent chamber's perspective) deference to committees-and a large body of theoretical and empirical research has sought to determine when and why it exists. This paper takes as given only the weakest form the observation, namely, that committee power exists sometimes. It does not directly address the questions of when and why committee power exists, although much of the relevant literature is reviewed. Rather, it focuses on a prerequisite to the resolution of disputes about committee power. How can committee power be assessed empirically? Section I reviews three classes of explanations and identifies obstacles to convincing empirical tests of the accounts. Section II introduces an econometric approach for analyzing committee power. Section III applies the technique to a sequence of votes on minimum wage legislation in the Senate in 1977. Section IV extends the technique to multi-dimensional choice spaces. Section V is a discussion and summary

Stochastic Simulation of Labor Demand Under Wage Subsidization

The impact of a system of wage subsidies, funded by unemployment insurance vouchers, is evaluated by combining a set of disaggregated industry labor demand models with an input/ output model. The program is shown to increase employment initially by lowering the cost of labor to firms. The disposable income of workers is increased which acts as a macroeconomic stimulus. The success of the subsidy program depends to some extent on the degree to which demand induced by greater consumer spending is able to sustain higher employment levels. Overall, it is estimated that a four-quarter wage subsidy equivalent to 30 percent of prevailing industry wages results in a long run decline in unemployment in excess of 1 percent

Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress

Correlations between legislative support scores and presidential popularity do not accurately reflect the relationship between public opinion and presidential influence in Congress. Presidents make strategic choices to expend their public prestige to obtain congressional approval of programmatic initiatives. Previous studies have ignored such choices as well as other features of the strategic environment which tend to lower the apparent legislative success rates of popular presidents. A model of presidential and congressional behavior is proposed and it is estimated that a one percent increase in a president's public support level increases the president's legislative approval rate by approximately one percent (holding program size fixed)

Experimental Estimates of the Impact of Wage Subsidies

The effects of a wage subsidy program on the duration of insured unemployment are investigated using experimental data. Participation in the experiment was voluntary and about one third of the subjects refused to take the subsidy voucher offered to them. Because subsidies appear to have stigmatic effects which tend to lower participation rates by high-skilled workers, experimental participants have longer average durations of unemployment than non-participants. However, correcting for self-selection, we find that wage subsidies can substantially increase a participant's probability of reemployment. Subsidies are also compared to a search bonus proposal which is also cost effective, but, due to differences in participation patterns, has rather different effects

Alternative Policies for Unemployment Insurance

The effects of a wage subsidy program on the duration of insured unemployment are investigated using data from a demonstration project conducted by the Illinois Department of Employment Security. UI claimants were offered a voucher that could be presented to potential employers as an inducement for their hire. Participation in the subsidy program was voluntary and eligibility was limited to a ten week period following the initial UI claim. In principle, the subsidy should increase the demand for the unemployed worker's services by reducing an employer's net wage costs. It may also have supply effects if the expiration of eligibility for the subsidy causes an increase in search effort, though it is also possible that the subsidy causes workers to adjust their reservation wage levels upward. In practice, subsidies have stigmatic effects that tend to lower participation rates by high-skilled workers. As a result, participants in a subsidy program have longer average durations of unemployment than non-participants. However, correcting for self-selection, we find that wage subsidies can substantially increase a worker's probability of reemployment and that the net benefits of such a program exceed its cost. In addition, wage subsidies are compared to a search bonus proposal which is also cost effective, but, due to differences in participation patterns, has rather different effects

The People and the Experts: Alternative Views on Economic Affairs

Are speculators driving up oil prices? Should we raise energy prices to slow global warming? The present study takes a small number of such questions and compares the views of economic experts with those of the public. This comparison uses a panel of 2000+ respondents from YouGov with the views of the panel of experts from the IGM at the Chicago Booth School. We found that most of the US population is at best modestly informed about major economic questions and policies. The low level of knowledge is generally associated with the intrusion of ideological, political, and religious views that challenge or deny the current economic consensus. The intruding factors are highly heterogeneous and are much more diverse than the narrowness of public political discourse would suggest. Many of these findings have been established for scientific subjects, but they appear to be equally important for economic views