On the transition to efficiency in Minority Games

The existence of a phase transition with diverging susceptibility in batch Minority Games (MGs) is the mark of informationally efficient regimes and is linked to the specifics of the agents' learning rules. Here we study how the standard scenario is affected in a mixed population game in which agents with the `optimal' learning rule (i.e. the one leading to efficiency) coexist with ones whose adaptive dynamics is sub-optimal. Our generic finding is that any non-vanishing intensive fraction of optimal agents guarantees the existence of an efficient phase. Specifically, we calculate the dependence of the critical point on the fraction $q$ of `optimal' agents focusing our analysis on three cases: MGs with market impact correction, grand-canonical MGs and MGs with heterogeneous comfort levels.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures; contribution to the special issue "Viewing the World through Spin Glasses" in honour of David Sherrington on the occasion of his 65th birthda

On the strategy frequency problem in batch Minority Games

Ergodic stationary states of Minority Games with S strategies per agent can be characterized in terms of the asymptotic probabilities a with which an agent uses a of his strategies. We propose here a simple and general method to calculate these quantities in batch canonical and grand-canonical models. Known analytic theories are easily recovered as limiting cases and, as a further application, the strategy frequency problem for the batch grand-canonical Minority Game with S ≤ 2 is solved. The generalization of these ideas to multi-asset models is also presented. Though similarly based on response function techniques, our approach is an alternative to the one recently employed by Shayeghi and Coolen for canonical batch Minority Games with arbitrary number of strategies. © IOP Publishing Ltd