Wiring the Labor Market

Workers and jobs are naturally heterogeneous and the quality of their interaction when paired is difficult to forecast. The Internet promises to open new channels for worker-firm communications. What are the consequences of this opening? I discuss three labor market features that may be altered: how worker-firm matches are made; how labor services are delivered; and how local markets shape labor demand. Theory predicts these developments will produce social benefits. But the gains are unlikely to be uniform and realizing them will generate novel problems. One result may be the formation of new institutions to address issues accompanying these opportunities.

The polarization of job opportunities in the U.S. labor market: implications for employment and earnings

An in-depth analysis of the state of the U.S. labor market over the past three decades reveals that the U.S. labor market is polarizing into low- and high-skill jobs, with fewer opportunities in the middle.Labor market

The Economics of Labor Market Intermediation: An Analytic Framework

Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that interpose themselves between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved. This paper offers a conceptual foundation for analyzing the economic role played by these understudied institutions, and to develop a qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative sense of their significance to market operation and welfare. Though heterogeneous, I argue that LMIs share a common function, which is to redress – and in some cases exploit – a set of endemic departures of labor market operation from the efficient neoclassical benchmark. At a rudimentary level, LMIs such as online job boards reduce search frictions by aggregating and reselling disparate information at a cost below which workers and firms could obtain themselves. Beyond passively supplying information, a set of LMIs forcibly redress adverse selection problems in labor markets by compelling workers and firms to reveal normally hidden credentials, such as criminal background, academic standing, or financial integrity. At their most forceful, LMIs such as labor unions and centralized job matching clearinghouses resolve coordination and collective action failures in markets by tightly controlling – even monopolizing – the process by which workers and firms meet, match and negotiate. A unifying observation of the analytic framework is that participation in the activities of a given LMI are typically voluntary for one side of the market and compulsory for the other; workers cannot, for example, elect to suppress their criminal records and firms cannot opt out of collective bargaining. I argue that the nature of participation in an LMI’s activities – voluntary or compulsory, and for which parties – is dictated by the market imperfection that it addresses and thus tells us much about its economic function.intermediation, unions, job search, internet, temporary-help, adverse selection, collective action

This Job Is 'Getting Old:' Measuring Changes in Job Opportunities Using Occupational Age Structure

High- and low-wage occupations are expanding rapidly relative to middle-wage occupations in both the U.S. and the E.U. We study the reallocation of workers from middle-skill occupations towards the tails of the occupational skill distribution by analyzing changes in age structure within and across occupations. Because occupations typically expand by hiring young workers and contract by curtailing such hiring, we posit that growing occupations will get younger while shrinking occupations will 'get old.' After verifying this proposition, we apply this observation to local labor markets in the U.S. to test whether markets that were specialized in middle-skilled occupations in 1980 saw a differential movement of both older and younger workers into occupations at the tails of the skill distribution over the subsequent 25 years. Consistent with aggregate trends, employment in initially middle-skill-intensive labor markets hollowed-out between 1980 and 2005. Employment losses among non-college workers in the middle of the occupational skill distribution were almost entirely countered by employment growth in lower-tail occupations. For college workers, employment losses at the middle were offset in roughly equal measures by gains in the upper- and lower-tails of the occupational skill distribution. But gains at the upper-tail were almost entirely limited to young college workers. Consequently, older college workers are increasingly found in lower-skill, lower-paying occupations.job polarization, occupational structure, age structure, local labor markets, technical change

Inequality and Specialization: The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs in the United States

After a decade in which wages and employment fell precipitously in low-skill occupations and expanded in high-skill occupations, the shape of U.S. earnings and job growth sharply polarized in the 1990s. Employment shares and relative earnings rose in both low and high-skill jobs, leading to a distinct U-shaped relationship between skill levels and employment and wage growth. This paper analyzes the sources of the changing shape of the lower-tail of the U.S. wage and employment distributions. A first contribution is to document a hitherto unknown fact: the twisting of the lower tail is substantially accounted for by a single proximate cause − rising employment and wages in low-education, in-person service occupations. We study the determinants of this rise at the level of local labor markets over the period of 1950 through 2005. Our approach is rooted in a model of changing task specialization in which "routine" clerical and production tasks are displaced by automation. We find that in labor markets that were initially specialized in routine-intensive occupations, employment and wages polarized after 1980, with growing employment and earnings in both high-skill occupations and low-skill service jobs.skill demand, job tasks, inequality, polarization, technological change, occupational choice

Structural demand shifts and potential labor supply responses in the new century

It is widely recognized that inequality of labor market earnings in the United States grew dramatically in recent decades. Over the course of more than three decades, wage growth was weak to nonexistent at the bottom of the distribution, strong at the top of the distribution, and modest at the middle. While real hourly earnings of workers in the bottom 30 percent of the earnings distribution rose by no more than 10 percentage points, earnings of workers at the 90th percentile rose by more than 40 percentage points. What is much less widely known, however, is that this smooth, monotone growth of wage inequality is a feature of a specific time period--and that this time period has passed.Labor supply ; Wages

Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?

Nominally free, unrestricted training in portable computer skills is offered by the majority of U.S. temporary help supply (THS) establishments, a practice that is inconsistent with the competitive model of training. This paper asks why temporary help firms provide free general skills training. The answer proposed is that in addition to skills formation, training plays an informational role at THS firms by eliciting private information about worker ability. The model is built on the premise that training is more productive and therefore valuable to high ability workers. Firms offer a package of training and initially lower wages that induces self-selection. Workers of high perceived ability choose training in anticipation of a steeper wage profile while low ability workers are deterred by limited expected gains. Firms profit from their sunk training investment via their short-run informational advantage about ability and thereby limited monopsony power. Market competition among THS firms reduces employer rents, yielding higher wages and more training. Detailed tests of the model using representative establishment data on wages and training find strong support. The analysis demonstrates that beyond providing spot market labor, THS firms gather and sell information about worker quality to clients. The rapid growth of THS as a labor market information broker implies that the demand for worker screening is rising.

Explaining trends in wages, work, and occupations

The inequality of labor market earnings in the U.S. has increased dramatically in recent decades. However, closer examination of the data reveals two distinct periods of rising inequality: 1973–89 and 1989–2005. The first period was one of diverging wages throughout the distribution, while the second period was one of polarizing wage growth.Labor market ; Wages ; Employment