Ex-Post: The Investment Performance of Collectible Stamps

This paper investigates the returns on British collectible postage stamps over the very long run, based on stamp catalogue prices. Between 1900 and 2008, we find an annualized return on stamps of 6.7% in nominal terms, which is equivalent to an average real return of 2.7% per annum. Prices have increased much faster in the second half of the 1960s, the late 1970s, and the current decade. However, we also record prolonged periods of real depreciation, for example in the 1980s. As a financial investment, stamps have outperformed bonds, but underperformed stocks. After unsmoothing the returns on stamps, we find that the volatility of stamp prices approaches that of equities. There is mixed evidence that stamps are a good hedge against inflation. Once the problem of non-synchronous trading is taken into account, stamp returns seem impacted by movements in the equity market.Alternative investments;Indexes;Long-term returns;Market model;Stamps

The price of wine

We examine the impact of aging on wine prices and the performance of wine as a long-term investment, using a unique historical database for five long-established Bordeaux wines that we construct from auction and dealer prices. We estimate the life-cycle price patterns with a regression model that avoids multicollinearity between age, vintage year, and time by replacing the vintage effects with annual data on production yields and weather quality. In line with the predictions of an illustrative model, we observe the highest rates of appreciation for young high-quality wines that are still maturing. The findings suggest that the non-financial “psychic return” to holding wines that are substantially beyond maturity is at least 1%. Using an arithmetic repeat-sales regression, we estimate an annualized return to wine investments (net of insurance and storage costs) of 4.1%, in real GBP terms, between 1900 and 2012. Wine underperforms equities over this period, but outperforms government bonds, art, and stamps. Wine and equity returns are positively correlated

Expected cost of equity and the expected risk premium in the UK

Discussion paper. Final version published in Review of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 3 Iss: 1, pp.1 - 26In this paper, it is argued that previous estimates of the expected cost of equity and the expected arithmetic risk premium in the UK show a degree of upward bias. Given the importance of the risk premium in regulatory cost of capital in the UK, this has important policy implications. There are three reasons why previous estimates could be upward biased. The first two arise from the comparison of estimates of the realised returns on Government Bond (“Gilt”) to realised and expected returns on equities. These estimates are frequently used to infer a risk premium relative to either the current yield on index-linked gilts or an “adjusted” current yield measure. This is incorrect on two counts; first, inconsistent estimates of the risk free rate are implied on the right hand side of the CAPM (Jenkinson, 1993); second, they compare realised returns from a bond which carried inflation risk with realised and expected returns from equities which may be expected to have at least some protection from inflation risk. The third, and most important, source of bias arises from uplifts to expected returns. If markets exhibit “excess volatility” (Shiller 1981), or if part of the historical return arises because of revisions to expected future cash flows, then estimates of variance derived from historical returns or price growth must be used with great care when uplifting average expected returns to derive simple discount rates. Adjusting expected returns for the effect of such biases leads to lower expected cost of equity and risk premia than those that are typically quoted

To divest or to engage? A case study of investor responses to climate activism

An increasing number of investors face the dilemma of whether to divest from environmentally damaging businesses or enter into a dialogue with them. This debate has now taken root in Cambridge, England, where the ancient University of Cambridge confronts great pressure from students and staff members to respond to the threat of climate breakdown. Having already received two reports on its approach to responsible investment, the university appointed a new chief investment officer (CIO) who, alongside the Cambridge University Endowment Fund (CUEF) Trustee and the wider university community, needs to consider the question of whether to divest from, or to engage with, fossil fuel firms. What would be the financial effects of each choice, and what would be the outcome in terms of environmental impact? This case study describes the background and the research behind the debate. The new CIO and her colleague, the chief financial officer, reflect on both sides of this debate as they consider the position the university should adopt. In contrast with other journal articles, this one does not propose solutions. Instead, it asks the reader to consider the arguments and to take a position

Microstructure Effects on Daily Return Volatility in Financial Markets

We simulate a series of daily returns from intraday price movements initiated by microstructure elements. Significant evidence is found that daily returns and daily return volatility exhibit first order autocorrelation, but trading volume and daily return volatility are not correlated, while intraday volatility is. We also consider GARCH effects in daily return series and show that estimates using daily returns are biased from the influence of the level of prices. Using daily price changes instead, we find evidence of a significant GARCH component. These results suggest that microstructure elements have a considerable influence on the return generating process.Comment: 15 pages, as presented at the Complexity Workshop in Aix-en-Provenc

The growth companies puzzle: can growth opportunities measures predict firm growth?

While numerous empirical studies include proxies for growth opportunities in their analyses, there is limited evidence as to the validity of the various growth proxies used. Based on a sample of 1942 firm-years for listed UK companies over the 1990-2004 period, we assess the performance of eight growth opportunities measures. Our results show that while all the growth measures show some ability to predict growth in company sales, total assets, or equity, there are substantial differences between the various models. In particular, Tobin's Q performs poorly while dividend-based measures generally perform best. However, none of the measures has any success in predicting earnings per share growth, even when controlling for mean reversion and other time-series patterns in earnings. We term this the 'growth companies puzzle'. Growth companies do grow, but they do not grow in the key dimension (earnings) theory predicts. Whether the failure of 'growth companies' to deliver superior earnings growth is attributable to increased competition, poor investments, or behavioural biases, it is still a puzzle why growth companies on average fail to deliver superior earnings growth

Neurology

Contains reports on six research projects.U. S. Public Health Service (B-3055-4, B-3090-4, MH-06175-02)U. S. Air Force (AF49(638)-1313)U.S. Navy. Office of Naval Research (Nonr-1841(70)