Does Human Nature Conflict with Itself?: Human Form and the Harmony of the Virtues

Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise—to accept the harmony of the virtues—required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: (1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it; and (2) to provide a partial defense of the harmony of the virtues. More specifically, I show how the harmony of the virtues can be interpreted and defended within the kind of Aristotelian naturalism developed by philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. I argue that far from being an embarrassing liability for Aristotelianism—based in an “archaic metaphysical biology”—the harmony thesis is an interesting and plausible claim about human excellences, supported by a sophisticated account of the representation of life, and fully compatible with a realistic view of our human situation

Risk and Tradeoffs

The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU theory, the weight that each outcome gets in decision-making is not the subjective probability of that outcome; rather, the weight each outcome gets depends on both its subjective probability and its position in the gamble. Furthermore, the individual's utility function, her subjective probability function, and a function that measures her attitude towards risk can be separately derived from her preferences via a Representation Theorem. This theorem illuminates the role that each of these entities plays in preferences, and shows how REU theory explicates the components of instrumental rationality

On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson

In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio-enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio-enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu's and Persson's normative argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in some detail, and their implication for Savulescu's & Persson's proposal, we conclude by outlining some positive suggestions

Cross section (40X) of normal cardiac myocytes from vehicle+vehicle group.

<p>(A), vehicle+celecoxib group showing a mild organizing pericarditis (*) and adjacent normal cardiac myocytes (arrow) (B), normal cardiac myocytes from misoprostol+misoprostol group (C), misoprostol+celecoxib group showing a severe organizing pericarditis (*), and adjacent normal cardiac myocytes (arrow) (D).</p

Sodium and potassium plasma levels on day 10.

<p>VEH+VEH – vehicle+vehicle; VEH+CEL – vehicle+celecoxib; MISO+MISO – misoprostol+misoprostol; MISO+CEL – misoprostol+celecoxib.</p><p>The values were not significantly different, p>0.05.</p

Effect of treatment with vehicle+vehicle (VEH+VEH), vehicle+celecoxib (VEH+CEL), misoprostol+misoprostol (MISO+MISO), or misoprostol+celecoxib (MISO+CEL) on potassium excretion rate.

<p>*p<0.05, significantly different from baseline. ^¶p<0.05, significantly different from day 2. ^#p<0.05, significantly different from VEH+VEH. ^‡p<0.05, comparison of MISO+MISO group with MISO+CEL group.</p

NKCC2 immunohistochemistry consisting of an isotype control, then one section from each group (vehicle+vehicle (A); vehicle+celecoxib (B); misoprostol+misoprostol (C); misoprostol+celecoxib (D)) showing the presence of NKCC2 (arrows).

<p>40x magnification and insert at 100x.</p

Assessment of tubular necrosis and dilatation.

<p>VEH+VEH – vehicle+vehicle; VEH+CEL – vehicle+celecoxib; MISO+MISO – misoprostol+misoprostol; MISO+CEL – misoprostol+celecoxib.</p>#<p>p<0.05, significantly different from VEH+VEH.</p>‡<p>p<0.05, comparison of MISO+MISO group with MISO+CEL group.</p>+<p>p<0.05, comparison of VEH+CEL group with MISO+CEL group.</p

Celecoxib concentration in the plasma, kidney, and heart.

<p>VEH+CEL – vehicle+celecoxib; MISO+CEL – misoprostol+celecoxib.</p><p>The values were not significantly different, p>0.05.</p

Total body, kidney, and heart weight with organ to body ratio.

<p>VEH+VEH – vehicle+vehicle; VEH+CEL – vehicle+celecoxib; MISO+MISO – misoprostol+misoprostol; MISO+CEL – misoprostol+celecoxib.</p><p>The values were not significantly different, p>0.05.</p