Forschungsprogramm Wiederverwertung von Kunststoffabfaellen Schlussbericht zum Teilprojekt 4: Sortierung von Kunststoffabfaellen. Kurzfassung

Orginalbericht vorhanden als AC 4754Technische Informationsbibliothek Hannover: AC 4144 (4). / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman

Authentic leadership and followers’ cheating behaviour: A laboratory experiment from a self-concept maintenance perspective

This chapter presents insights into the question whether followers’ perceptions of authentic leadership attenuate cheating. From the perspective of self-concept maintenance theory, followers will cheat so long as they can maintain a positive self-concept. We suggested that authentic leadership lowers the perceptual threshold under which followers can still consider themselves honest. A laboratory experiment combined video-based variations of authentic leadership with a cheating-of-mind experiment. We collected data from 343 students at a German university. Results indicate that participants cheated, but not to the fullest extent possible. Authentic leadership did not affect the extent to which participants cheated. These results held when moderating variables were tested (e.g., cheating norm, victimization). Hence, the findings do not support the notion that a short-term authentic leadership intervention attenuates cheating

Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply

Motivated by the observation that access to evasion opportunities is distributed heterogeneously across the labor market, this paper examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on such evasion opportunities. We first set up a theoretical model to formally show that labor supply responses depend on access to evasion. The model is then tested in a lab experiment in which all participants undertake a real-effort task over several rounds. Subjects face a tax rate, which varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income. The treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not. We find zero labor effort responses to tax rates in the control group and positive statistically significant adjustments in the treatment group; suggesting that both groups indeed react differently to taxes