2,419 research outputs found
A formal theory for spatial representation and reasoning in biomedical ontologies
Objective: The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how a
formal spatial theory can be used as an important tool for
disambiguating the spatial information embodied in biomedical
ontologies and for enhancing their automatic reasoning capabilities.
Method and Materials: This paper presents a formal theory of parthood
and location relations among individuals, called Basic Inclusion
Theory (BIT). Since biomedical ontologies are comprised of assertions
about classes of individuals (rather than assertions about individuals),
we define parthood and location relations among classes in the
extended theory BIT+Cl (Basic Inclusion Theory for Classes). We
then demonstrate the usefulness of this formal theory for making
the logical structure of spatial information more precise in two
ontologies concerned with human anatomy: the Foundational Model of
Anatomy (FMA) and GALEN.
Results: We find that in both the FMA and GALEN, class-level spatial
relations with different logical properties are not always explicitly
distinguished. As a result, the spatial information included in
these biomedical ontologies is often ambiguous and the possibilities
for implementing consistent automatic reasoning within or across
ontologies are limited.
Conclusion: Precise formal characterizations of all spatial relations
assumed by a biomedical ontology are necessary to ensure that the
information embodied in the ontology can be fully and coherently
utilized in a computational environment. This paper can be seen as
an important beginning step toward achieving this goal, but much
more work is along these lines is required
The Roberts Court Revolution, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Promise (and Peril) of Constitutional Statesmanship
Our nation is in the middle of a constitutional revolution. While many periods of constitutional transformation have arisen out of large-scale political realignments, the Roberts Court Revolution is a product of our nationâs long (and unusual) political interregnum. Even as neither political party has managed to secure enough support to reconstruct our nationâs politics, the Roberts Courtâwith its young and ambitious conservative majorityâhas already moved quickly to reconsider key pillars of the existing constitutional regime. This represents a challenging moment for the Roberts Court and its institutional legitimacy. To counteract this danger, the Justices might return to an old ideaâone that has both seduced and vexed scholars and Justices alike for generations: constitutional statesmanship. When wrestling with the statesmanship ideal, theorists are often inclined to simply shrug their shoulders, concede that a precise definition is impossible, and suggest that we often know statesmanship when we see it. We can do better. In this Article, I define constitutional statesmanship for our age of constitutional revolution. Drawing on a diverse set of theorists and methodological approachesâmost notably, Ronald Dworkinâs famous concept of âfitââI argue that constitutional statesmanship is best understood as the balance between three modes of analysis: (1) legal fit (relying on conventional legal materials and arguments); (2) popular fit (drawing on concrete indicators of current public opinion); and (3) pragmatic fit (factoring in predictions about public responses, policy consequences, and assessments by legal elites)
Supreme Court Legitimacy: A Turn to Constitutional Practice
Commentators offer the Justices consistentâif unsolicitedâadvice: tend to the Supreme Courtâs institutional legitimacy. However, to say thisâwithout saying moreâis to say very little. Of course, constitutional theorists already wrestle with the meaning of legitimacyâits contours, its complexity, and its influence on the Justices. Political scientists debate the relationship between institutional concerns and judicial behavior. At the same time, previous scholars largely ignore issues of constitutional practice. This is a mistake. In this Article, I take up this neglected topic. To that end, I detail how the individual Justice might work to bolster the Courtâs legitimacy in concrete cases. Part of the answer turns on legal craftâidentifying the tools available to a Justice as she decides individual cases. However, part of it also requires adopting a regime perspectiveâ ensuring that a Justiceâs actions meet the challenges of her own constitutional moment. In my account, Chief Justice Roberts takes centerstage. Beginning with legal craft, I analyze the tools that Roberts employs to preserve the Courtâs legitimacy in concrete casesânamely, coalition building, calls for action by the elected branches, incrementalism, charity for the opposing side, triangulating between constitutional extremes, and promoting a vision of institutional humility. From there, I adopt a regime perspective, charting three future paths for the Roberts Courtâeach with its own set of challenges for the Justices as they seek to preserve the Courtâs institutional legitimacy
Linear measurement instruments used by beginning workers in selected manufacturing industries in Massachusetts
Thesis (Ed.D.)--Boston University
The Resurrection of State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d (8th Cir. 1984)
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