A formal theory for spatial representation and reasoning in biomedical ontologies

Objective: The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how a formal spatial theory can be used as an important tool for disambiguating the spatial information embodied in biomedical ontologies and for enhancing their automatic reasoning capabilities. Method and Materials: This paper presents a formal theory of parthood and location relations among individuals, called Basic Inclusion Theory (BIT). Since biomedical ontologies are comprised of assertions about classes of individuals (rather than assertions about individuals), we define parthood and location relations among classes in the extended theory BIT+Cl (Basic Inclusion Theory for Classes). We then demonstrate the usefulness of this formal theory for making the logical structure of spatial information more precise in two ontologies concerned with human anatomy: the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) and GALEN. Results: We find that in both the FMA and GALEN, class-level spatial relations with different logical properties are not always explicitly distinguished. As a result, the spatial information included in these biomedical ontologies is often ambiguous and the possibilities for implementing consistent automatic reasoning within or across ontologies are limited. Conclusion: Precise formal characterizations of all spatial relations assumed by a biomedical ontology are necessary to ensure that the information embodied in the ontology can be fully and coherently utilized in a computational environment. This paper can be seen as an important beginning step toward achieving this goal, but much more work is along these lines is required

The Roberts Court Revolution, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Promise (and Peril) of Constitutional Statesmanship

Our nation is in the middle of a constitutional revolution. While many periods of constitutional transformation have arisen out of large-scale political realignments, the Roberts Court Revolution is a product of our nation’s long (and unusual) political interregnum. Even as neither political party has managed to secure enough support to reconstruct our nation’s politics, the Roberts Court—with its young and ambitious conservative majority—has already moved quickly to reconsider key pillars of the existing constitutional regime. This represents a challenging moment for the Roberts Court and its institutional legitimacy. To counteract this danger, the Justices might return to an old idea—one that has both seduced and vexed scholars and Justices alike for generations: constitutional statesmanship. When wrestling with the statesmanship ideal, theorists are often inclined to simply shrug their shoulders, concede that a precise definition is impossible, and suggest that we often know statesmanship when we see it. We can do better. In this Article, I define constitutional statesmanship for our age of constitutional revolution. Drawing on a diverse set of theorists and methodological approaches—most notably, Ronald Dworkin’s famous concept of “fit”—I argue that constitutional statesmanship is best understood as the balance between three modes of analysis: (1) legal fit (relying on conventional legal materials and arguments); (2) popular fit (drawing on concrete indicators of current public opinion); and (3) pragmatic fit (factoring in predictions about public responses, policy consequences, and assessments by legal elites)

Supreme Court Legitimacy: A Turn to Constitutional Practice

Commentators offer the Justices consistent—if unsolicited—advice: tend to the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy. However, to say this—without saying more—is to say very little. Of course, constitutional theorists already wrestle with the meaning of legitimacy—its contours, its complexity, and its influence on the Justices. Political scientists debate the relationship between institutional concerns and judicial behavior. At the same time, previous scholars largely ignore issues of constitutional practice. This is a mistake. In this Article, I take up this neglected topic. To that end, I detail how the individual Justice might work to bolster the Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases. Part of the answer turns on legal craft—identifying the tools available to a Justice as she decides individual cases. However, part of it also requires adopting a regime perspective— ensuring that a Justice’s actions meet the challenges of her own constitutional moment. In my account, Chief Justice Roberts takes centerstage. Beginning with legal craft, I analyze the tools that Roberts employs to preserve the Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases—namely, coalition building, calls for action by the elected branches, incrementalism, charity for the opposing side, triangulating between constitutional extremes, and promoting a vision of institutional humility. From there, I adopt a regime perspective, charting three future paths for the Roberts Court—each with its own set of challenges for the Justices as they seek to preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy

Linear measurement instruments used by beginning workers in selected manufacturing industries in Massachusetts

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Boston University