4,704 research outputs found
Measuring Taxes on Income from Capital
This paper provides a conceptual review of how the impact of taxes on the incentive to invest in the corporate sector can be measured. The focus is on measures derived from economic theory. Two measures are derived – effective marginal and average tax rates – which reflect different forms of investment decisions. A number of extensions to the basic model are examined, including the role of personal taxes, the source of finance and risk. These measures are compared to empirical measures based on observed tax revenues or tax liabilities.
The Distorting Arm's Length Principle
To prevent profit shifting by manipulation of transfer prices, tax authorities typically apply the arm's length principle in corporate taxation and use comparable market prices to 'correctly' assess the value of intracompany trade and royalty income of multinationals. We develop a model of heterogeneous firms subject to financing frictions and offshoring of intermediate inputs. We find that arm's length prices systematically differ from independent party prices. Application of the principle thus distorts multinational activity by reducing debt capacity and investment of foreign affiliates, and by distorting organizational choice between direct investment and outsourcing. Although it raises tax revenue and welfare in the headquarter country, welfare losses are larger in the subsidiary location, leading to a first order loss in world welfare.Corporate tax, transfer prices, arm's length principle, outsourcing, foreign direct investment, corporate finance
How Would EU Corporate Tax Reform Affect US Investment in Europe?
This paper examines the likely impact of a proposed formula apportionment system for corporation tax in the EU on the inbound investment of US multinational companies. We pay attention to tax planning strategies that may be employed by US multinationals and investigate whether effective tax rates in Europe of US companies differ from those of European companies. The proposal is for an optional system: we estimate the extent to which both European and US companies would be likely to choose it taking into account their existing structures and future investment incentives. The relative position of US and European companies depends crucially on the taxation of foreign passive income.
Measuring Taxes on Income from Capital: Evidence from the UK
This paper explores the empirical properties of alternative measures of the taxation of income from capital, using UK data over the last thirty years. We analyse measures of effective marginal and average tax rates, based on applying the legal parameters of the tax system to a hypothetical investment; and also measures based on observed tax payments or liabilities, scaled by various measures of income. There is a significant difference between these measures, both in their level and in how they move over time. The implicit assumption in some empirical work that these measures are broadly comparable to each other is not justified.
Taxing Multinationals
This paper analyzes the effects of tax policy on the strategic choices of a domestic multinational company competing with a foreign multinational company in a third country. We demonstrate the role of the effective average tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate on the company's choices. We consider the impact on national welfare of alternative tax policies for outbound investment. Our results differ from existing models. In contrast to Feldstein and Hartman (1979), in our model, taxing foreign source income on accrual with a deduction for foreign taxes is not generally optimal. However, unlike Mintz and Tulkens (1996), the optimal policy for domestic and outbound investment is linked through the strategic choices of the multinational.
Consumption and Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting
We model the effects of consumption-type taxes which differ according to the base and location of the tax. Our model incorporates a monopolist producing and selling in two countries with three sources of rent, each in a different location: a fixed factor (located with production), mobile managerial skill, and a monopoly mark-up (located with consumption). In the general case, we show that for national governments, there are tradeoffs in choosing between alternative taxes. In particular, a cash-flow tax on a source basis creates welfare-impairing distortions to production and consumption, but is incident on the owners of domestic production who may be non-resident. By contrast, a destination-based cash-flow tax does not distort behavior, but is incident only on domestic residents. In the alternative case of perfect competition, with the returns to the fixed factor accruing to domestic residents, the only distortion from the source-based tax is through the allocation of the mobile managerial skill. In this case, the sourcebased tax is also incident only on domestic residents, and is dominated by an equivalent tax on a destination basis, or by a sales tax.
Alternative Systems of Business Tax in Europe: An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT Reforms
This paper explores the economic implications of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) and a combination of the two in the EU. We illustrate the key trade-offs in designing ACE and CBIT in the presence of tax distortions at various decision margins of firms, such as its financial structure, investment, profit allocation and discrete location. Using an applied general equilibrium model for Europe, we quantitatively assess the effects of ACE, CBIT and combined reforms in EU countries. The results suggest that ACE is welfare improving as long as corporate tax rates are not used to cover the cost of base narrowing. CBIT typically reduces welfare by exacerbating marginal investment distortions. When governments adjust statutory corporate tax rates to balance their budget, however, CBIT reforms become more attractive while ACE reforms are welfare reducing in a number of countries. European coordination of reforms mitigates fiscal spillovers within the EU and renders ACE reforms more, and CBIT reforms less, attractive for welfare. A combination of ACE and CBIT reforms can be designed to be revenue neutral and welfare improving through smaller financial distortions.European Union, corporate taxation
Can children withhold consent to treatment
A dilemma exists when a doctor is faced with a child or young person who refuses medically indicated treatment. The Gillick case has been interpreted by many to mean that a child of sufficient age and intelligence could validly consent or refuse consent to treatment. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeal on a child's refusal of medical treatment have clouded the issue and undermined the spirit of the Gillick decision and the Children Act 1989. It is now the case that a child patient whose competence is in doubt will be found rational if he or she accepts the proposal to treat but may be found incompetent if he or she disagrees. Practitioners are alerted to the anomalies now exhibited by the law on the issue of children's consent and refusal. The impact of the decisions from the perspectives of medicine, ethics, and the law are examined. Practitioners should review each case of child care carefully and in cases of doubt seek legal advice
Taxing Corporate Income
Following Meade (1978), we reconsider issues in the design of taxes on corporate income. We outline developments in economies and in economic thought over the last thirty years, and investigate how these developments should affect the design of taxes on corporate income. We consider a number of tax systems which have been proposed, distinguishing them in two main dimensions: the definition of what is to be taxed, and where it is to be taxed. We propose that a tax levied on economic rent accruing in the corporate sector, and on a destination basis, merits serious consideration. We discuss alternative approaches, including both R-based and R+F-based flow-of-funds taxes and an ACE allowance. It is the destination basis – with border adjustments for exports and imports – which primarily distinguishes our proposals from those of Meade (1978).
DO COUNTRIES COMPETE OVER CORPORATE TAX RATES?
This paper tests whether OECD countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment. We develop two models: with …rm mobility, countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the e¤ective average tax rate, while with capital mobility, countries compete only over the e¤ective marginal tax rate. We estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 and 1999. We …nd evidence that countries compete over all three measures, but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the e¤ective average tax rate. This is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational …rms are discrete. We also …nd evidence of concave reaction functions, consistent with the model outlined in the paper.tax competition ; corporate taxes ; effective average tax rate ; effective marginal tax rate
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