Refinancing MFIs with market power: Theory and evidence

This paper presents a model of the complete microcredit financing chain investor -> MIV -> MFI -> micro-borrower, in which social-minded MIVs provide funds only to those MFIs which do not exploit their bargaining power towards micro-borrowers. The MFIs with the highest bargaining power do not use MIV capital, since eschewing their market power is most costly for them. Consistent with this prediction of the theoretical model, we find empirically that the net interest margin, as a measure of MFI market power, negatively affects the likelihood of using MIV finance. This lends support to the view that social criteria play an effective role in MIVs' investment policies, thereby also impacting MFIs' lending behavior

Refinancing MFIs with Market Power: Theory and Evidence

Microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) play an increasingly important role as a source of funding for microfinance institutions (MFIs). This paper presents theory and evidence on the relation between the use of MIV capital and MFI market power. We present a model in which MIVs are social-minded in that they do not lend to MFIs which exploit their market power in the market for microcredit. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find empirically that measures of MFI market power are negatively related to the likelihood of using MIV capital. This suggests that MIVs play an effective role in promoting social objectives in microfinance

Crowdfunding Models, Strategies, and Choices Between Them

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Local time and the pricing of time-dependent barrier options

A time-dependent double-barrier option is a derivative security that delivers the terminal value $\phi(S_T)$ at expiry $T$ if neither of the continuous time-dependent barriers b_\pm:[0,T]\to \RR_+ have been hit during the time interval $[0,T]$. Using a probabilistic approach we obtain a decomposition of the barrier option price into the corresponding European option price minus the barrier premium for a wide class of payoff functions $\phi$, barrier functions $b_\pm$ and linear diffusions $(S_t)_{t\in[0,T]}$. We show that the barrier premium can be expressed as a sum of integrals along the barriers $b_\pm$ of the option's deltas \Delta_\pm:[0,T]\to\RR at the barriers and that the pair of functions $(\Delta_+,\Delta_-)$ solves a system of Volterra integral equations of the first kind. We find a semi-analytic solution for this system in the case of constant double barriers and briefly discus a numerical algorithm for the time-dependent case.Comment: 32 pages, to appear in Finance and Stochastic

Lending Crowdfunding : Principles and Market Development

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Introduction : From Fundamentals to Advances in Crowdfunding Research and Practice

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Addressing information asymmetries in online peer-to-peer lending

Digital technologies are transforming how small businesses access finance and from whom. This chapter explores online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, a form of crowdfunding that connects borrowers and lenders. Information asymmetry is a key issue in online peer-to-peer lending marketplaces that can result in moral hazard or adverse selection, and ultimately impact the viability and success of individual platforms. Both online P2P lending platforms and lenders seek to minimise the impact of information asymmetries through a variety of mechanisms. This chapter discusses the structure of online P2P lending platforms and reviews how the disclosure of hard and soft information, and herding can reduce information asymmetries. The chapter concludes with a discussion of further avenues for research

Equity Crowdfunding in Germany and the UK: Follow-Up Funding and Firm Survival

Today, start-ups often obtain financing via the Internet through many small contributions of non-sophisticated investors. Yet little is known about whether these start-ups can ultimately build enduring businesses. In this paper, we hand-collected data from 38 different equity crowdfunding (ECF) portals and 656 firms that ran at least one successful ECF campaign in Germany or the United Kingdom. The evidence shows that German firms that receive ECF stand a higher chance of obtaining follow-up funding through business angels or venture capitalists and have a relatively lower likelihood to survive. We find firm age, the average age of the management team, and excessive funding during the ECF campaign all have a negative effect on firms’ likelihood to obtain post-campaign financing. By contrast, the number of senior managers, registered trademarks, subsequent successful ECF campaigns, crowd exits, and the amount of the funding target all have a positive impact. Subsequent successful ECF campaigns, crowd exits, and the number of venture capital investors are significant predictors reducing firm failure. Finally, we find that some of these factors have a differential impact for Germany and the United Kingdom