Explaining the Constitutional Integration and Resurgence of Traditional Political Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa

Social scientists have recently observed a “resurgence” of traditional political institutions on the constitutional level in Sub-Sahara Africa. Yet, the scope and causes of the resurgence remain unclear. We base our analysis on original data on the degree of constitutional integration of traditional institutions and on their constitutional resurgence since 1990 in 45 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. We test six theoretical explanations for constitutionalization: former colonial rule, democratization, state capacity, economic development, foreign aid and settlement patterns. First, we verify the broad resurgence of traditional political institutions on a constitutional level. Second, our analysis suggests that, particularly in former British colonies, traditional leaders were able to translate the arrangements of British colonial rule as well as the advantages of a country’s deconcentrated settlement pattern into greater constitutional status. Third, settlement patterns proved important for traditional leaders to gain or increase constitutional status – leading to a constitutional resurgence of traditional institutions

Changing of the guard? An anatomy of power within Swapo of Namibia

This article presents an anatomy of power relations and policy making within the ranks of the former liberation movement SWAPO in Namibia. It summarizes the features of Namibia‟s dominant party state and argues that Namibia is a case of competitive authoritarian rule. Our analysis documents how the first generation of SWAPO activists, in exile since the early 1960s, has since independence in 1990 remained the most influential segment of the former anticolonial movement. This continuity is personified in the country‟s third president Hage Geingob and parts of his team in cabinet. Despite some gradual and increasingly visible shifts in the composition of SWAPO MPs, the party‟s first generation has so far remained largely in control over the country‟s political affairs. Analysing the background of the ministers serving since independence also shows, that a second generation of SWAPO activists in exile since the mid-1970s gradually expanded influence and took over leading positions. Given the dominance of SWAPO and the lack of any meaningful political opposition, a new leadership depends on upward inner-party mobility. Given the limited scope for a younger generation to move into higher offices, the strengthening of democracy through new leadership and innovative thinking is very limited. Rather, politics tends to be reproduced through established networks and bonds with a low degree of permissiveness, which reinforces the nature of the competitive authoritarian regime under the control of „old men‟.http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org2018-12-31hb2016Political Science

The Dualism of Contemporary Traditional Governance and the State

In many parts of the world, people live in “dual polities”: they are governed by the state and organize collective decision making within their ethnic community according to traditional rules. We examine the substantial body of works on the traditional–state dualism, focusing on the internal organization of traditional polities, their interaction with the state, and the political consequences of the dualism. We find the descriptions of the internal organization of traditional polities scattered and lacking comparative perspective. The literature on the interaction provides a good starting point for theorizing the strategic role of traditional leaders as intermediaries, but large potentials for inference remain underexploited. Studies on the consequences of “dual polities” for democracy, conflict, and development are promising in their explanatory endeavor, but they do not yet allow for robust conclusions. We therefore propose an institutionalist research agenda addressing the need for theory and for systematic data collection and explanatory approaches

Which groups fight? : Customary institutions and communal conflicts in Africa

Why are some ethnic groups embroiled in communal conflicts while others are comparably peaceful? We explore the group-specific correlates of communal conflicts in Africa by utilizing a novel dataset combining ethnographic information on group characteristics with conflict data. Specifically, we investigate whether features of the customary political institutions of ethnic groups matter for their communal-conflict involvement. We show how institutional explanations for conflict, developed to explain state-based wars, can be successfully applied to the customary institutions of ethnic groups. We argue that customary institutions can pacify through facilitating credible nonviolent bargaining. Studying 143 ethnic groups, we provide large-N evidence for such an ‘ethnic civil peace’, showing that groups with a higher number of formalized customary institutions, like houses of chiefs, courts and legislatures, are less prone to communal conflict, both internally and with other groups. We also find some evidence, although slightly weaker, that groups with more inclusive or ‘democratic’ customary institutions are less prone to communal conflicts.publishe

Between Cooperation and Conflict: Tracing the Variance in Relations of Traditional Governance Institutions and the State in Sub-Saharan Africa

The relationship between the state and traditional governance institutions (TGI) in contemporary politics has recently received increased scholarly attention. Traditional leaders play important roles in elections, public goods provision or conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa. We analyze under what conditions cooperation or conflict emerge between the state and TGI. We contribute to the understanding of state-traditional relations by studying how governments interact simultaneously with varying TGI of different ethnic groups. We compare state-TGI relations for eight traditional polities in Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda, based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with state and traditional authorities, experts and constituents. We study three factors shaping state relations with different TGI: (1) the significance of TGI – both social and organizational – in each country and ethnic group; (2) the institutional similarity of TGI and state; and (3) the integration of TGI – both legal and political. Our analysis shows TGI with social significance and functional organizations challenge the state more frequently. Constitutional ambiguity fosters conflict between TGI and state. Relations are less conflictive in countries with more democratic governments. The same governments and TGI often simultaneously engage in cooperative and conflictive relations, highlighting that governments rarely pursue uniform policies with all TGI