Does Central Bank Intervention Increase the Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates?

Since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, exchange rates have displayed a surprisingly high degree of time-conditional volatility. This volatility can be explained statistically using autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models, but there remains the question of the economic source of this volatility. Central bank intervention policy may provide part of the explanation. Previous work has shown that central banks have relied heavily on intervention policy to influence the level of exchange rates, and that these operations have, at times, been effective. This paper investigates whether central bank interventions have also influenced the variance of exchange rates. The results from daily and weekly GARCH models of the $/DM and$/Yen rates over the period 1985 to 1991 indicate that publicly known Fed intervention generally decreased volatility over the full period. Further, results indicate that intervention need not be publicly known for it to influence the conditional variance of exchange rate changes. Secret intervention operations by both the Fed and the Bundesbank generally increased exchange rates volatility over the period.

The Market Microstructure of Central Bank Intervention

One of the great unknowns in international finance is the process by which new information influences exchange rate behavior. This paper focuses on one important source of information to the foreign exchange markets, the intervention operations of the G-3 central banks. Previous studies using daily and weekly foreign exchange rate data suggest that central bank intervention operations can influence both the level and variance of exchange rates, but little is known about how exactly traders learn of these operations and whether intra-daily market conditions influence the effectiveness of central bank interventions. This paper uses high-frequency data to examine the relationship between the efficacy of intervention operations and the 'state of the market' at the moment that the operation is made public to traders. The results indicate that some traders know that a central bank is intervening at least one hour prior to the public release of the information in newswire reports. Also, the evidence suggests that the timing of intervention operations matter interventions that occur during heavy trading volume and that are closely timed to scheduled macro announcements are the most likely to have large effects. Finally, post-intervention mean reversion in both exchange rate returns and volatility indicate that dealer inventories are affected by market reactions to intervention news.

When Do Central Bank Interventions Influence Intra-Daily and Longer-Term Exchange Rate Movements?

This paper examines dollar interventions by the G3 since 1989, and the reasons that trader reactions to these interventions might differ over time and across central banks. Market microstructure theory provides a framework for understanding the process by which sterilized central bank interventions are observed and interpreted by traders, and how this process in turn, might influence exchange rates. Using intra-daily and daily exchange-rate and intervention data, the paper analyzes the influence of interventions on exchange-rate volatility, finding evidence of both within day and daily impact effects, but little evidence that interventions influence longer term volatility.central bank intervention, exchange rate volatility, market-microstructure

Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Matter? Disentangling the Portfolio and Expectations Effects for the Mark

The time is ripe for a re-examination of the question whether foreign exchange intervention can affect the exchange rate. We attempt to isolate two distinct effects: the portfolio effect, whereby an increase in the supply of marks must reduce the dollar/mark rate (for given expected rates of return) and the additional expectations effect, whereby intervention that is publically known may alter investors expectations of the future exchange rate, which will feed back to the current equilibrium price. We estimate a system consisting of two equations, one describing investors' portfolio behavior and the other their formation of expectations, where the two endogenous variables are the current spot rate and investors' expectation of the future spot rate. We use relatively new data sources: actual daily data on intervention by the Bundesbank, newspaper stories on known intervention, and survey data on investors' expectations. We find evidence of both an expectations effect and a portfolio effect. The statistical significance of the portfolio effect suggests that even sterilized intervention may have had positive effects during the sample period. (It tends to be significant only during the later of our two sample periods, October 1984 to December 1987. That intervention appears less significant statistically during the earlier period, November 1982 to October 1984, could be attributed to the fact that little intervention was undertaken until 1985.) For the magnitude of the effects to be large requires that intervention be publically known. Our (still preliminary) estimates suggest that a typical $100 million of "secret" intervention has an effect of less than 0.1 per cent on the exchange rate, but that the effect of news reports of intervention can be as large as an additional 4 per cent.

Effects of the Changing U.S. Age Distribution on Macroeconomic Equations

The effects of the changing U.S. age distribution on various macroeconomic equations are examined in this paper. The equations include consumption, money demand, housing investment, and labor force participation equations. Seven age groups are analyzed: 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40- 54, 55-64, and 65+. There seems to be enough variance in the age distribution data to allow reasonably precise estimates of the effects of a number of age categories on the macro variables. The results show that, other things being equal, age groups 30-39 and 40-54 consume less than average, invest less in housing than average, and demand more money than average. Age group 55-64 consumes more and demands more money. If these estimates are right, they imply, other things being equal, that consumption and housing investment will be negatively affected in the future as more and more baby boomers enter the 30-54 age group. The demand for money will be positively affected. If, as Easterlin argues, the average wage that an age group faces is negatively affected by the percent of the population in that group, then the labor force participation rate of a group should depend on the relative size of the group. If the substitution effect dominates, people in a large group should work less than average, and if the income effect dominates, they should work more than average. The results indicate that the substitution effect dominates for women 25-54 and that the income effect dominates for men 25-54.

The Influence of Actual and Unrequited Interventions

Intervention operations are used by governments to manage their exchange rates but officials rarely confirm their presence in the market, leading inevitably to erroneous reports in the financial press. There are also reports of what we term, unrequited interventions, interventions that the market expects but do not materialize. In this paper we examine the effects of various types of intervention news on intra-day exchange rate behavior. We find that unrequited interventions have a statistically significant influence on returns, volatility and order flow, suggesting that the expectation of intervention, even when governments do not intervene, can affect currency values.

Market Responses To Coordinated Central Bank Intervention

The scale of unilateral and coordinated intervention in the foreign exchange market by the G-5 countries has become considerably larger over the last few years, following a period in which official U.S. policy was opposed to intervention. This paper examines market responses to official sterilized central bank intervention policy over the period 1985 through 1987. The efficacy of sterilized intervention is hypothesized to depend on the market's belief that central banks both have "inside" information about future monetary policy and the incentive to reveal that information truthfully through intervention signals. Central banks may agree to coordinate their intervention operations in order to influence the market's perception of the relative importance and credibility of own signals. Market responses to intervention over the period 1985 through 1987 are examined econometrically using heretofore unavailable daily data on G-3 unilateral and coordinated intervention operations. The empirical evidence indicates that: (1) even though daily intervention data are not published, market participants were generally able to comtemporaneously observe the source and magnitude of central bank intervention operations, (2) unilateral intervention significantly influenced market expectations in some periods, and (3) coordinated intervention had a significantly different and longer-term influence on market expectations than did unilateral intervention over the three year period examined.

Effects of the Changing U.S. Age Distribution on Macroeconomic Equations

The effects of the changing U.S. age distribution on various macroeconomic equations are examined in this paper. The equations include consumption, money demand, housing investment, and labor force participation equations. Seven groups are analyzed: 16-19, 20-24, 30-39, 40-54, 55-64, and 65+. There seems to be enough variance in the age distribution data to allow reasonably precise estimates of the effects of a number of age categories on the macro variables. The results show that, other things being equal, age groups 30-39 and 40-54 consume less than average, invest less in housing than average, and demand more money than average. Age group 55-64 consumes more and demands more money. If these estimates are right, they imply, other things being equal, that consumption and housing investment will be negatively affected in the future as more and more baby boomers enter the 30-54 age group. The demand for money will be positively affected. If, as Easterlin argues, the average wage that an age group faces is negatively affected by the percent of the population in that group, then the labor force participation rate of a group should depend on the relative size of the group. If the substitution effect dominates, people in a large group should work less than average, and if the income effect dominates, they should work more than average. The results indicate that the substitution effect dominates for women 25-54 and that the income effect dominates for men 25-54