'duo au courant'

Daron HagenDominick Argent

Jake Daron, Piano

Jake Daron, Pianohttps://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/musicprograms/2652/thumbnail.jp

Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis

Statement of responsibility reads: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre YaredAugust 200

Esther Kim, Violin

Esther Kim, Violin Jake Daron, Pianohttps://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/musicprograms/2650/thumbnail.jp

Economic and political inequality in development : the case of Cundinamarca, Colombia

Statement of responsibility on t.p. reads: Daron Acemoglu , Mara Angelica Bautista, Pablo Querubin, James A. RobinsonJune 200

The consequences of radical reform : the French Revolution

Statement of responsibility on t.p. reads: Daron Acemoglu, David Cantoni, Simon Johnson, James A. RobinsonMarch 19, 200

Faculty recital series: James Demler and Shiela Kibbe, January 27, 2009

This is the concert program of the faculty recital of James Demler and Shiela Kibbe on Tuesday, January 27, 2009 at 7:30 p.m., at the Boston University Concert Hall, 855 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts. Works performed were Four Shakespeare Songs, Opus 30 by Roger Quilter, Larkin Songs by Daron Hagen, Five Street Songs and Pieces by Charles Ives, Four Songs by Samuel Barber, and Songs Before Sleep by Richard Rodney Bennett. Digitization for Boston University Concert Programs was supported by the Boston University Center for the Humanities Library Endowed Fund

Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics

Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions, in contrast to what would be suggested by a reasoning extending the Coase Theorem to politics? Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions because of differences in the beliefs and ideologies of their peoples or leaders? Or are inefficiencies in politics and economics the outcome of social and distributional conflicts? This paper discusses these various approaches to political economy, and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent, and that they are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups holding political power, at the expense of the society at large. At the center of the theoretical case are the commitment problems inherent in politics: parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements.

The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies

This paper develops a model where this is a trade-off between the enforcement of the property rights of different groups. An oligarchic' society, where political power is in the hands of major producers, protects their property rights, but also tends to erect significant entry barriers, violating the property rights of future producers. Democracy, where political power is more widely diffuesed, imposes redistributive taxes on the producers, but tends to avoid entry barriers. When taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low, an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency. Nevertheless, because comparative advantage in entreprenuership shifts away from the incumbents, the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time. The typical pattern is therefore one of the rise and decline of oligarchic societies: of two otherwise identical societies, the one with an oligarchic organization will first become richer, but later fall behind the democratic society. I also discuss how democratic societies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies, and how the unequal distribution of income in an oligarchic society supports the oligarchic institutions and may keep them in place even when the become significantly costly to society.