A Humean Theory of Choice of which Rationality May Be One Consequence

For the reader who considers economic theory of choice as a special case of a more general theory of action, Hume's discussion of the determinants of action in the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), in the Enquiry on Human Understanding (1748), and in the Dissertation on Passions (1757), deserves attention. However, according to some modern commentators, Hume does not seem to have given any evidence which would favour what we nowadays consider as the kind of rationality involved in modern theories of rational choice. On the contrary, this paper arrives to the conclusion that consistency between preferences and choice, like the usual properties of completeness and transitivity, may be considered as outcomes of a mental process, described by means of a decision algorithm which aims at representing Hume's theory of choice.Hume; rationality; decision; passion; desire; preference; will; choice; rationalité; décision; désir; préférences, volonté; choix

Why Rationality May Be a Consequence of Hume's Theory of Choice

Facing R. Sugden's criticism of our interpretation, it is shown in this paper that rationality appears as a possible consequence of Hume's theory of choice. We first argue that Sugden's dismissal of the preference relation from the type of rationality through which Hume's theory is apprehended, is highly disputable, from the point of view of both standard choice theory and Hume's theory of passions. Nonetheless, Sugden's criterion of rationality might be restated in Humean terms as a condition of non-revision of preferences in the dynamics of passions. But, since the process of choice that we have described explicitly takes into account the revision of preferences, and shows that, when this last is no longer required, rationality occurs as an outcome of this process, it is not really concerned by Sugden's criticism.Hume; rationality; decision; passion; desire; preference; will; choice; rationalité; décision; désir; préférence; volonté; choix

The Composition of Compensation Policy: From Cash to Fringe Benefits

Cet article développe un modèle principal-agent pour analyser la composition optimale des politiques de rémunérations en présence d'incitations monétaires et non monétaires. On caractérise les bénéfices non monétaires comme des symboles pour capturer un ensemble large de compensations non monétaires telles que les avantages en natures, le statut, l'identité ou même les sanctions. Nous montrons que lorsque les préférence des agents sont de connaissance commune les incitaions non monétaires sont toujours plus efficaces que les incitations monétaires. Nous caractérisons également la compostion optimale du schéma de rémunération lorsque le principal ne connaît qu'imparfaitement les préférences des agents. En particulier, nous montrons que des avantages en nature fixes combinés à un salaire variable sont plus rentables pour le principal dans ce contexte.

A simple test of Richter-rationality

We propose in this note a simple non-parametric test of Richter-rationality which is the basic definition of rationality used in choice functions theory. Loosely speaking, the data set is rationalizable in the Richter' sense if there exists a complete-acyclic binary relation that rationalizes the data set. Hence a data set is rationalizable in the Richter' sense if there exists a variable intervals function which rationalizes this data set. Since an acyclic binary relation is not necessary transitive then the proposed Richter-rationality test is weaker than GARP. Finally the test is performed over Mattei's data sets.GARP ; choice functions ; Richter-rationality ; variable intervals functions.

Subjective Evaluation of Performance Through Individual Evaluation Interview: Empirical evidence from France

Individual evaluation interviews have become a widespread practice. 52% of employees in French manufacturing firms over 50 employees declared an annual individual evaluation interview in 1997. However whereas the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evaluation (which is defined simply as a signal in most papers) receives a large attention, firm-level evaluation interviews are strikingly left aside from economic analysis. This paper aims at identifying the underlying logics of individual evaluation interviews in the case of individual production and of team production. Especially, it aims at analyzing the relationships between effort, wage distribution within the firms and individual evaluation interviews. From a theoretical standpoint, three papers by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), by Che and Yoo (2001) and by MacLeod (2003) are closely related to our paper and from an empirical point of view, a paper by Engellandt and Riphahn (2004). Our theoretical analysis allows to derive testable predictions regarding the effect of individual evaluation interviews on productive and cognitive effort, on work overload and on wage setting. Using a matched employer / employee survey on computerisation and organisational change (COI), we are able to test part of these predictions and to corroborate them. First, evaluation interviews have a positive impact on productive and cognitive effort. Second, evaluation interviews increase effort through two effects: the classical incentive effect and also a selection effect. Third, the selection effect is stronger in the case of individual production compared with the case of team production. Fourth, evaluated employees earn more than employees in a classical incentive scheme and fifth, evaluated workers have a better knowledge of the rules driving wage setting.

The World According to GARP* : Non-parametric Tests of Demand Theory and Rational Behavior

The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first point out that violation of rationality axioms (SARP, GARP, WARP) do not necessarily lead to a non-rational behavior. Second, our tests of axioms SARP, GARP and WARP over a Polish panel data (1987-90) show that over the 3630 households only 240 violate the three axioms. However these 240 violations are not caused by the non-respect of demand theory axioms but by the changing of preferences over the period. A logistic regression confirms the robustness of the test since the more the real expenditure increases in absolute value, the more the probability of violating the axioms increases (the respect of the axioms by the 3390 households is not due to an increase of the real expenditure). Moreover, changing in the composition of the family structure increases the probability of being inconsistent. It seems therefore that the 240 apparent violations are due to the appearance of new constraints, which increase the shadow prices of the goods. In order to explain these 240 households' preference changes, we build an econometric model of prices including an observed monetary component and an unobserved non-monetary component expressing the constraints faced by the agent. The estimation of this econometric model shows that the agents who apparently violate the axioms have these complete price changes superior to those of the agents who respect the axioms. Thus the agents who apparently violate the axioms faced during the period a change of their non-monetary resources and the appearance of new constraints.Rationality, GARP, Non-parametric tests, Shadow prices.

Subjective evaluation of performance through individual evaluation interview : theory and empirical evidence from France

Individual evaluation interviews have become a widespread practice. 52 % of employees in French manufacturing firms over 50 employees declared an annual individual evaluation interview in 1997. However whereas the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evaluation (which is defined simply as a signal in most papers) receives a large attention, firm-level evaluation interviews are strikingly left aside from economic analysis. This paper aims at identifying the underlying logics of individual evaluation interviews in the case of individual production and of team production. Especially, it aims at analyzing the relationships between effort, wage distribution within the firms and individual evaluation interviews. From a theoretical standpoint, three papers by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), by Che and Yoo (2001) and by MacLeod (2003) are closely related to our paper and from an empirical point of view, a recent paper by Engellandt and Riphahn (2004). We test in our paper four predictions. First, evaluation interviews have a positive impact on effort. Second, evaluation interviews increase the effort through twoeffects : the classical incentive effect and also a high selection effect. Third, evaluation interviews are associated with positive beliefs regarding wage and work recognition. Finally, evaluation interviews are associated with monetary gains for employees. These predictions are tested using a matched employer/employee survey on Computerization and Organizational Change (survey «Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation», C.O.I.), conducted in 1997 over a sample of about 4 000 firms and 9 000 employees.Subjective evaluation, Principal-Agent model, personnel economics, super-modularity.

GARP violation, Economic Environment Distortions and Shadow Prices : Evidence from Household Expenditure Panel Data

This paper contributes to the discussion of the compatibility of consumers' behavior in "real" life with GARP. Within expenditure panel data we observe a relatively low rate of violation (240 out of 3630 households). We show that these violations do not imply an "irrational" behavior of the agents, but can be attributed to a change in the agents' choice conditions during a period of time, which includes a shift from a centrally planned towards a market oriented economy.GARP, shadow prices.

A Humean Theory of Choice of which Rationality May Be One Consequence

International audienceFor the reader who considers economic theory of choice as a special case of a more general theory of action, Hume's discussion of the determinants of action in the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), in the Enquiry on Human Understanding (1748), and in the Dissertation on Passions (1757), deserves attention. However, according to some modern commentators, Hume does not seem to have given any evidence which would favour what we nowadays consider as the kind of rationality involved in modern theories of rational choice. On the contrary, this paper arrives to the conclusion that consistency between preferences and choice, like the usual properties of completeness and transitivity, may be considered as outcomes of a mental process, described by means of a decision algorithm which aims at representing Hume's theory of choice