Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach with a Psychological Twist

Akerlof and Dickens (1982) suggested that in a model of criminal behavior which considered the effects of cognitive dissonance, increasing the severity of punishment could increase the crime rate. This paper demonstrates that that conjecture was correct. With cognitive dissonance, people may have to rationalize not committing crimes under normal circumstances if punishment is not severe. The rationalization may lead them to underestimate the expected utility of committing crimes when opportunities present themselves. If punishment is severe, then rationalization may not be necessary and people may be more likely to commit crimes when opportunities arise.

Do Labor Rents Justify Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy?

Several efficiency wage theories of wage determination have the property that identical workers are more productive in high wage industries and that the promotion of employment in high wage industries can increase GDP (and some measures of welfare). I argue that while policies to favor high wage industries may increase productivity, the effects in developed economies are likely to be very small. This is mainly because the workers who fill the high wage vacancies will come from fairly high wage jobs.

Labor Market Segmentation and the Union Wage Premium

Studies of the earnings of union workers have consistently shown that they earn considerably more than nonunion workers. This paper considers whether part of this observed union/nonunion differential is due to unions organizing high paying primary sector jobs. We extend our earlier work on the dual labor market in which we used an unknown regime switching regression to identify two labor market sectors --a high wage primary sector and a low wage secondary sector. Here we estimate a model where worker's wages are determined by one of three wage equations: a union wage equation, a nonunion primary equation or a nonunion secondary equation. If individuals are in the union sector their sector is treated as known. If they are not then their sector is treated as unknown. Parameter estimates for this model suggest that union/nonunion differences are very large for average workers even when comparing union and nonunion primary workers. We continue to find distinct primary and secondary sectors with wage equations similar to those that would be expected from the dual market perspective. Since it appears that union workers may be receiving large wage premiums it seems likely that there is non-price rationing of union jobs. If there is, our finding inprevious papers of non-price rationing of primary sector jobs may have been due only to the rationing of union jobs. We test for the existence of non-price rationing of nonunion primary sector employment in this three sector model and continue to find evidence that at least black workers find it difficult to secure primary sector employment.

Testing Dual Labor Market Theory: A Reconsideration of the Evidence

This paper replicates and extends our earlier analysis of dual market theory. We use a technique which estimates for each worker a probability of being in the primary sector on the basis of his characteristics. We use this information to determine the occupational and industrial composition of the sectors. We continue to produce results which are very supportive of the theory. In studies by other authors, workers were "assigned" to the primary or secondary sector on the basis of the industry or occupation in which they are employed and educated guesses about the industries or occupations which make up the two sectors. We find that previous studies, which produced mixed and inconclusive results, had serious misclassification problems. In the cases examined, at least half of all full time prime age male workers identified as being in the secondary sector by these classification schemes are found to have a high probability of primary sector attachment. Past studies which were most supportive of dual market theory are found to have had the least severe misclassification problems.

A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory

Despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate policy response to the existence of poverty, neither the proponents of dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive tests of the dual market hypothesis.This paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual market theory -- 1) the existence of two distinct labor markets with different wage setting mechanisms and 2) the existence of barriers to mobility between the labor markets. We find considerable support for both hypothesis. Estimation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two distinct wage equations. The one which most workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital regression with significant returns to education and experience. The other equation is flat with no returns to human capital. These two equations resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the "primary" and "secondary" markets respectively. Further, we present evidence that(at least) some non-white workers are involuntarily confined to the secondary market. This crowding of minority workers into the low wage labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white/non-white wage differences. We interpret these results as providing empirical support for the dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wagemodels. In addition, combining the efficiency wage argument with the observation that much of the white/non-white wage difference is explained by the exclusion of non-whites from the primary sector suggests an explanation for the persistance of wage differences.

A Goodness of Fit Test of Dual Labor Market Theory

We subject our dual labor market model to a goodness of test fit and compare the results with those obtained using a single equation model with a complex error structure. The dual labor market does an excellent job of predicting the wage distribution except for failing to explain bunching at $7.50 and$10.00 per hour. The null hypothesis that the model is correct cannot be rejected at the .05 level. In contrast, the wage distribution predicted by the single labor market model differs significantly from the observed distribution.

Neoclassical and Sociological Perspectives on Segmented Labor Markets

Neoclassical theory has been misrepresented in the segmented economy literature. Consequently, most tests of "structural" vs. "neoclassical" models are inadequate. Moreover, segmented economy theorists have concentrated on the least significant departures of segmented models from neoclassical economics. In fact, neoclassical economists have developed elements of a segmented labor market model which is similar to the segmented economy theories. We sketch this model and argue that the neoclassical model gives a precise meaning to the concept of dual or segmented labor markets but does not suggest that a classification system for job characteristics must rely on a single dimension.

Accounting For The Decline in Union Membership

Since the early 50s, the percent of the workforce organized by unions has declined considerably. In the most recent decade that rate of decline has accelerated sharply. In an attempt to discover what factors can account for the overall decline and the further deterioration during the 70s, we decompose the sources of growth and decline to determine the relative importance of changes in organizing activity, success in certification elections, decertifications, and net growth due to economic causes. We find that all factors except decertifications account for a substantial part of the change. In addition, interactions between the factors are very important. A significant finding is that while organizing activity and success rates have been declining over time, the net growth (or loss) of membership due to economic causes has remained stable controlling for the aggregate level of economic activity. We argue that this finding is inconsistent with the prevailing view that the decline in the percent of the workforce organized is primarily due to the decline of the heavily unionized core industries.

Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination

Numerous studies have shown large differences in wages for apparently similar workers across industries. These findings pose a challenge to standard model s of labor market behavior. A problem with past studies of industry wage differences is that they have failed to distinguish between union and nonunion workers. Many economists may expect union workers wages to be set in a noncompetitive fashion but would be surprised if nonunion wages were. We examine the differences in wages across industries for both union and nonunion workers. We find that even after controlling for a wide range of personal characteristics and geographic location large wage differences persist for both union and nonunion workers. Furthermore the premiums of union and nonunion workers are highly correlated. We review past studies which demonstrate that industry wage premiums are also highly correlated across countries and have been very similar over many decades. We present new evidence that the wages of different occupations are highly correlated across industries -- that is if any occupation in an industry is highly paid all occupations are. We also review the evidence which suggests that people who move from low to high paying industries receive a large fraction of the industry wage premium and that those who move from high to low paying industries lose the premium. Finally, we review the evidence on the correlates of industry wage differences. Quit rates, human capital variables, capital labor ratios and market power measures are all positively correlated with industry wage differences individually though the data are not adequate to determine their independent contributions in multiple regression. On the basis of all the evidence we conclude that standard labor market clearing models can not easily explain all the facts. Several alternative models are discussed including efficiency wage and collective action threat mode1 s. These are found to be more consistent with the facts though some troubling problems remain.

Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply

This study presents a model of labor supply in which individuals may face constraints on their choice of work hours, and analyzes the sensitivity of parameter estimates and policy conclusions to the usual assumption of unrestricted choice. We set up the labor supply decision asa discrete choice problem, where each worker faces a finite number of employment opportunities, each offering fixed hours of work.The distribution from which these are drawn, as well as the number of draws, is estimated along with the behavioral parameters of individual labor supply.The standard model with unconstrained hours appears as a special case where the number of draws approaches infinity. We estimate the mean absolute difference between desired and actual work hours to be about ten hours perweek. The results strongly support the notion that hours choices are constrained, and suggest that models which ignore restrictions on hours worked may yield biased estimates of the wage elasticity of desired hours. Further, we suggest that analysis of policies such as income transfers and the flat rate tax which do not consider their effects on the distribution of hours offered may be very misleading.