License Expenditures of Incumbents and Potential Entrants: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Behavior

This paper presents the results of an empirical test concerning the auction model of Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The study uses data on German companies in order to analyze expenditures for technology licenses. Aside of standard control variables the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account. We differentiate between firms which intend to secure their present position in the market (incumbents) and those intending to enter a new market (challengers). In line with the prediction of the auction model, it turns out that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants. --Innovation,Licenses,Incumbent versus entrant,Limited Dependent Variables

Are Credit Ratings Valuable Information?

Credit ratings are commonly used by lenders to assess the default risk, because every credit is connected with a possible loss. If the probability of a default is above a certain threshold, a credit will not be provided. The purpose of this paper is to test whether credit ratings contribute valuable information on the creditworthiness of firms. Employing a large sample of Western German manufacturing firms, we investigate loan defaults. First, we estimate Probit models with publicly available information. Subsequently, we additionally use a credit rating and show that it contributes significantly to the regression fit. However, the publicly available information has an independent effect aside of the ratings. Simple calculations demonstrate that the interest rate has to increase significantly to compensate for a possible loss in case of default, if a firm has a weak rating. --Credit Rating,Insolvency,Loan Default,Discrete Regression Models

Measuring the impact of innovation on firm value: a new approach

Most of the existing empirical literature on the relationship of firm value and knowledge capital is based on the stock market valuation of companies. However, the assets of many firms are not publicly traded, and hence the calculation of market value is limited to a subsample of firms. We suggest to use a credit rating score instead and present an empirical analysis. It turns out that innovative firms, i.e. those with a reasonable knowledge stock, have a better credit rating and thus, as we propose, a higher value. However, too much of innovative activi-ties is seen as risky and the firm value decreases. --Firm Value,Credit Rating,Innovation,Intellectual Property Discrete Regression Models

R&D and Firm Performance in a Transition Economy

We estimate the effects of R&D on firms' credit ratings and on financial distress. The main purpose is the comparison of firms in Western Germany and Eastern Germany as a transitional economy. Innovative activity has a positive impact on firm value proxied by ratings in Western Germany, but a negative impact in Eastern Germany. We also consider future financial distress, and find that R&D in Eastern German firms leads to higher default risk, in contrast to Western Germany. There, R&D enhances future performance. This result is highly politically relevant, since the high level of subsidies present in Eastern Germany may be subject to misallocation. --Transitional Economy,Credit Rating,Bankruptcy,Innovation,Policy

An empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity: who invests more into R&D - the incumbent or the challenger?

The theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the (potential) entrant invests more into R&D has attracted considerable interest. This paper reports the results of an empirical study on this question using data of about 3500 German firms over the years 1992 to 1995. The survey explicitly asks the firms for their motives to undertake innovative activity. It is thus possible to take account of intended, not just completed, market entry. It turns out that the challenger invests more into R&D in order to enter a new market than the incumbent. Thus, the patent racing model by Reinganum and others seems to characterize innovative activity more accurately than the competing auction model of Gilbert and Newbery. We use a heteroscedastic tobit as well as a tobit model with selectivity in order to deal with the econometric problems of double censoring. --Innovative Activity,Patent Races,Uncertainty,Incumbent versus Entrant,Tobit with Selectivity

License expenditures of incumbents and potential entrants : an empirical analysis of firm behavior.

This paper presents the results of an empirical test concerning the auction model of Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The study uses data on German companies in order to analyze expenditures for technology licenses. Aside of standard control variables the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account. We differentiate between firms which intend to secure their present position in the market (incumbents) and those intending to enter a new market (challengers). In line with the prediction of the auction model, it turns out that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants.Behavior; Companies; Data; Firms; Incumbant versus entrant; Innovation;

Spillovers of Innovation Activities and Their Profitability

Knowledge spillovers to competitors are regarded as an important aspect of the innovation process. While a company possibly benefits from incoming information on successful R&D conducted by other companies, a generally high probability of leakage of knowledge in an industry will negatively affect profitability. This paper presents the results of an empirical study on the effects of outgoing and incoming spillovers on firms? profitability. It turns out that the expected asymmetry is actually at work. In contrast to spillovers from competitors, spillovers from suppliers, customers and research institutions exert no effect. --Innovation,Spillover,Profitability

Management Control and Innovative Activity

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 3,978 observations is used and it turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled have a very similar R&D intensity. --Innovative Activity,Managerial versus Owner-led Firms,Incentives,Tobit Regression