3,079 research outputs found

    Differentiation Requires Continuous Regulation

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    Efficient Provision of High-Quality Early Childhood Education: Does the Private Sector or Public Sector Do It Best?

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    Bildung, Kinder, Pädagogik, Bildungspolitik, Bildungsinvestition, Privatwirtschaft, Öffentlicher Sektor, Education, Children, Education sciences, Educational policy, Human capital investment, Private sector, Public Sector

    The Determinants and Consequences of Child Care Subsidies for Single Mothers

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    This paper provides an analysis of child care subsidies under welfare reform. Previous studies of child care subsidies use data from the pre-welfare-reform period, and their results may not apply to the very different post-reform environment. We use data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families to analyze the determinants of receipt of a child care subsidy and the effects of subsidy receipt on employment, school attendance, job search, and welfare participation. We analyze the impact on subsidy receipt of household characteristics such as family size and structure, and past participation in welfare. The most important determinant of receipt of a child care subsidy is past receipt, but we cannot determine from our analysis whether this is a causal effect or a result of unobserved heterogeneity. Ordinary least squares estimates that treat subsidy receipt as exogenous show an effect of subsidy receipt of about 13 percentage points on employment. Two stage least squares estimates that treat subsidy receipt as endogenous and use county dummies as identifying instruments show an effect of 32 percentage points. We present some evidence that is consistent with the assumption that county dummies are valid identifying instruments, and some evidence that is inconsistent with the assumption.

    Framing social security reform: Behavioral responses to changes in the full retirement age

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    We use a US Social Security reform as a quasi-experiment to provide evidence on framing effects in retirement behavior. The reform increased the full retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66 in two month increments per year of birth for cohorts born from 1938 to 1943. We find strong evidence that the spike in the benefit claiming hazard at 65 moved in lockstep along with the FRA. Results on self-reported retirement and exit from employment are less clear-cut, but go in the same direction. The responsiveness to the new FRA is stronger for people with higher cognitive skills. We interpret the findings as evidence of reference dependence with loss aversion. We develop a simple labor supply model with reference dependence that can explain the results. The model has potentially important implications for framing of future Social Security reforms.social security ; framing ; loss aversion ; retirement

    Framing Social Security Reform: Behavioral Responses to Changes in the Full Retirement Age

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    We use a US Social Security reform as a quasi-experiment to provide evidence on framing effects in retirement behavior. The reform increased the full retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66 in two month increments per year of birth for cohorts born from 1938 to 1943. We find strong evidence that the spike in the benefit claiming hazard at 65 moved in lockstep along with the FRA. Results on self-reported retirement and exit from employment are less clear-cut, but go in the same direction. The responsiveness to the new FRA is stronger for people with higher cognitive skills. We interpret the findings as evidence of reference dependence with loss aversion. We develop a simple labor supply model with reference dependence that can explain the results. The model has potentially important implications for framing of future Social Security reforms.retirement, social security, loss aversion

    The Role of Retiree Health Insurance in the Employment Behavior of Older Men

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    We model the employment and medical care decisions of older men who face health risk. The budget constraint incorporates detailed characteristics of health insurance as well as Social Security and private pensions. A man whose health insurance is tied to continued employment with his current employer faces the risk of large medical expenditures in the event of an adverse health shock if he retires before becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65. A man whose employer provides retiree health insurance or who has access to other health insurance not tied to his employment decision (e.g., from his wife) can retire before age 65 without consequences for his health insurance coverage. We use data from the Health and Retirement Survey to estimate the parameters of the model using structural methods. Simulations based on the estimates imply that changes in health insurance, including access and restrictions to retiree health insurance and Medicare have a modest impact on employment behavior among older males.

    The Supply of Quality in Child Care Centers

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    We use data from a sample of day care centers to estimate the relationships between cost and the quality of the child care service provided, and between revenue and quality. We use a measure of child care quality derived from an instrument designed by developmental psychologists. This measure of quality has been found to be positively associated with child development. Taking the estimated cost-quality and revenue-quality relationships as given, we then estimate the objective functions of the firms and compute the supply function for quality. The results indicate that (1) the estimated cost function is inconsistent with the implications of cost-minimization; (2) for-profit firms operate at a positive level of marginal cost, but non-profit firms operate at zero or negative marginal cost; (3) revenue is positively but weakly associated with quality; and (4) the supply of quality is inelastic, with point estimates of the supply elasticity of .04-.05 for both for-profit and non-profit firms. Implications of the results for child care policy are discussed.

    Federal Child Care Policy

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    What Determines Family Structure?

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    We estimate the effects of policy and labor market variables on the fertility, union formation and dissolution, type of union (cohabiting versus married), and partner choices of the NLSY79 cohort of women. These demographic behaviors interact to determine the family structure experienced by the children of these women: living with the biological mother and the married or cohabiting biological father, a married or cohabiting step father, or no man. We find that the average wage rates available to men and women have substantial effects on family structure for children of black and Hispanic mothers, but not for whites. The tax treatment of children also affects family structure. Implementation of welfare reform and passage of unilateral divorce laws had much smaller effects on family structure for the children of this cohort of women, as did changes in welfare benefits. The estimates imply that observed changes from the 1970s to the 2000s in the policy and labor market variables considered here contributed to a reduction in the proportion of time spent living without a father by children of the NLSY79 cohort of women. This suggests that the observed increase in this non-traditional family structure in the U.S. in the last three decades was caused by other factors.family structure

    Pensions, household saving, and welfare: A dynamic analysis of crowd out

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    This paper specifies a life cycle model of saving and employment and uses it to analyze crowd out of private household saving by public and private pensions. Some parameters of the model are estimated and others are calibrated to match life cycle employment and asset profiles, and Social Security claiming decisions. Simulation results indicate that defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pensions on average crowd out household wealth by 0.09and0.09 and 0.37 per dollar of pension wealth, respectively, while crowd out by Social Security is $0.56. The magnitude of crowd out is sensitive to model specification, with more restrictive versions of the model (e.g., no employment decision, no bequest motive, no uncertainty) generally resulting in larger simulated crowd out. A welfare analysis implies that DB pensions and Social Security are not valued by households. The longevity insurance provided by such plans is offset by a high degree of impatience and, for Social Security, low benefits relative to taxes paid. A typical DC pension is valued at about one quarter of its expected present discounted value
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