Financing Georgia's Schools: A Primer

Georgia's nearly 1.5 million students make it the ninth largest state K-12 school system in the United States. Furthermore, Georgia has one of the fastest growing school enrollments in the nation, registering an increase of 12.2 percent between 1996 and 2002. Educating these students requires substantial financial resources. The purpose of this Primer is to explain how education in Georgia is financed and to point out some of the major school financing issues confronting the state. Report No.8

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Over the moonlit moor the wail of bagpipes rose and fell with the gusting of the wind; disembodied notes, measures lost in space and time, moving like the patches of mist that floated between the barren hilltops

Black-Box Immigration Federalism

In Immigration Outside the Law, Hiroshi Motomura confronts the three hardest questions in immigration today: what to do about our undocumented population, who should decide, and by what legal process. Motomura’s treatment is characteristically visionary, analytically rich, and eminently fair to competing views. The book’s intellectual arc begins with its title: “Immigration Outside the Law.” As the narrative unfolds, however, Motomura explains that undocumented immigrants are “Americans in waiting,” with moral and legal claims to societal integration

Relative Checks : Towards optimal Control of Administrative Power

Administrative agencies wield a necessary but dangerous power. Some control of that power is constitutionally required and normatively justified. Yet widely discordant views persist concerning the appropriate means of control. Scholars have proposed competing administrative control models that variably place the judiciary, the President, and Congress at the helm. Although these models offer critical insights into the institutional competencies of the respective branches, they tend to understate the limitations of those branches to check administrative power and ultimately marginalize the public interest costs occasioned by second-guessing administrative choice. The “relative checks” paradigm introduced here seeks to improve upon existing models in at least two critical respects. First, it posits the existence of an optimal control point within the shared values of two sometimes competing missions in administrative law: that of promoting the public interest and that of legitimizing administrative power within our constitutional scheme. Next, the paradigm argues that the optimal control ideal can be best realized by tailoring both the source and degree of administrative control to particular types of administrative actions with sensitivity to the institutional competencies of the respective checking bodies. Prescriptively, this framework seeks to apportion control among the respective branches in a way that capitalizes on each branch’s competencies while democratically promoting the public interest. Descriptively, looking through a relative checks lens may also enhance our understanding of existing administrative practices and the academic critiques thereof

Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers

Federal agencies are key players in our federalist system: they make front-line decisions about the scope of federal policy and whether such policy should preempt state law. How agencies perform these functions, and how they might fulfill them better, are questions at the heart of “administrative federalism.” Some academic proposals for administrative federalism work to enhance states’ ability to participate in federal agency decisionmaking. Other proposals work to protect state autonomy through adjustments to the Supreme Court’s administrative preemption doctrine. As jurists and scholars debate what these proposals entail for federalism, this Article doubles-down with a twist: it examines what these same proposals can do for separation of powers. As uncovered here, adjustments to the administrative system—although made in federalism’s name—will derivatively affect how national law is made and checked along the separation-of-powers dimension. Moreover, as shown here, federalism-inspired proposals for the administrative system may require a tradeoff in constitutional values. Pushed to decide, we might choose federalism over separation of powers, or vice versa. This Article informs that choice by comparing and contrasting what administrative federalism’s major proposals entail for federalism and separation of powers, simultaneously

State Regulation of Federal Contractors: Three Puzzles of Procurement Preemption

This Article unpacks three doctrinal puzzles at the intersection of federalism and federal contracting, using student loan law as its anchoring case study. Currently, more than $1 trillion of federal student loan debt is serviced by private financial institutions under contract with the Department of Education. These loan servicers have allegedly engaged in systemic consumer abuses but are seldom held accountable by the federal government. To bridge the accountability gap, several states have recently passed “Student Borrower Bills of Rights.” These state laws include provisions to regulate the student loan servicing industry, including the Department’s federal contractors. States undoubtedly have legitimate interests to protect their residents, communities, and local economies against industry malfeasance. The overarching question, however, is whether federal law prohibits states from performing this remedial function. This Article offers a fresh look at three doctrinal puzzles at the heart of that debate. The first puzzle is whether the federal government’s constitutional immunity extends to shield federal contractors from generally applicable state laws. The second puzzle is whether federal procurement laws preempt state licensing of federal contractors. The third puzzle is whether federal contracts that expressly incorporate state law can save state law from preemption. Individually and collectively, how these puzzles are resolved may have far-reaching implications—not only for the future of student loan law, but also for federalism and federal contracting more generally

Black-Box Immigration Federalism

In Immigration Outside the Law, Hiroshi Motomura confronts the three hardest questions in immigration today: what to do about our undocumented population, who should decide, and by what legal process. Motomura’s treatment is characteristically visionary, analytically rich, and eminently fair to competing views. The book’s intellectual arc begins with its title: “Immigration Outside the Law.” As the narrative unfolds, however, Motomura explains that undocumented immigrants are “Americans in waiting,” with moral and legal claims to societal integration

Delegating Supremacy?

The Supreme Court has long held that federal agencies may preempt state law in much the same way as Congress: either by issuing binding administrative rules that conflict with state law or by asserting exclusive federal control over a regulatory domain. Under this sweeping conception of the Supremacy Clause, agencies wield an extraordinary power in our federalist system. Specifically, agencies may displace the laws of all fifty states without the political and procedural safeguards inhering in the legislative process. The administrative-preemption power rests on the undertheorized doctrinal assumption that Congress may, in effect, delegate supremacy to agencies. This Article challenges the constitutionality of that premise and normatively defends an imagined federalist system in which agencies are stripped of the power to create supreme federal law