"Gauging the Potential for Social Unrest"

It stands to reason that social unrest does not erupt out of the blue. Although there are a great many reasons why social dismay might descend into social disorder, only few yardsticks or indices can plausibly be used to gauge the potential for social unrest (PSU). If policy makers want to undertake public action to prevent social dismay escalating into social disruption, they obviously need to draw on practical sensors. This paper assesses critically the adequacy of two such measures, the polarization (P) index, and the total relative deprivation (TRD) index. The paper proposes a tentative guide to selecting between these two measures. A review of three stylized scenarios suggests that, where income redistributions reduce the number of distinct income groups, and when each group is characterized by a strong sense of within-group identity, the P index surpasses the TRD index as a basis for predicting PSU. When the within-group identification is weak, however, it is better to use the TRD index to predict PSU.Social dismay; Potential for social unrest; Polarization; Total relative deprivation; Policy choice

Job Selection in a Network of Autonomous UAVs for Delivery of Goods

This article analyzes two classes of job selection policies that control how a network of autonomous aerial vehicles delivers goods from depots to customers. Customer requests (jobs) occur according to a spatio-temporal stochastic process not known by the system. If job selection uses a policy in which the first job (FJ) is served first, the system may collapse to instability by removing just one vehicle. Policies that serve the nearest job (NJ) first show such threshold behavior only in some settings and can be implemented in a distributed manner. The timing of job selection has significant impact on delivery time and stability for NJ while it has no impact for FJ. Based on these findings we introduce a methodological approach for decision-making support to set up and operate such a system, taking into account the trade-off between monetary cost and service quality. In particular, we compute a lower bound for the infrastructure expenditure required to achieve a certain expected delivery time. The approach includes three time horizons: long-term decisions on the number of depots to deploy in the service area, mid-term decisions on the number of vehicles to use, and short-term decisions on the policy to operate the vehicles

An evolutionary edge of knowing less (or: on the 'Curse' of global information)

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner's dilemma 'rule of engagement'. A farmer's payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner's dilemma games played with his two neighbors. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous members of the group comprising his own father and a set of his father's neighbors. The size of this set, which can vary, is termed the 'span of information.' It is shown that a larger span of information can be detrimental to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection, and that in well-defined circumstances, a large span of information leads to an end of cooperation, whereas a small span does not. Conditions are outlined under which, when individuals' optimization is based on the assessment of less information, the social outcome is better than when optimization is based on an assessment of, and a corresponding response to, more information.Gegenstand der Analyse ist eine stilisierte Gemeinde von Landwirten, die sich entlang eines Seeufers niedergelassen haben, wodurch jedes Gemeindemitglied genau zwei Nachbarn hat, mit denen es auch Handelsbeziehungen unterhält (wohingegen zu weiter entfernten Gemeindemitgliedern keinerlei Handelsbeziehungen bestehen bzw. aufgenommen werden). Die Art dieser wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen folgt den Spielregeln eines Gefangenendilemmas; der einzelne Landwirt hat demnach die Wahl zwischen kooperativem und nicht-kooperativem Verhalten. Der aus dem Handel resultierende Gewinn ergibt sich als Summe der Auszahlungen der beiden Spiele vom Typ eines Gefangenendilemmas, im Rahmen derer ein Landwirt mit seinen beiden Nachbarn interagiert. Stirbt eine Generation von Landwirten, übernehmen die Söhne die Betriebe ihrer Väter. Dann entscheiden die Söhne auf Basis der Erfahrungen ihrer Väter und derer Handelspartner, wie sie sich ihren Nachbarn gegenüber verhalten werden. Dazu kopieren sie die Verhaltensweise desjenigen unmittelbaren Vorfahren bzw. seiner beiden Handelspartner, der den höchsten Gewinn erwirtschaftet hat. Die Menge der Referenzpersonen aus deren Erfolgen bzw. Misserfolgen ein Sohn lernt (auch Informationsbasis oder span of information genannt), die in ihrer Mächtigkeit variieren kann, bildet die Basis der Optimierungsentscheidung. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine große Informationsbasis die Möglichkeit der Koexistenz von kooperativem und nicht-kooperativem Verhalten negativ beeinflussen kann und dass, unter klar definierten Bedingungen, eine große Informationsbasis kooperatives Verhalten sogar gänzlich aus der Gemeinde von Landwirten zu entfernen vermag, während dies bei einer kleineren Informationsbasis nicht der Fall ist. Es werden Voraussetzungen dargelegt, unter denen das gesellschaftliche Ergebnis besser ist, wenn die Optimierungsentscheidung des Einzelnen auf der Verwendung einer kleineren Informationsbasis beruht (und der entsprechenden Reaktion darauf), als für den Fall individueller Entscheidungen, die auf einer größeren Informationsbasis beruhen

An evolutionary edge of knowing less (or: on the "curse" of global information)

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner’s dilemma games played with his two neighbors. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous members of the group comprising his own father and a set of his father’s neighbors. The size of this set, which can vary, is termed the “span of information.” It is shown that a larger span of information can be detrimental to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection, and that in well-defined circumstances, a large span of information leads to an end of cooperation, whereas a small span does not. Conditions are outlined under which, when individuals’ optimization is based on the assessment of less information, the social outcome is better than when optimization is based on an assessment of, and a corresponding response to, more information

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of 'swapping' individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology - of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks - which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors a scenario is postulated under which 'programmed' migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of “swapping” individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology - of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks - which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors a scenario is postulated under which “programmed” migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of swapping individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology - of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks - which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors a scenario is postulated under which programmed migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.Wir betrachten hier einen Bestand an altruistischen und egoistischen Individuen, der durch ein sogenanntes „Haystack-Modell“ beschrieben wird und sich, über die Zeit, gemäß der Auszahlungsmatrix eines Gefangenendilemmas entwickelt. Migration wird dabei als Prozess des „Austauschs von Individuen“ zwischen heterogenen Paaren beschrieben, die jeweils durch die Besiedelung der Haystacks mit zwei zufällig ausgewählten Individuen entstehen. Wichtig ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Migration zwar nach der Besiedelung, aber noch vor der Reproduktion erfolgt und durch zwei Parameter charakterisiert wird: (1) exogen vorgegebene Migrationskosten, die Such-, Koordinations-, Wanderungs- und Vorbereitungskosten beinhalten, und die, die mit der Migration verbundene Anstrengungen messen; (2) eine exogen vorgegebene Migrationstechnologie, die den Grad der Machbarkeit von Wanderungsbewegungen zwischen besiedelten bzw. neu zu besiedelnden „Haystacks“ quantifiziert. Geht man von einer anfänglich heterogenen Population von Altruisten und Egoisten aus, wird ein Szenario postuliert, in dem „programmierte“ Migration (im Gegensatz zu Migration als Folge einer bewussten individuellen Entscheidung) jenen Mechanismus darstellt, der das langfristige Überleben altruistischer Individuen gewährleistet

Trust-building in temporary public health partnerships: a qualitative study of the partnership formation process of a Covid-19 test, trace and protect service

Background: Public health initiatives require coordinated efforts from healthcare, social services and other service providers. Organisational theory tells us that trust is essential for reaching collaborative effectiveness. This paper explores the drivers for initiating and sustaining trust in a temporary public health partnership, in response to a sudden health threat. Methods: This qualitative study analysed the formation process of a multisector partnership for a Covid-19 contact tracing service. Data was collected through 12 interviews, two focus groups, one feedback workshop, and an online survey with workforce members from all seven partner organisations. Purposive maximum variation sampling was used to capture the reflections and experiences of workforce members from all seven partner organisations. A deductive code scheme was used to identify drivers for building and sustaining trust in inter-organisational collaboration. Results: Relational mechanisms emanating from the commitment to the common aim, shared norms and values, and partnership structures affected trust-building. Shared values and the commitment to the common aim appeared to channel partners’ behaviour when interacting, resulting in being perceived as a fair, reliable and supportive partner. Shared values were congruent with the design of the partnership in terms of governance structure and communication lines reflecting flat hierarchies and shared decision-making power. Tensions between partner organisations arose when shared values were infringed. Conclusions: When managing trust in a collaboration, partners should consider structural components like governance structure, organisational hierarchy, and communication channels to ensure equal power distribution. Job rotation, recruitment of candidates with the desired personality traits and attitudes, as well as training and development, encourage inter-organisational networking among employees, which is essential for building and strengthening relationships with partner organisations. Partners should also be aware of managing relational dynamics, channelling behaviours through shared values, objectives and priorities and fostering mutual support and equality among partner organisations

Why resilience in health care systems is more than coping with disasters: implications for health care policy

Health care systems need to be resilient to deal with disasters like the global spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) on top of serving the changing needs of a multi-morbid, ageing and often dispersed population. This paper identifies, discusses and augments critical dimensions of resilience retrieved from the academic literature. It pulls together an integrated concept of resilience characterised by organisational capabilities. Our concept does not focus on the micro-level like most resilience literature in health care but addresses the system level with many stakeholders involved. Distinguishing exogenous shocks to the health care system into adverse events and planned innovations provides the basis for our conclusions and insights. It becomes apparent only when dealing with planned interventions that transformative capabilities are indispensable to cope with sudden increases in health care pressures. Due to the current focus on absorptive and adaptive resilience, organisations over-rely on management capabilities that cannot generate a lasting increase in functionality. Therefore, reducing the resilience discussion to bouncing back from adverse events could deceive organisations into cultivating a suboptimal mix of organisational capabilities lacking transformative capabilities, which pave the way for a structural change that aims at a sustainably higher functionality

Modeling disease progression and treatment pathways for depression jointly using agent based modeling and system dynamics

Introduction: Depression is a common mental health condition that affects millions of people worldwide. Care pathways for depression are complex and the demand across different parts of the healthcare system is often uncertain and not entirely understood. Clinical progression with depression can be equally complex and relates to whether or not a patient is seeking care, the care pathway they are on, and the ability for timely access to healthcare services. Considering both pathways and progression for depression are however rarely studied together in the literature. Methods: This paper presents a hybrid simulation modeling framework that is uniquely able to capture both disease progression, using Agent Based Modeling, and related care pathways, using a System Dynamics. The two simulation paradigms within the framework are connected to run synchronously to investigate the impact of depression progression on healthcare services and, conversely, how any limitations in access to services may impact clinical progression. The use of the developed framework is illustrated by parametrising it with published clinical data and local service level data from Wales, UK. Results and discussion: The framework is able to quantify demand, service capacities and costs across all care pathways for a range of different scenarios. These include those for varying service coverage and provision, such as the cost-effectiveness of treating patients more quickly in community settings to reduce patient progression to more severe states of depression, and thus reducing the costs and utilization of more expensive specialist settings