A Soft Budget Constraint Explanation for the Venture Capital Cycle

We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture which multiplies the well known agency problems. We argue that an inside investor cannot provide a hard budget constraint while a less well informed outsider can. Therefore, the venture capitalist delegates the continuation decision to the outsider by ex ante restricting the amount of capital he has under management. The soft budget constraint problem becomes the more important the higher the entrepreneur’s private benefits are and the higher the probability of failure of a project is

Public Policy and Venture Capital Backed Innovation

This paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasizes four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, entrepreneurial effort and venture capital advice during the start-up period, and introduction of new goods by successful start-ups. The paper considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of policy reform with regard to capital gains taxation, innovation subsidies, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives

Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective.

This paper investigates the structure of outside investment in a profitable entrepreneurial venture. Though efficient, financing the venture up front may be infeasible because the entrepreneur cannot commit to not renegotiate down the outside investor's claim once she's sunk her investment. Staging the investment over time helps to mitigate this commitment problem. The early rounds of investment create collateral that support the later rounds. The author characterizes the optimal staged investment path and shows how it is affected by various features of the venture. The predictions of the model are consistent with observations on staged financing in venture capital. Copyright 1999 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.