The Role of Organizational Justice in Pay and Employee Benefit Satisfaction, and Its Effects on Work Attitudes

The objective of our study is to provide a complementary approach with regard to organizational justice in the domain of compensation. It presents research undertaken on a sample of six hundred employees in three different Canadian organizations. The results reveal that employees distinguish clearly between pay satisfaction and benefit satisfaction, and that distributive justice perceptions are better predictors of pay satisfaction than procedural justice perceptions. This result is reversed for employee benefit satisfaction: procedural justice perceptions are better predictors than distributive justice perceptions. Lastly, the results show that distributive justice perceptions with regard to pay play a more important role than procedural justice in job satisfaction and satisfaction with the organization. Cet article a pour but d'apporter un éclairage complémentaire en ce qui concerne la justice organisationnelle dans le domaine de la rémunération. On y fait état de recherches réalisées auprès de six cents salariés appartenant à trois organisations canadiennes différentes. Les résultats révèlent que les salariés dissocient bien la satisfaction à l'égard du salaire, de la satisfaction à l'égard des avantages sociaux. Ils montrent également que les perceptions de justice distributives permettent de mieux prédire la satisfaction à l'égard du salaire que les perceptions de justice procédurales. Le résultat est inverse en ce qui concerne la satisfaction à l'égard des avantages sociaux : les perceptions de justice procédurales sont de meilleurs prédicteurs que les perceptions de justice distributives. Ils montrent enfin que la perception de justice distributive concernant les salaires joue un rôle plus important que la justice procédurale dans la satisfaction à l'égard du travail et à l'égard de l'entreprise.Organizational justice, pay and benefit satisfaction, work attitudes, Justice organisationnelle, satisfaction du salaire, satisfaction des avantages sociaux, attitudes au travail

Explaining Sales Pay Strategy Using Agency, Transaction Cost and Resource Dependence Theories

The purpose of this study was to investigate, using data gathered from 325 French-Canadian organizations, the influence of key constructs related to agency, transaction cost and resource dependence theories on the proportion of salary in sales compensation. Level of task programmability, capacity to observe behavior, career opportunities and financial resources offered were associated with an increased use of salary pay. In contrast, difficulty of measuring result outcomes, availability of product/service-related resources and high marginal sales force productivity were associated with decreased use of the salary component. Results supported the argument that integration of multiple theoretical perspectives offered a better explanation of pay policy. However, the results have not supported the ability of market and selling uncertainty to predict the proportion of salary L'objectif de cette étude était d'examiner, auprès d'un échantillon de 325 organisations, l'influence des construits clés relatifs à la théorie de l'agence, la théorie des coûts de transaction et la théorie de la dépendence des ressource sur la proportion du salaire dans l'enveloppe de la rémunération directe du personnel de vente. Le niveau de programmation des tâches, la capacité à observer les comportements, les opportunités de carrière et les ressources financières offertes étaient associés à une augmentation du recours de la composante salariale. En revanche, le degré de difficulté à mesurer les résultats, la disponibilité de ressources reliés aux produits/services et un grand différentiel de performance étaient associés à une diminution de la composante salaire. Les résultats supportent l'argument de l'intégration d'une multitude de perspecttives théoriques pour expliquer le choix des stratégies salariales.Sales, compensation, agency theory, cost analysis theory, resource dependence theory, Représentants aux ventes, rémunération, théorie de l'agence, théorie des coûts de transaction, théorie de la dépendance des ressources

Gainsharing and Mutual Monitoring: A Combined Agency-Procedural Justice Interpretation

This study examines the behavioral consequences of gainsharing using a combined theoretical framework that includes elements of agency and procedural justice theory. The hypothesis tested is that gainsharing as a collective form of incentive alignment results in increased mutual monitoring among agents (employees) when the plan is perceived to be procedurally fair. The hypothesis was supported in two separate firms using a quasi-experimental field study. The implications of the study for future extensions of agency theory to examine intraorganizational phenomena are discussed

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States Final Report

On April 9, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. issued Executive Order 14023 establishing this Commission, to consist of “individuals having experience with and knowledge of the Federal judiciary and the Supreme Court of the United States.” The Order charged the Commission with producing a report for the President that addresses three sets of questions. First, the Report should include “[a]n account of the contemporary commentary and debate about the role and operation of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system and about the functioning of the constitutional process by which the President nominates and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints Justices to the Supreme Court.” Second, the Report should consider the “historical background of other periods in the Nation’s history when the Supreme Court’s role and the nominations and advice-and-consent process were subject to critical assessment and prompted proposals for reform.” Third, the Report should provide an analysis of the principal arguments for and against particular proposals to reform the Supreme Court, “including an appraisal of [their] merits and legality,” and should be informed by “a broad spectrum of ideas.” The Report begins by explaining the genesis of today’s Court reform debate, including by identifying developments that gave rise to President Biden’s decision to issue the April 2021 Executive Order, particularly the debates surrounding the most recent nominations. This Introduction emphasizes that the Court’s composition and jurisprudence long have been subjects of public controversy and debate in the nation’s civic life: The Court serves as a crucial guardian of the rule of law and also plays a central role in major social and political conflicts. Its decisions have profound effects on the life of the nation. Though conflict surrounding the processes by which the President nominates and the Senate confirms Justices is not new, it has become more intensely partisan in recent years. The Introduction also articulates three common and interrelated ideas frequently invoked in reform debates and throughout the Chapters of the Report: the importance of protecting or enhancing the Court’s legitimacy; the role of judicial independence in our system of government; and the value of democracy and its relationship to the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. These important ideas can mean different things to different people. The Introduction discusses the range of meanings ascribed to these terms, with the aim of clarifying how they are deployed in arguments for and against reform

Assessing managerial power theory: A meta-analytic approach to understanding the determinants of CEO compensation

Although studies about the determinants of CEO compensation are ubiquitous, the balance of evidence for one of the more controversial theoretical approaches, managerial power theory, remains inconclusive. The authors provide a meta-analysis of 219 U.S.-based studies, focusing on the relationships between indicators of managerial power and levels of CEO compensation and CEO pay-performance sensitivities. The results indicate that managerial power theory is well equipped for predicting core compensation variables such as total cash and total compensation but less so for predicting the sensitivity of pay to performance. In most situations where CEOs are expected to have power over the pay setting process, they receive significantly higher levels of total cash and total compensation. In contrast, where boards are expected to have more power, CEOs receive lower total cash and total compensation. In addition, powerful directors also appear to be able to establish tighter links between CEO compensation and firm performance and can accomplish this even in the face of powerful CEOs. The authors discuss the implications for theory and research regarding the determinants of executive compensation