How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in Their Use of Neuroscience Evidence

Much of the public debate surrounding the intersection of neuroscience and criminal law is based on assumptions about how prosecutors and defense attorneys differ in their use of neuroscience evidence. For example, according to some commentators, the defense’s use of neuroscience evidence will abdicate criminals of all responsibility for their offenses. In contrast, the prosecution’s use of that same evidence will unfairly punish the most vulnerable defendants as unfixable future dangers to society. This “double- edged sword” view of neuroscience evidence is important for flagging concerns about the law’s construction of criminal responsibility and punishment: it demonstrates that the same information about the defendant can either be mitigating or aggravating depending on who is raising it. Yet empirical assessments of legal decisions reveal a far more nuanced reality, showing that public beliefs about the impact of neuroscience on the criminal law can often be wrong. This Article takes an evidence-based and multidisciplinary approach to examining how courts respond to neuroscience evidence in capital cases when the defense presents it to argue that the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime was below the given legal requisite due to some neurologic or cognitive deficiency

Courting Abolition

This Review of Courting Death offers a different take on two of Professor Carol Steiker and Professor Jordan Steiker\u27s major themes: (1) the tension between effecting meaningful reform and legitimatizing legal façades, and (2) the future of the American death penalty. The Review argues several points, one being that the Model Penal Code may have had a larger pre-Furman impact than the Steikers acknowledge. In addition, the Review expands on some key contributors to the death penalty’s decline that may have been obscured by the all-encompassing nature of the Steikers’ regulation argument — for example, the emergence of unforeseeable exogenous variables (similar to the introduction of DNA evidence into criminal trials in the 1980s), as well as pressure points that exist largely outside of the constitutional regulatory framework, such as lethal injection litigation. Despite these influences, the Review finds the Steikers’ prediction — that, when abolition seems right, it will come by way of a “Furman II” Supreme Court decision — to readily comport with the death penalty’s trajectory over the last fifty years

Impact of a Youth Service Center

This study evaluates the impact of a Youth Service Center (YSC) in South Philadelphia, using methods which consider both the Center\u27s goals and relevant developments within its target area. The YSC is a delinquency-prevention program housed in the South Philadelphia Community Center (SPCC), a general recreation facility which evolved from the Philadelphia Boys\u27 Club in 1974. The YSC program was added in June 1975 to prevent and limit youth from becoming involved in the Juvenile Justice System, police courts, and institutions . Program referrals comprise area youths between the ages of 10 and 18 who have been arrested and are in the process of entering the juvenile justice system, or are deemed troublesome by other agencies or their families

Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity

On June 20, 2001, Andrea Yates drowned her four children in a bathtub. At Andrea’s trial, in Harris County, Texas, the prosecution’s star expert, Patrick Dietz, appeared particularly adept at persuading the jury to accept the prosecution’s assertion that Andrea was sane and acting intentionally when she killed her children. This Article analyzes the problematic aspects of Dietz\u27s testimony in an effort to contribute some balance to the Andrea Yates story. Despite the long history of expert witnesses in criminal trials, the justice system should question the fairness and efficacy of such an unregulated storytelling process. Part I of this Article briefly discusses Andrea\u27s life up to her marriage as well as the outcome of her trial. Part II provides an overview of the insanity defense and the strict Texas insanity standard. Part III examines Dietz\u27s background, his reputation, and his psychiatric philosophy, in addition to his proclivity to testify for the prosecution. Part IV describes Andrea\u27s history of mental illness, especially her postpartum psychosis that started with the birth of her first child and ended with a severe psychotic episode. Part V focuses on Dietz\u27s testimony in the Yates trial, beginning with his pre-trial interview with Andrea and ending with an analysis of his conclusions. The discussion emphasizes the speculative nature of many of Dietz\u27s statements and their lack of connection to Andrea\u27s history of mental illness. Part VI presents the other perspectives and experts in the Yates case, and considers how the case might have reached a different result with a more consistent defense strategy or a less rigid insanity standard

Foreword

This Foreword provides an overview of Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience Collide, a symposium hosted by the Fordham Law Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and Law Center. While the field of neuroscience is vast—generally constituting “the branch of the life sciences that studies the brain and nervous system”— this symposium focused on the cutting-edge ties between neuroscience evidence and the different facets of criminal law. Such an intersection invited commentary from an expert group on a wide span of topics, ranging from the historical underpinnings between law and neuroscience to the treatment of young adults to the different roles of neuroscience in the context of sentencing, expert testimony, defenses, prediction, punishment, and rehabilitation, as well as the civil and criminal divide. These diverse subjects have an overarching theme in common: each pertains in some way to the criminal justice system’s effort to punish or rehabilitate more fairly and effectively

The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons

This Article contends that some of the case law and social science research that form the basis for the United States Supreme Court\u27s decision in Roper v. Simmons are insufficient and outdated. The Court also relies heavily upon briefs submitted by the respondent and his amici, in lieu of providing more pertinent citations and analysis that could have enhanced and modernized the Court\u27s arguments. The sparse and sometimes archaic sources for Roper potentially limit the opinion\u27s precedential value. For example, the Court cites Erik Erikson\u27s 1968 book, Identity: Youth and Crisis, to support the view that, relative to adults, juveniles have more undeveloped and unstable identities. While Erikson\u27s influence as a psychologist is indisputable, his work reflects an outmoded psychoanalytic perspective. Furthermore, the Court does not specify which of Erikson\u27s highly complex theories are relevant to Roper\u27s conclusions. The shortcomings of Erikson\u27s book and other sources cited in the opinion would be less apparent but for the Court\u27s overall dearth of social science support. This Article concludes that despite Roper\u27s correct result, the Court\u27s application of interdisciplinary studies was, in part, flawed, thereby detracting from the Court\u27s otherwise progressive direction. Ultimately, the opinion\u27s strength derives more from its traditional legal analysis than from its application of relevant social science, an outcome the Court may not have fully intended

Death Bed

Lethal injection is this country\u27s primary method of execution, adopted for use by all but one of the thirty-seven death penalty states, as well as the federal government. It is predictable, then, that questions would arise the moment such a widely accepted form of punishment becomes especially vulnerable to an Eighth Amendment attack, as recent cases have shown. This article discusses this author\u27s involvement as an expert in one of these cases, Baze v. Rees, which concerned a 2005 challenge to the constitutionality of lethal injection in Kentucky. While the Baze court upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky\u27s lethal injection procedure, the opinion also revealed some extraordinary and unprecedented statements about the flaws of lethal injection as well as recommendations for how it should be improved. For example, the court found it cruel and unusual for the state\u27s lethal injection protocol to enable an inmate\u27s neck to be catheterized, a decision influenced by a department of corrections doctor who testified he would refuse to conduct the procedure, and that those who would were unqualified to do so. Baze is one of a series of opinions demonstrating that the more we know about how lethal injection is administered, the more problems we find with this means of execution

Evolutionary Biology and Rape

This article queries whether an evolutionary analysis of rape may be more compelling in explaining a rape victim\u27s fear than a defendant\u27s sexual aggression. Such a victim-oriented approach could help legal decisionmakers assess the reasonableness of the victim\u27s fear when determining whether sex was forced or threatened. These ideas are explored in the context of two well-known rape trials, State v. Rusk and State v. Smith. This article concludes that evolutionary biology can contribute to an understanding of rape. However, the supposed evolutionary underpinnings of male sexual aggression should not justify such behavior or render it acceptable as a criminal defense. Moreover, evolutionary research must be evaluated in a social frame so that generalizations do not unfairly or inaccurately bias plaintiffs or defendants