Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.Climate Change Modelling, International Environmental Agreements, Non-cooperative Game Theory, Technology Spillovers

Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Assessment

This paper deals with an assessment of the economic costs of environmental policies in the Netherlands, using a dynamic Applied General Equilibrium model with bottom-up information on abatement techniques. Empirical abatement cost curves are used to determine substitution possibilities between pollution and abatement and the characteristics of abatement goods. The results show that an absolute decoupling of economy and environment is possible. Smog formation is the most costly environmental theme, due to the absence of technical abatement options. For all environmental themes, the least-cost way to reduce emissions is via a combination of technical abatement measures and substantial economic restructuring.Applied general equilibrium, Pollution abatement, Dynamics, Environmental policy, Netherlands

Pollution abatement in the Netherlands: a dynamic applied general equilibrium assessment

This paper deals with an assessment of the economic costs of environmental policies in the Netherlands, using a dynamic Applied General Equilibrium model with bottom-up information on abatement techniques. Empirical abatement cost curves are used to determine substitution possibilities between pollution and abatement and the characteristics of abatement goods. The results show that an absolute decoupling of economy and environment is possible. Smog formation is the most costly environmental theme, due to the absence of technical abatement options. For all environmental themes, the least-cost way to reduce emissions is via a combination of technical abatement measures and substantial economic restructuring.Applied General Equilibrium, pollution abatement, dynamics, environmental policy, Netherlands

Multi-Product Crops for Agricultural and Energy Production – an AGE Analysis for Poland

By-products from agriculture and forestry can contribute to production of clean and cheap (bio)electricity. To assess the role of such multi-product crops in the response to climate policies, we present an applied general equilibrium model with special attention to biomass and multi-product crops for Poland. The potential to boost production of bioelectricity through the use of multi-product crops turns out to be limited to only 2-3% of total electricity production. Further expansion of the bioelectricity sector will have to be based on biomass crops explicitly grown for energy purposes. The competition between agriculture and biomass for scarce land remains limited, given the availability of relatively poor land types and substitution possibilities. The importance of indirect effects illustrates that the AGE framework is appropriate.Applied general equilibrium (AGE), Biomass, Energy policy, Renewable energy

Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations

This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations.Stability of Coalitions, International Environmental Agreements, Partition Function Approach, Sharing Rules, Optimal Transfers, Renegotiations

Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement

Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links uncertainty about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability analysis of coalitions in a stochastic, empirical setting. We show that the concept of Stability Likelihood improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analysis. Our numerical application is based on a modified version of the climate model STACO. It turns out that the only non-trivial coalition structure with a relatively high Stability Likelihood (around 25 percent) is a coalition between the European Union and Japan, though quantitative results depend especially on the variance in regional benefits from abatement.Climate change, Coalition formation, International environmental agreements, Uncertainty

The Timing of National Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in the Presence of Other Environmental Policies

This paper shows in an empirical context that substantial cost reductions can be achieved in the implementation of Dutch national climate policy by (i) targeting the policy at the stock of greenhouse gases, thus allowing polluters flexibility in their timing of emission reductions; and (ii) integrating climate policy with other policies, thereby optimising the restructuring of the economy needed to achieve environmental policy targets. A dynamic applied general equilibrium model with bottom-up information on abatement techniques is used to show that the optimal timing of GHG emission reductions tends to follow the timing for the other environmental themes with an additional emphasis on emission reductions in the later periods. The optimal mix of technical measures and economic restructuring as source of emission reductions is affected by the strictness of environmental policy targets for all themes and hence can only be derived from an integrated analysis of these policies.Economic growth, Applied general equilibrium model, Climate change, Environmental policy

Energy Biased Technical Change: A CGE Analysis

This paper studies energy bias in technical change. For this purpose, we develop a computable general equilibrium model that builds on endogenous growth models. The model explicitly captures links between energy, the rate and direction of technical change, and the economy. We derive the equilibrium determinants of biased technical change and show the importance of feedback in technical change, substitution possibilities between final goods, and general-equilibrium effects for the equilibrium bias. If the feedback effect is strong, or the substitution elasticity large, or both, our model tends to a corner solution in which only technologies are developed that are appropriate for production of non-energy intensive goods.Computable general-equilibrium models, Endogenous technical change, Energy, Environment

Impacto económico del control del cambio climático en el País Vasco

[EN] In this paper analyze the economic effects of CO2 emission reductions in the Basque Country (Spain) using an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model with specific attention to environment-energy-economy interactions. Environmental policy is implemented through a system of tradable pollution permits that the government auctions. The costs of different levels of CO2 abatement are discussed, focusing on the variations of macroeconomic, sectoral and environment-energy variables. Results show that the costs for achieving the Kyoto targets can remain limited if the appropriate combination of changes in fuel-mix and restructuring of the economy is induced.[ES] En este trabajo analizamos el impacto económico de una reducción de las emisiones de CO2 en el País Vasco. Para ello utilizamos un modelo de equilibrio general aplicado (MEGA), que presta especial atención a las interacciones entre economía, medio ambiente y energía y que implementa la política ambiental mediante un mercado de permisos de emisión regulado por el gobierno. El artículo discute el coste de reducción de diferentes niveles en las emisiones, mostrando las variaciones en las principales variables macroeconómicas, sectoriales y energéticas. Los resultados muestran que los costes de cumplirlos objetivos de Kyoto pueden ser moderados, si se consiguen inducir los cambios apropiados en el mix energético y en las estructuras de producción y consumo.González, M.; Dellink, R. (2006). Impact of climate policy on the Basque economy. Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales - Agricultural and Resource Economics. 6(12):187-213. doi:10.7201/earn.2006.12.09SWORD18721361

How Harmful are Adaptation Restrictions

The dominant assumption in economic models of climate policy remains that adaptation will be implemented in an optimal manner. There are, however, several reasons why optimal levels of adaptation may not be attainable. This paper investigates the effects of suboptimal levels of adaptation, i.e. adaptation restrictions, on the composition and level of climate change costs and on welfare. Several adaptation restrictions are identified and then simulated in a revised DICE model, extended with adaptation (AD-DICE). We find that especially substantial over-investment in adaptation can be very harmful due to sharply increasing marginal adaptation costs. Furthermore the potential of mitigation to offset suboptimal adaptation is investigated. When adaptation is not possible at extreme levels of climate change, it is cost-effective to use more stringent mitigation policies in order to keep climate change limited, thereby making adaptation possible. Furthermore not adjusting the optimal level of mitigation to these adaptation restrictions may double the costs of adaptation restrictions, and thus in general it is very harmful to ignore existing restrictions on adaptation when devising (efficient) climate policies.Integrated Assessment Modelling, Adaptation, Climate Change