Distinct distances on regular varieties over finite fields

In this paper we study some generalized versions of a recent result due to Covert, Koh, and Pi (2015). More precisely, we prove that if a subset $\mathcal{E}$ in a regular variety satisfies $|\mathcal{E}|\gg q^{\frac{d-1}{2}+\frac{1}{k-1}}$, then $\Delta_{k, F}(\mathcal{E})\supseteq \mathbb{F}_q\setminus \{0\}$ for some certain families of polynomials $F(\mathbf{x})\in \mathbb{F}_q[x_1, \ldots, x_d]$

International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.international fisheries;overexploitation;partial cooperation;games in partition function form;competitive equilibrium;modified Shapley value.

The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The concepts and axioms, related to the Shapley value, have been extended and a characterization for the Shapley value has been provided.Finally, an application of the Shapley value is given.game theory

Regional differences in willingness to pay for organic vegetables

The concern about vegetable safety, together with a booming population and the rise of the middle class has made Vietnam become a potential market for organic vegetables. This paper investigates the determinants of willingness to pay (WTP) for organic vegetables in Hanoi, Vietnam with a particular attention to regional differences and the effect of risk perception. Using Contingent Valuation Method to analyze the data from a sample of 498 consumers in Hanoi, the paper shows that the perceived use values of organic vegetables, trust in organic labels, and disposable family income increased WTP for organic vegetables in both urban and rural regions.Though risk perception of conventional vegetables was high in both regions, such heightened risk perception just translated into the WTP in the rural region. In addition, the percentage of home-grown vegetables in the total vegetable consumption of the family influenced the WTP in the rural region only. Moreover, being an organic purchaser was positively related to the WTP in the urban region but not in the rural region. The paper also discusses three policy implications for Vietnam to boost the demand for organic food.fals

Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations.international fisheries, overexploitation, partial cooperation, games in partition function form, competitive equilibrium, modified Shapley value, Agribusiness, Crop Production/Industries, Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Oligopoly Games With and Without Transferable Technologies

In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies.From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games.We show that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with transferable are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex.Oligopolies;cooperative games;convexity;total balancedness

Transboundary Fishery Management: A Game Theoretic Approach

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by means of the proportional rule.Furthermore, we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits within a coalition. Finally, we show that the equal division of the net gain value can be used to expand a coalition.game theory;fishing industry;Nash equilibrium