How to Catch Foreign Fish? FDI and Privatization in EU Accession Countries

We examine the determinants of FDI stocks of ‘old’ EU-members in ten accession countries. Our partial adjustment framework results in a dynamic panel data analysis. In addition to the traditional variables, such as market potential and unit labour costs, we find institutional development to be a robust determinant of equilibrium FDI stocks. The adjustment towards equilibrium is rapid. The relationship between FDI and the privatization process is complex. Non-direct privatization schemes negatively affect the speed of adjustment, whereas direct privatization strategies positively affect the equilibrium itself. Privatization history increases equilibrium FDI stocks, independently of the method applied.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40171/3/wp785.pd

Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client’s decision. We test this frame work using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more attractive to both parties when the client is richer, and we find empirically that both bribery incidence and value are increasing in household income. However, 65% of the relation between bribery incidence and income is explained by greater use of officials by high–income households, and by their use of more corrupt types of official. Compared to a client dealing with an honest official, a client who pays a bribe has a similar probability of concluding her business, while a client who refuses to bribe has a probability 16 percentage points lower. This indicates that service improvements in response to a bribe merely offset service reductions associated with angling for a bribe, and that clients refusing to bribe are punished. We use these and other results to argue that bribery is not a regressive tax.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40178/3/wp792.pd