The Reaquisition of Credit Following Chapter 7 Personal Bankruptcy

Federal law allows credit bureaus to report past bankruptcies up to ten years, so the financial implication of filing includes a ten-year influence on new credit. I document this influence with a large panel database of credit files which tracks many Chapter 7 filers past the moment when the filing disappears from potential creditors' view, providing a tightly controlled test of the filing's impact on credit access. The principal finding is that the bankruptcy flag has a big effect on the access of the more creditworthy past filers; when they lose their bankruptcy flags, their credit scores jump substantially and they open new credit relationships, high-limit bank cards in particular, quickly. Subsequently, the score-increases mostly reverse and delinquency is abnormally high.

Investment Decisions Depend on Portfolio Disclosure

A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This allows for a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios.

A portfolio view of consumer credit

This paper takes a portfolio view of consumer credit. Default models (credit-risk scores) estimate the probability of default of individual loans. But to compute risk-adjusted returns, lenders also need to know the covariances of the returns on their loans with aggregate returns. Covariances are independently relevant for lenders who care directly about the volatility of their portfolios, e.g., because of Value-at-Risk considerations or the structure of the securitization market. Cross-sectional differences in these covariances also provide insight into the nature of the shocks hitting different types of consumers. ; The authors use a unique panel dataset of credit bureau records to measure the ‘covariance risk’ of individual consumers, i.e., the covariance of their default risk with aggregate consumer default rates, and more generally to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of credit, including the effects of credit scores. They obtain two key sets of results. First, there is significant systematic heterogeneity in covariance risk across consumers with different characteristics. Consumers with high covariance risk tend to also have low credit scores (high default probabilities). Second, the amount of credit obtained by consumers significantly increases with their credit scores, and significantly decreases with their covariance risk (especially revolving credit), though the effect of covariance risk is smaller in magnitude. It appears that some lenders take covariance risk into account, at least in part, in determining the amount of credit they provide. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 05-15Consumer credit ; Credit scoring systems

Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money Management

Recent studies (e.g. Gruber (1996)) conclude that a subset of investors allocates away from funds with relatively worse prospects, and toward funds with better prospects. The implication for a given fund is that good prospects increase the density of performance-sensitive investors, and bad prospects increase the density of performance-insensitive investors. Since fees come out of performance, this has a straightforward pricing implication: investors remaining in the funds with bad prospects should be charged more, whether by the same fund or by a different fund that absorbs the investors. This dynamic is apparent from several angles in a sample of retail money-funds.

A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit

To compute risk-adjusted returns and gauge the volatility of their portfolios, lenders need to know the covariances of their loans' returns with aggregate returns. Cross-sectional differences in these covariances also provide insight into the nature of the shocks hitting different types of consumers. We use a unique panel dataset of credit bureau records to measure the 'covariance risk' of individual consumers, i.e., the covariance of their default risk with aggregate consumer default rates, and more generally to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of credit, including the effects of credit scores. We obtain two key sets of results. First, there is significant systematic heterogeneity in covariance risk across consumers with different characteristics. Consumers with high covariance risk tend to also have low credit scores (high default probabilities). Second, the amount of credit obtained by consumers significantly increases with their credit scores, and significantly decreases with their covariance risk (especially revolving credit), though the effect of covariance risk is smaller in magnitude.

What Happens When Information Leaves a Market? Evidence From Postbankruptcy Consumers

Federal law mandates the removal of personal bankruptcies from credit reports after 10 years. The removal’s effect is market efficiency in reverse. The short-term effect is a spurious boost in apparent creditworthiness, especially for the more creditworthy bankrupts, delivering a substantial increase in both credit scores and the number and aggregate limit of bank cards. The longer-term effect is lower scores and higher delinquency than initial full-information scores predict. These findings relate to both the debate over the bankruptcy code and the wisdom of influencing market clearing by removing information

Investment Decisions Depend on Portfolio Disclosures

A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This makes possible a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios. Cross-sectional comparisons locate the most intense rebalancing in the worst recent performers

Predatory mortgage lending

Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders attenuates predatory lending. We use our model to analyze the effects of legislative interventions.Predatory lending

Predatory lending in rational world

Regulators express growing concern over “predatory lending,” which we take to mean lending that reduces the expected utility of borrowers. We present a rational model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, and identify the circumstances in which it arises with and without competition. Predatory lending is associated with imperfect competition, highly collateralized loans, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders eliminates predatory lending.Predatory lending

Trading and Voting

Complete financial markets transform the political choice between candidates with different redistribution policies. If redistribution policies do not affect aggregate wealth, then financial trade implies that wealth considerations have no effect on voting and so do not affect who wins. However, an election in which one candidate would redistribute results in redistribution, and redistribution is the same whether or not he wins. Furthermore, he proposes, and if elected carries out, more redistribution than he prefers. If redistribution policies do affect aggregate wealth, then everybody expects more wealth if the candidate with the higher aggregate‐wealth policy wins