Trends in the Return and Prosecution of ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the United States

Approximately 300 Americans are estimated to have traveled or attempted to join the Islamic State (ISIS) as part of the group’s campaign in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2019. These individuals joined more than 53,000 men, women, and minors from roughly 80 countries. Often referred to as foreign (terrorist) fighters (FTF), these are individuals from third countries who travel to join a terrorist group to support its activities. In the United States (U.S.) context, the FTF designation does not denote the act of fighting itself, but rather the support of a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO). While many of these radicalized individuals traveled alone to the conflict zone, others brought their families or formed new ones in-theater. As ISIS’ selfdeclared caliphate collapsed, many were killed, some fled to other locations, and many were captured and held by Kurdish forces. Men and some teenage boys were primarily placed in prisons, while women and minors were often moved into detention camps. Today, an estimated 10,000 male FTFs remain held in northeastern Syria including 2,000 men and boys from 60 countries outside Syria and Iraq (third country nationals, or TCNs). In addition, local camps hold close to 55,000 female FTF and FTF-affiliated family members, including roughly 10,000 TCN women and children. Some of these individuals have now been in detention for four years or more. The indefinite detention of FTF and FTF-affiliated families in northeastern Syria is not a tenable solution. In addition to clear humanitarian concerns, there is a significant security risk that the facilities’ inhabitants provide a groundswell of recruits to the still active ISIS campaign in the region. A 2022 U.S. military report puts it bluntly, “These children in the camp are prime targets for ISIS radicalization. The international community must work together to remove these children from this environment by repatriating them to their countries or communities of origin while improving conditions in the camp.” In lockstep, U.S. diplomatic leaders have made repatriation a policy priority empowered by a general domestic partisan consensus that the repatriation of FTF and FTF-affiliated families from northeastern Syria should be done expediently. Progress has been slow, while many Western nations were strongly resistant to bringing their detained citizens home, there is recent evidence for cautious optimism. Approximately 9,200 persons – including 2,700 TCNs and 6,500 Iraqis repatriated since 2019. This year, 13 countries have repatriated roughly 2,300 persons, including more than 350 TCNs. However, more work remains to be done. As of July 15, 2023, 39 U.S. persons have been officially repatriated, including both adults and minors. At least 11 additional U.S. persons have returned on their own accord, ten of whom remained in the U.S. following their return. Furthermore, the U.S. has made the decision to bring several non-U.S. persons to the U.S. to stand trial

The Repatriation & Reintegration Dilemma: How states manage the return of foreign terrorist fighters & their families

This study analyzes the interplay of factors which drive states’ approaches to the repatriation and reintegration of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their family members. The literature is dominated by descriptive studies of state policies that tend to explain states’ failure to repatriate and reintegrate citizens as the result of deference to governments’ national security decisions. Our study builds on these foundations to offer the scholarly and policy fields both a framework to explain why governments adopt distinct policy postures, and a means to enable these same actors to engage in more systematic analysis and development of repatriation and reintegration policy. This study argues that a balance of four considerations are crucial for explaining state behavior in this policy context: (i.) the scope of the issue, including the number of citizens considered FTFs or affiliated persons, geographic proximity, and access to the conflict, (ii.) existing legal basis for repatriation and reintegration, (iii.) instrumentalization for institution building, and (iv.) programming strategy for repatriation and reintegration. As a pilot study, this paper applies the framework to assess cases of the United States, the Netherlands, Kosovo, and Iraq. As FTF management issues are not a relic of the recent past but a persistent policy concern that warrants more nuanced and forward-looking attention, this study also considers the continued application of the framework to explore the different ways in which states may balance these four considerations in policy design and practice in the future

Woman in American Violent Extremism: An Examination of Far-Right and Salafi-Jihadist Movements

Executive Summary This report compares women’s participation in far-right and salafi-jihadist movements in the United States through the examination of four case studies: the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. To do so, the authors apply a unique analytical framework that examines three key aspects of women’s participation to compare similarities and differences. First, the report takes a top-down approach to analyze how organizations conceptualize women’s roles. Second, it takes a bottom-up approach to explore how women have participated in violent extremism in the United States. Finally, it uses a gendered lens to address how groups have responded when women have participated in violent extremism in America. Key observations and findings include: To understand how groups incorporate women into their ranks, it is essential to look at group ideologies and goals. These factors help determine women’s participation in violent extremism. Far-right and salafi-jihadist movements often adhere to gendered stereotypes, patriarchal societies, and power dynamics that incorporate both overt and underlying gendered beliefs that women must circumvent. These traditional gender roles ensure that women are rarely visible on the ‘frontlines’ of group activities. This in turn enables men to take on more public-facing and violent roles, leaving women’s contributions to these movements often underplayed, underexplored, and misunderstood. Groups driven by conservative gendered ideologies are more likely to cultivate gender segregation and the exclusion of women in their ranks. This can result in the removal of women’s agency and make it harder for women to undertake active, tactical, or leadership roles in organizations. On the other hand, while pervaded by casual misogyny, far-right anti-government groups are more likely to incorporate women into their ranks, while at the same time viewing women as pawns to further their causes. Women involved in violent extremism in the U.S. see themselves contributing to values and ideals they believe in. Despite gendered conceptualizations within violent extremist organizations, women find ways to engage in these movements in various manners, sometimes beyond the roles created by groups. While organizations may have clear conceptualizations of women’s roles and gender dynamics, women themselves can be inspired by groups and movements, and reinterpret dictated gender roles in order to shape their own actions. Far-right movements in the U.S. provide women with greater personal capacity to participate in public-facing and leadership roles. In contrast, women in salafi-jihadist movements participate in auxiliary and, more frequently, operational roles that serve the strategic activities of the groups. However, women operating in the U.S. and inspired by salafi-jihadist ideology often have greater autonomy to carry out violent acts as they operate outside of the direct control of groups. When faced with women’s participation in violent extremism, far-right and salafi-jihadist movements respond to women in varying ways, much of the time guided by their ideological and strategic goals. Women’s engagement in violent extremism is often due to and shaped by these ideological and goal-oriented drivers

Reintegration of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Families: A Framework of Best Practices for the U.S.

This report outlines a comprehensive framework of best practices in the reintegration of foreign terrorist fighter spouses and children (i.e., “the FTF family”). It collates and synthesizes a suite of interlocking principles to guide reintegration policy and implementation, covering practical challenges and programmatic objectives, the organizational structure and process of reintegration management in the U.S. context, the role of strategic communications and trauma-informed care, and the use of specialized risk assessment tools. Drawing on original work conducted in previous investigative streams, this report combines scholarly analyses from both theory and practice, interviews with practitioners and stakeholders, case study investigations, and the authors’ collective experiences in the field. Four key findings are central to this report. First, overarching policy and programmatic planning must take into account a suite of core objectives that are central to the reintegration of FTF families. Four main categories of objectives emerge within which are a range of policy and programmatic goals: align domestic policy and programmatic responses with the scope and nature of the returnee problem, develop a strategically guided approach to reintegration, integrate existing legal bases and systems of reintegration, and consider how FTF management may be instrumentalized towards broader policy objectives. These core objectives provide a compass for guiding how policymakers and practitioners navigate through the complex and interrelated challenges associated with reintegration work. Moreover, in order to achieve the goals and objectives outlined above, this report has identified a set of best practices relating to the formal structures and roles and responsibilities assigned to the reintegration mission community in the U.S. Second, we argue that the coordination and efficacy of reintegration activities can be improved with a greater focus on the role of strategic communications at the overarching planning and management level. It is broadly recognized that reintegration efforts should not be stovepiped. Less acknowledged is the role that a robust and integrated approach to strategic communications can play in helping to improve the sequencing and synchronicity of standard programming activities. This coordination issue also extends to how the age, gender and psychosocial needs of FTF returnees and their families are addressed. Third, we highlight the need for better incorporation of gender, age, and trauma-informed considerations at the program and case levels. The synthesis of trauma-informed approaches during the repatriation and reintegration process is vital and case managers must be appropriately equipped to develop tailored plans that harness gender, age, and familial factors too. Together, the coherent integration of compatible reintegration efforts and supporting activities will enable a more strategically focused approach. Finally, this report presents the broad parameters of a risk assessment tool for assessing FTF returnees and their families based on the project’s multidisciplinary and multisectoral findings. The framework is underpinned by a rigorous methodology and an evidence-based theory of change. However, it also seeks to be accessible and adaptable to ensure usability. The development and further refinement of this risk assessment instrument presents a promising avenue for future applied research

Hezbollah\u27s Operations and Networks in the United States: Two Decades in Reviews

Executive Summary ● This report aims to provide a comprehensive examination of Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America by examining all publicly-known federal criminal cases from 1997 to 2020 in the United States with a concrete link to Hezbollah. The authors found evidence of 128 individuals that meet these criteria. ● The majority of cases involve small, centralized hubs of Hezbollah operatives, who engage in illegal activities in conjunction with wider criminal enterprises to create an array of networks across America. These relationships of convenience have resulted in Hezbollah operatives collaborating with financially-motivated individuals, criminals, and other non-ideological actors, in furtherance of a broader operational mission. These arrangements, in turn, have allowed Hezbollah to profit financially and deepen its influence in the United States, even as many such cases display minimal direct connective links to the terrorist organization itself. ● Based on analysis of the cases, the authors identified two distinct categories of participation in Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America: individuals who provided financial support to Hezbollah (109 individuals), and those who provided operational support (19 individuals). ○ 87% of individuals provided financial or material support to Hezbollah as money launderers, bundlers, fraudsters, and goods smugglers, with many raising funds from others to be provided to Hezbollah or directly providing funds to the group themselves. This finding supports existing assessments that Hezbollah’s primary aspirations in the United States are to use it as a financial support hub. ○ 13% of individuals in the dataset engaged in operational conduct in support of Hezbollah, including as human smugglers, weapons procurers, pre-operational surveillance, and travelers who sought to join the group. Despite the prominence of Hezbollah’s financing activities in the United States, elements within Hezbollah remain intent on developing the capacity and capability to plot attacks on U.S. soil. ● The vast majority (92%) of cases involved network activities between two or more individuals. Larger geographic hubs operated out of Michigan (55 cases), California (19 cases), North Carolina (16 cases), and New York (15 cases). 90% of individuals operating in these four states and 76% of all cases in this dataset were a part of just six networks. ○ Large parts of network activity involved individuals with limited evidence to suggest a direct link to Hezbollah. As discussed above, these individuals actively collaborated with persons with an evidenced connection to the terrorist organization, and in many cases appear to be driven primarily by financial rather than ideological motivations. This in and of itself is a manifestation of Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, which sought to use local criminal actors in furtherance of their illegal activities. Further, in several significant instances, network activity often involved friends or family members engaged in organized conspiracies. ● 84% of individuals were convicted and sentenced to an average of 49.6 months in prison. Notably, only 19 of the 128 individuals (14%) were charged with providing material support to Hezbollah, while the others were charged with non-terrorism related offenses. Individuals sentenced on terrorism material support charges received an average sentence length of 85.6 months, almost twice as long as the average sentence for individuals not sentenced on material support charges. ● Hezbollah-affiliated individuals were primarily male (83%) and tended to be older (average age: 37) than members of other designated foreign terrorist organizations in the US, in particular the Islamic State (average age: 28)

The Repatriation & Reintegration Dilemma: How states manage the return of foreign terrorist fighters & their families

This study analyzes the interplay of factors which drive states’ approaches to the repatriation and reintegration of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their family members. The literature is dominated by descriptive studies of state policies that tend to explain states’ failure to repatriate and reintegrate citizens as the result of deference to governments’ national security decisions. Our study builds on these foundations to offer the scholarly and policy fields both a framework to explain why governments adopt distinct policy postures, and a means to enable these same actors to engage in more systematic analysis and development of repatriation and reintegration policy. This study argues that a balance of four considerations are crucial for explaining state behavior in this policy context: (i.) the scope of the issue, including the number of citizens considered FTFs or affiliated persons, geographic proximity, and access to the conflict, (ii.) existing legal basis for repatriation and reintegration, (iii.) instrumentalization for institution building, and (iv.) programming strategy for repatriation and reintegration. As a pilot study, this paper applies the framework to assess cases of the United States, the Netherlands, Kosovo, and Iraq. As FTF management issues are not a relic of the recent past but a persistent policy concern that warrants more nuanced and forward-looking attention, this study also considers the continued application of the framework to explore the different ways in which states may balance these four considerations in policy design and practice in the future

Repeating the past or following precedent?: contextualising the Taliban 2.0’s governance of women

More than one year since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan we must ask, “what should we expect from Taliban governance?” Governance necessitates a group’s navigation of numerous factors, including gender. One way to contextualise the Taliban’s recent re-entrance into governance (Taliban 2.0) is to examine its own past and the precedent set by fellow governing violent Islamists, such as Islamic State (IS) and Hamas. While three distinct groups, all have adopted an explicitly “traditionalist” stance. Through these transitions, all three groups have faced a dilemma stuck between their ideology and the practical issues that arise from governing. This article first explores three case studies - IS, Hamas, and the Taliban - to provide a brief but nuanced understanding of how each of the groups’ gendered ideologies has manifested in their local contexts. Second, using primary and secondary sources, it compares these groups across three critical areas of their governance praxis: implementation of gendered policies; the utility of women to the group’s strategic objectives; and bids for local and external legitimacy. In doing so, this exploratory paper examines the similarities and differences across the case studies, addressing important implications for scholars and practitioners in understanding the future direction of the Taliban 2.0, and consequences for other governing violent Islamist groups