The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics

This essay by Professor David Luban is written in response to critics of his book, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity. In part I Professor Luban addresses the primacy that he assigns conscience over the professional role and focuses mainly on the arguments of his critics, Professors Norman Spaulding and W. Bradley Wendel. Part II explores the challenge of pluralism, replying primarily to Professors Katherine Kruse, Spaulding, and Wendel. Part III, in response to Professors Kruse and William Simon, elaborates on the concept of human dignity. Part IV discusses institutions and ethics, focusing on Professors Susan Carle and Simon. The final part discusses Professor Anthony Alfieri’s essay

Risk Taking and Force Protection

time: 2.30-4.30pmroom: Osgoode Hall – IKB 4034speaker: David Luban (Georgetown)respondent: Dan Priel (Osgoode

Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person

A Review of The Good Lawyer: Lawyers\u27 Roles and Lawyers\u27 Ethics edited by David Luban and The Adversary System: A Description and Defense by Stephan Landsma

Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren\u27t Busy Assaulting It)

David Luban argues in this lecture that the moral foundation of the lawyer\u27s profession lies in the defense of human dignity-and the chief moral danger facing the profession arises when lawyers assault human dignity rather than defend it. The concept of human dignity has a rich philosophical tradition, with some philosophers identifying human dignity as a metaphysical property of individuals-a property such as having a soul, or possessing autonomy. Luban argues instead that human dignity is a relational property of the dignifier and the dignified, emphasizing that assaulting human dignity humiliates the victim. Lawyers honor the human dignity of others by protecting them against humiliations, and defile that dignity by subjecting them to humiliations. The lecture develops these ideas through four traditional issues in legal ethics: the right of criminal defendants to an advocate, the duty of confidentiality, paternalism of attorneys toward their clients, and pro bono service

Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense

Since David Luban\u27s is the work on legal ethics that I admire and agree with most, there is an element of perversity in my vehement critique of his arguments on criminal defense. I am therefore especially thankful for his gracious and thoughtful response. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that Luban is mistaken in excepting criminal defense from much of the responsibility to substantive justice that we both think appropriate in every other sphere of lawyering

Lawyer\u27s Justice

A Review of Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study by David Luban, and The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: Case Studies by Philip B. Heymann and Lance Liebma

The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes\u27s \u3ci\u3eThe Path of the Law\u3c/i\u3e

Although Justice Holmes did not much enjoy listening to speeches (he once wondered what makes the world throng to hear loose-fibred and coarse-grained men drool ), he had a remarkable gift for writing them. Holmes\u27s 1920 Collected Legal Papers includes a dozen speeches and addresses, all delivered to student audiences or lawyers\u27 associations, and there are unexpected pleasures to be found in every one. He had published all but four in a previous book of speeches, where he described them as chance utterances of faith and doubt.., for a few friends who will care to keep them. \u27 Among the four he omitted from his compendium of speeches are his only surviving full length addresses, Law in Science and Science in Law and The Path of the Law. These, Mark Howe observes, evidently seemed to Holmes to be something more significant than \u27chance utterances of faith and doubt. \u2

Fred Zacharias’s Skeptical Moralism

Fred Zacharias\u27s articles, Rethinking Confidentiality, published in two parts, were a sensational start to an illustrious career. Fred conducted the first and one of the best empirical studies of confidentiality in years, surveying lawyers and clients in Tompkins County, New York, about what lawyers actually told clients about confidentiality and its exceptions, and what difference the exceptions made in whether clients withheld information from their lawyers

Group Rights, Group Intentions, and the Value of Groups

This paper is part of a symposium on Berel Lang’s 2016 book Genocide: The Act as Idea (University of Pennsylvania Press). While agreeing with much of Lang’s important argument about the moral significance of criminalizing genocide as a crime against groups, I raise several objections and questions. Lang ties the crime of genocide to group rights, specifically the right of groups to exist in the future; I argue that the concept of group rights obscures rather than clarifies the crime of genocide. What matters is not the rights of groups but the value of groups, both to their members and to non-members. The two leading accounts are those of Arendt and Lemkin, one pluralist and one universalist, and Lang leaves the issue dividing them unresolved. He also neglects an important objection to the criminalization of genocide, namely that placing so much emphasis on groups invites just the kind of tribalist mentality that fosters genocide. Finally, I raise doubts about Lang’s claim that anyone who commits genocide knows it is wrong

Asking the Right Questions

At this Symposium, we have heard about forms of law practice that raise large questions about the lawyer\u27s role. My sole theme in the present essay is that we often ask the wrong large questions. Too often, the questions about multidisciplinary practice ( MDP ), mediation and arbitration, and in-house lawyering are whether they are good for lawyers and good for clients. These are questions, I will suggest, that the market itself will decide. The right question is not whether new roles with no rules are good for lawyers and clients, but rather whether they are good for the rest of us- us being the citizenry who count on lawyers to be guardians of the law, and who market forces will not necessarily protect. All three of the new roles raise the interesting prospect of the lawyer\u27s traditional role dissolving into a different one as role boundaries blur and thin. In MDP, the prospect is that lawyers become indistinguishable from accountants, investment bankers, financial advisors, or business consultants. For in-house lawyers, the prospect is that lawyers become indistinguishable from corporate executives, or, more broadly, from clients. And for third-party neutrals, the prospect is that lawyers become very much like judges. I will not be discussing all three roles in this paper. My principal focus is on multidisciplinary practice. The role of in-house counsel is a secondary focus, and I shall not address the role of third-party neutral at all