1,010 research outputs found

    DHWM: A scheme for managing watermarking keys in the Aquarelle multimedia distributed system

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    Demonstrating Possession of a Discrete Logarithm Without Revealing it

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    Cryptanalysis of Ladder-DES

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    Experimentally realizable quantum comparison of coherent states and its applications

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    When comparing quantum states to each other, it is possible to obtain an unambiguous answer, indicating that the states are definitely different, already after a single measurement. In this paper we investigate comparison of coherent states, which is the simplest example of quantum state comparison for continuous variables. The method we present has a high success probability, and is experimentally feasible to realize as the only required components are beam splitters and photon detectors. An easily realizable method for quantum state comparison could be important for real applications. As examples of such applications we present a "lock and key" scheme and a simple scheme for quantum public key distribution.Comment: 14 pages, 5 figures, version one submitted to PRA. Version two is the final accepted versio

    Cryptographic Dysfunctionality-A Survey on User Perceptions of Digital Certificates

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    Key exchange with the help of a public ledger

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    Blockchains and other public ledger structures promise a new way to create globally consistent event logs and other records. We make use of this consistency property to detect and prevent man-in-the-middle attacks in a key exchange such as Diffie-Hellman or ECDH. Essentially, the MitM attack creates an inconsistency in the world views of the two honest parties, and they can detect it with the help of the ledger. Thus, there is no need for prior knowledge or trusted third parties apart from the distributed ledger. To prevent impersonation attacks, we require user interaction. It appears that, in some applications, the required user interaction is reduced in comparison to other user-assisted key-exchange protocols

    A Security Analysis of OpenID

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    International audienceOpenID, a standard for Web single sign-on, has been gaining popularity both with Identity Providers, Relying Parties, and users. This paper collects the security issues in OpenID found by others, occasionally extended by the authors, and presents them in a uniform way. It attempts to combine the shattered knowledge into a clear overview. The aim of this paper is to raise awareness about security issues surrounding OpenID and similar standards and help shape opinions on what (not) to expect from OpenID when deployed in a not-so-friendly context

    On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol

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    The Algebraic Eraser has been gaining prominence as SecureRF, the company commercializing the algorithm, increases its marketing reach. The scheme is claimed to be well-suited to IoT applications but a lack of detail in available documentation has hampered peer-review. Recently more details of the system have emerged after a tag authentication protocol built using the Algebraic Eraser was proposed for standardization in ISO/IEC SC31 and SecureRF provided an open public description of the protocol. In this paper we describe a range of attacks on this protocol that include very efficient and practical tag impersonation as well as partial, and total, tag secret key recovery. Most of these results have been practically verified, they contrast with the 80-bit security that is claimed for the protocol, and they emphasize the importance of independent public review for any cryptographic proposal.Comment: 21 pages. Minor changes. Final version accepted for ACNS 201

    Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions

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    Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals communicating over a public network, and each holding public /private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and refine them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and concurrent sessions). Within this model we define the execution of a protocol for authenticated dynamic group Diffie-Hellman and show that it is provably secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model
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