What do you mean “This isn’t the question”?

This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons. We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view, showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys

Deep Desires

This article seeks to get clear on an important feature of a theistic way of life: namely, the appeal to ‘deep desires’ as part of an ethical and spiritual life-orientation. My main thesis is that such appeals should primarily be seen as pertaining to our acquired second nature and the space of meaning it makes possible, rather than first nature or innateness. To appeal to the ‘depth’ of a desire, on this account, is to say something about its normative importance: it is something of profound significance for our human fulfilment about which we ought to be concerned, and it correlates with the normative ‘height’ of the object of desire. Thus, our deepest desire correlates with what is seen as the highest or most worthy object of our desire (or love), which the theist claims is God. This view is contrasted with subjectivist accounts where desires are seen as ‘deep’ in that they structure our identity. My account affirms that deep desires structure our identity, but they do so because of their perceived objective normative importance. I also seek to show how we should affirm Alasdair MacIntyre's claim that ‘the deepest desire of every [human] being, whether they acknowledge it or not, is to be at one with God’

Moral Absolutes and Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism

In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe makes a “disenchanting” move: she suggests that secular philosophers abandon a special “moral” sense of “ought” since she thinks this no longer makes sense without a divine law framework. Instead, she recommends recovering an ordinary sense of ought that pertains to what a human being needs in order to flourish qua human being, where the virtues are thought to be central to what a human being needs. However, she is also concerned to critique consequentialist views for their rejection of absolute prohibitions. This raises the question of whether the disenchanted form of Aristotelian ethical naturalism that she recommends to secular philosophers can support such absolute prohibitions. Anscombe expresses skepticism on this point and seems ultimately to recommend a divine law ethic, at least as a supplement to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic. This chapter takes issue with Anscombe’s view, in part: the author agrees that the disenchanted form of Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot support absolute prohibitions, but disagrees that appeal to divine law is the best way to understand these prohibitions since it misses the intrinsic reasons for them: namely, they concern that which is sacred or reverence-worthy and thus should be regarded as inviolable and as involving a “special moral ought.” This means that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic that can properly recognize moral absolutes will need a reenchanting move: namely, it needs to recognize the special normative demands of the sacred. This chapter also explores the question of what “moral ontology” can best make sense of the moral phenomenology of the sacred, but the main aim is to show the significance of a common anti-consequentialist form of moral perception that involves a sense of the sacred

Transfiguring Love

In this essay I build on John Cottingham’s suggestion that we need an epistemology of involvement (or receptivity), as opposed to an epistemology of detachment, if we are properly to understand the world in religious terms. I also refer to these as ‘engaged’ and ‘disengaged’ stances. I seek to show how the spiritual practice of an ‘active’ or ‘engaged’ love is integral to the sort of epistemology of involvement through which we come to a religious understanding of the world. Such an understanding is one that gives proper recognition to the sacred or reverence-worthy character of the world. I discuss how a religiously-inflected language of love and the practice it informs can transfigure the world for us and enable its sacred or reverence-worthy character to come into view (supposing it is there in any case). I also seek to show how this is connected to a process of spiritual formation (or Bildung)

Manners and the Moral Life

I explore the place of manners in the moral life, particularly with regard to their role in virtue education and in expressing virtue. The approach developed here is Aristotelian and Confucian in character. I identify and discuss three crucial functions of good manners: (1) they help social life to go well; (2) they often involve ways of showing respect or reverence for that which is respect-worthy or reverence-worthy; and (3) they ennoble our animal nature via an acquired second nature. In light of this account I also discuss how concerns about arbitrariness, oppressiveness, and dishonesty with respect to manners can be overcome

The Virtue of Piety in Medical Practice

Following the Introduction, the second section of this essay lays out Tom Cavanaugh’s helpful and convincing account of the enduring significance of the Hippocratic Oath in terms of how it responds to the problem of iatrogenic harm. The third section discusses something underemphasized in Cavanaugh’s account, namely, the key role of the virtue of piety within the Oath and the profession it establishes, and argues that this virtue should be regarded as integral to an authentic Hippocratic ethic. The fourth and final section briefly examines the connection between medicine and philosophy, focusing on how both should be seen as wisdom-seeking ways of life, and shows the relevance of this for regarding the virtue of piety as the key virtue of medical practice

Re-Enchanting The World: An Examination Of Ethics, Religion, And Their Relationship In The Work Of Charles Taylor

In this dissertation I examine the topics of ethics, religion, and their relationship in the work of Charles Taylor. I take Taylor\u27s attempt to confront modern disenchantment by seeking a kind of re-enchantment as my guiding thread. Seeking re-enchantment means, first of all, defending an `engaged realist\u27 account of strong evaluation, i.e., qualitative distinctions of value that are seen as normative for our desires. Secondly, it means overcoming self-enclosure and achieving self-transcendence, which I argue should be understood in terms of transcending a `lower\u27 mode of selfhood for a `higher\u27 one in concern for `strong goods\u27. One of the main issues that Taylor raises is whether re-enchantment requires theism for its full adequacy. He advances - often as `hunches\u27 - controversial claims regarding the significance of theism (1) for defending strong evaluative realism and (2) for motivating an ethic of universal human concern. I seek to fill out his hunches in terms of a theistic teleological perspective that is centered on the `telos of communion\u27. I argue that such a view is important for overcoming the problem of what Bernard Williams calls the `radical contingency\u27 of ethical beliefs, which seems to undermine their normative authority. However, I argue that if a non-theistic view of cosmic purpose (e.g., Thomas Nagel\u27s view) can be regarded as a viable option, then it could also help to address this problem and support a kind of re-enchantment. Taylor also advances the controversial view that (3) there is an ineradicable draw to `transcendence\u27 in human life in connection to the quest for the meaning of life. Here he opposes certain mainstream theories of secularization that see it as a process involving the ineluctable fading away of the relevance of religion. I seek to fill out and defend Taylor\u27s view in this matter. Besides providing a reading of Taylor\u27s work as a whole and advancing further some of the issues he raises, I also examine his general evaluative framework based on his account of strong evaluation. In doing so I show how he provides a distinct and important perspective among contemporary moral philosophers

Consent Is Not Enough: A Case Against Liberal Sexual Ethics

The standard liberal sexual ethic maintains that consent is the only requirement for ethical sexual relations. While consent is certainly necessary for an adequate sexual ethic (and it’s important to know what it involves), I argue that it’s far from sufficient. The key claims that I advance are the following: (1) The consent-only model of sexual ethics affirms a “casual” view of sex and therefore it can’t make sense of and properly combat what’s worst in the sexual domain: namely, the grave evil of sexual violence. (2) The consent-only model of sexual ethics fails properly to recognize the special significance of human sexuality and the nature of erotic love and its role in human sexual fulfillment and therefore it can’t make sense of and properly support what’s best in the sexual domain: namely, a committed erotic loving relationship. A more adequate sexual ethic, I maintain, would be a more traditionalist one that involves the following: it would give proper recognition to the special significance of human sexuality, avoid dehumanization in sexual desire, and encourage and support committed erotic love and its role in human fulfillment. Moreover, it would regard this as requiring that we cultivate sexual virtues such as chastity, modesty, and fidelity, and that we encourage and support life-long monogamous marriage as the proper context for human sexual relationship

A study of the readability of University of Tennessee Agricultural Extension Service publications and leaflets for boys taking vocational agriculture in high school

Departments of Vocational Agriculture in Tennessee are organized under a plan whereby each individual teacher sets up his program of instruction based in part on the Supervised Farming Programs of the boys that he teaches, and the farm enterprises found in the community. In forming the program the teacher would also consider the needs of the community, the interests of the individuals receiving instruction and possible improvements needed in the existing farm programs in the community. This plan makes a variety of programs necessary because the agricultural situation is different in each community. Variation of agricultural programs in different communities may be due to soil conditions, custom of the farmers, tools that are available on the farms, markets, climate, topography, knowledge that the farmers possess, and other factors. Because this wide difference in teaching programs exists, the source of teaching materials is one of the major problems of the Teacher of Vocational Agriculture. Because of the difference that exists in the programs, a text book as such is out of the question. Sources of information in general use are; Commercial books and publications used as reference material, farm magazines. Agricultural Education Publications, United States Department of Agriculture Farmers Bulletins, and other Federal Government Publications, Extension Service Material from adjoining states, University of Tennessee Agricultural Extension Service Publications and Leaflets, and University of Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletins and Circulars. University of Tennessee Agricultural Extension Service Publications and Leaflets are written to carry information to the farmers of the State. University of Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletins and Circulars are written for research people trained agricultural personnel. Information from both is based on findings from various experiments and studies carried on by the Experiment Stations under the supervision of the University of Tennessee. The Extension Service Publications and Leaflets are written for use by farmers. They are based on Tennessee findings, written for our climate weather conditions and adapted to the general conditions of our State. Because of these reasons these publications are one of the principle sources of information being used in the teaching of Vocational Agriculture. Reading is one of the more important learning procedures. Its importance comes from the facts that there is a wide variety of written material that is available and because it is a method of self-education.To the Teacher of Vocational Agriculture it is of considerable importance in his program because he frequently has boys working on individual problems. The success of this learning process is entirely dependent on the ability of the boy to understand the available written material on the subject. Explanations of passages are possible but are necessarily limited to the lack of time of the teacher and the likelihood that the boy will not ask for help. To be able to understand what he reads a boy must have the ability to read. Next he must have material that is understandable for a person of his reading ability. This second factor has prompted this study