Political strategies of external support for democratization

Political strategies of external support to democratization are contrasted and critically examined in respect of the United States and European Union. The analysis begins by defining its terms of reference and addresses the question of what it means to have a strategy. The account briefly notes the goals lying behind democratization support and their relationship with the wider foreign policy process, before considering what a successful strategy would look like and how that relates to the selection of candidates. The literature's attempts to identify strategy and its recommendations for better strategies are compared and assessed. Overall, the article argues that the question of political strategies of external support for democratization raises several distinct but related issues including the who?, what?, why?, and how? On one level, strategic choices can be expected to echo the comparative advantage of the "supporter." On a different level, the strategies cannot be divorced from the larger foreign policy framework. While it is correct to say that any sound strategy for support should be grounded in a theoretical understanding of democratization, the literature on strategies reveals something even more fundamental: divergent views about the nature of politics itself. The recommendations there certainly pinpoint weaknesses in the actual strategies of the United States and Europe but they have their own limitations too. In particular, in a world of increasing multi-level governance strategies for supporting democratization should go beyond preoccupation with just an "outside-in" approach

The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labor Market

Using the institutional theory of transaction cost, I demonstrate that the assumptions of the competitive labor market model are internally contradictory and lead to the conclusion that on purely theoretical grounds a perfectly competitive labor market is a logical impossibility. By extension, the familiar diagram of wage determination by supply and demand is also a logical impossibility and the neoclassical labor demand curve is not a well-defined construct. The reason is that the perfectly competitive market model presumes zero transaction cost and with zero transaction cost all labor is hired as independent contractors, implying multi-person firms, the employment relationship, and labor market disappear. With positive transaction cost, on the other hand, employment contracts are incomplete and the labor supply curve to the firm is upward sloping, again causing the labor demand curve to be ill-defined. As a result, theory suggests that wage rates are always and everywhere an amalgam of an administered and bargained price. Working Paper 06-0

The Non-existence of the Labor Demand/Supply Diagram, and Other Theorems of Institutional Economics

The most famous and influential diagram in modern (neoclassical) labor economics is the model of wage determination by supply and demand. Using concepts and ideas from institutional economics, I argue that the theory of a perfectly competitive labor market is logically contradictory and, hence, the demand/supply diagram cannot exist on the plane of pure theory. Four other fundamental theorems concerning labor markets are also derived, as are implications about the theoretical foundation of the field of industrial relations and the economic evaluation of labor and employment policy. In this article I accomplish four things of significance. The first is to demonstrate that the core diagram of neoclassical labor economics - the diagram of wage determination by demand and supply (D/S) - does not have logical coherence and thus has no existence on the plane of pure theory. The second is to deduce this conclusion using a core concept of institutional economics (i.e., transaction cost), thus demonstrating that the institutional approach to labor economics has theoretical explanatory power. The third is to use the transaction cost idea to also deduce four fundamental theorems concerning labor markets and wage determination. The fourth is to identify the core theoretical foundation of the field of industrial relations. This discussion also yields important implications for the economic evaluation of labor and employment policy, as well as interesting insights on the history of thought in labor economics. Working Paper 07-2

Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age

Since the dawn of the nuclear age small groups of activists have consistently protested both the content of United States national security policy, and the process by which it is made. Only occasionally, however, has concern about nuclear weapons spread beyond these relatively marginal groups, generated substantial public support, and reached mainstream political institutions. In this paper, I use histories of peace protest and analyses of the inside of these social movements and theoretical work on protest cycles to explain cycles of movement engagement and quiescence in terms of their relation to external political context, or the "structure of political opportunity." I begin with a brief review of the relevant literature on the origins of movements, noting parallels in the study of interest groups. Building on recent literature on political opportunity structure, I suggest a theoretical framework for understanding the lifecycle of a social movement that emphasizes the interaction between activist choices and political context, proposing a six-stage process through which challenging movements develop. Using this theoretical framework I examine the four cases of relatively broad antinuclear weapons mobilization in postwar America. I conclude with a discussion of movement cycles and their relation to political alignment, public policy, and institutional politics.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68552/2/10.1177_106591299304600302.pd

A Cis-Regulatory Map of the Drosophila Genome

Systematic annotation of gene regulatory elements is a major challenge in genome science. Direct mapping of chromatin modification marks and transcriptional factor binding sites genome-wide1, 2 has successfully identified specific subtypes of regulatory elements3. In Drosophila several pioneering studies have provided genome-wide identification of Polycomb response elements4, chromatin states5, transcription factor binding sites6, 7, 8, 9, RNA polymerase II regulation8 and insulator elements10; however, comprehensive annotation of the regulatory genome remains a significant challenge. Here we describe results from the modENCODE cis-regulatory annotation project. We produced a map of the Drosophila melanogaster regulatory genome on the basis of more than 300 chromatin immunoprecipitation data sets for eight chromatin features, five histone deacetylases and thirty-eight site-specific transcription factors at different stages of development. Using these data we inferred more than 20,000 candidate regulatory elements and validated a subset of predictions for promoters, enhancers and insulators in vivo. We identified also nearly 2,000 genomic regions of dense transcription factor binding associated with chromatin activity and accessibility. We discovered hundreds of new transcription factor co-binding relationships and defined a transcription factor network with over 800 potential regulatory relationships