A microsimulation model for belgian indirect taxes with a carbon / energy tax illustration for Belgium.

Belgium; Model; Studies;

Who Pays Indirect Taxes in Russia?

indirect taxes, microsimulation, progressivity, Russia, tax reform, redistribution

The Choice of Inequality Measure in Empirical Research on Distributive Judgements.

We analyse questionnaire data from a representative sample of the Flemish working population. For 781 respondents we construct their perception of the actual and of the fair income distribution. We check whether the use of different inequality measures leads to different interpretations of these data. The ranking of individuals on the basis of their perceived and fair inequality is hardly affected and the same is true for the explanation of the interindividual variation. However, the simple classification of individual respondents in those who want and those who do not want less inequality does depend on the measure used in 20% of the cases. Moreover, the tendency to equalise is a poor measure of conservatism.

Weighting with individuals, equivalent individuals or not weighting at all. Does it matter empirically ?.

To take into account heterogeneity in a social welfare function, Ebert (1997) and Shorrocks (1995) show that the only consistent way of welfare measurement consists of either constructing an artificial distribution in which each household is weighted by the number of equivalent individuals, or weighting by the number of individuals in the household. Both approaches are not only mutually exclusive on axiomatic grounds, they are also in sharp contrast with many empirical applications where there is no weighting at all. Since ultimately, the choice is a normative one between axioms, and hence not easily envisaged, an empirical test of the sensitivity of welfare evaluations for the choice of the different weighting schemes might prove useful. In this paper we apply the different methods to administrative microdata of the 2000 PIT reform in Belgium, obtained from the microsimulation model SIRe of the Belgian Ministery of Finance. We find indeed sensitivity of our results with respect to the different weighting methods. In addition, using the number of equivalent individuals as weights to perform dominance analysis leads to fanciful results with respect to the choice of equivalence scales.

A bounded index test for robust heterogeneous welfare comparisons.

Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) develop a bounded dominance test to make robust welfare comparisons, which is intermediate between Ebert’s (1999) cardinal dominance criterion –generalized Lorenz dominance applied to household incomes, divided and weighted by an equivalence scale– and Bourguignon’s (1989) ordinal dominance criterion. In this paper, we develop a more complete, but less robust bounded index test, which is intermediate between Ebert’s (1997) cardinal index test –an index applied to household incomes, divided and weighted by the equivalence scale– and a (new) sequential index test –an index applied to household incomes of the most needy only, the most and second most needy only, and so on. We illustrate the power of our test to detect welfare changes in Russia using data of the RLMS-surveys.Indexes; Welfare;

Empirical Welfare Analysis in Random Utility Models of Labour Supply

The aim of this paper is to apply recently proposed individual welfare measures in the context of random utility models of labour supply. Contrary to the standard practice of using reference preferences and wages, these measures preserve preference heterogeneity in the normative step of the analysis. They also make the ethical priors, implicit in any interpersonal comparison, more explicit. On the basis of microdata from the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) for married couples in Germany, we provide empirical evidence about the sensitivity of the welfare orderings to different normative principles embodied in these measures. We retrieve individual and household specific preference heterogeneity, by estimating a structural discrete choice labor supply model. We use this preference information to construct welfare orderings of households according to the different metrics, each embodying different ethical choices concerning the preference heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure space. We then discuss how sensitive the assessment of a hypothetical tax reform is to the choice of metric. The chose tax reform is similar to a subsidy of social security contributions.Welfare measures, labour supply, random utility, preference heterogeneity

The Gini coefficient reveals more.

We revisit the well-known decomposition of the Gini coefficient into betweengroups, within-groups and overlap terms in the context of two groups in which the incomes in one group may be scaled and that group’s population weight modified. In this more general setting than usual, we focus on the properties of the overlap term, proving inter alia that overlap unambiguously reduces as a result of a within-group progressive transfer, and is increased by scaling up the incomes in the group with the lower mean, reaching a maximum when the two means become the same. In the case of a socially heterogeneous population and equivalized incomes, the effect on the Gini overlap of changing the income unit is determined, along with that of adjusting the equivalence scale deflator in case the income unit is the equivalent adult (such adjustment simultaneously changing the weighting of income units).

A Switch from Joint to Individual Taxation Is Welfare Improving

In this paper we empirically derive the welfare effects of a shift from joint taxation with full income splitting to a revenue neutral system of individual taxation in Germany. For the empirical welfare evaluation we estimate the preference heterogeneity in the population and use normative welfare concepts proposed in Fleurbaey (2006) to solve the difficulties of comparison between, and aggregation of heterogeneous individuals and households. We show that, irrespective of the individual welfare measure we use, individual taxation would on average increase individual welfare. Moreover, as far as the aggregation is concerned, we show that any social planner, ranging from a utilitarian to a Rawlsian one, would come to the same conclusion: a policy change which replaces joint taxation with full splitting by individual taxation, would be welfare improving.Taxation of couples, welfare measures, labour supply, preference heterogeneity

The Rise or Fall of World Inequality: A Spurious Controversy?

inequality, world income distribution