Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend

‘Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law’, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, famously remarked in his first Supreme Court dissent. For Holmes, ‘great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment’. On this account neither Marbury v Madison70 nor Van Gend en Loos would qualify. Van Gend was a case of great principle without greatly interesting facts. And Marbury was a great political battle that nevertheless produced a case of great principle

Federal Powers and the Principle of Subsidiarity.

Federal systems across the world are generally designed according to the principle of subsidiarity, which in one form or another holds that the central government should play only a supporting role in governance, acting if and only if the constituent units of government are incapable of acting on their own. The word itself is related to the idea of assistance, as in “subsidy,” and is derived from the Latin “subsidium,” which referred to auxiliary troops in the Roman military. See Oxford Latin Dictionary s.v. (1983)

Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World.

The idea that constitutionalism is central to the legitimate exercise of public power has dominated the modern liberal imagination since the Enlightenment. The ideal of limited collective self-governance has spawned a rich and highly diverse tradition of hard-fought national constitutions from the time of the Glorious Revolution into the present. Today, however, constitutionalism faces its greatest challenge yet: the question of its continued relevance to modern governance. With the explosion of governance beyond the state, many wonder whether constitutionalism as we know it is being marginalized or altogether undermined

Joseph Weiler, Eric Stein, and the Transformation of Constitutional Law

This chapter pursues that idea in three parts. Part I reviews the key contributions of The Transformation of Europe. Part II takes us back for a critical analysis of the idea of ‘constitutionalism’ as first developed by Eric Stein and then deployed by Joseph Weiler. On closer inspection, we shall see here that The Transformation of Europe may have neglected a core element of constitutional law, something this chapter terms a ‘generative space’ for law and politics. As this part further explains, recognising this generative element of constitutionalism lies at the heart of the struggle to make sense both practically and conceptually of European integration to this day. Part III then briefly outlines an emerging response to this challenge, and relates this response more broadly to the transformation of constitutional law

Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems

In comparative constitutional discourse, Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus; we eagerly tell our European counterparts about the U.S. constitutional experience, but rarely do we listen when they talk to us about their own. Whereas Europeans routinely examine U.S. constitutionalism as an illuminating point of comparison or contrast, as Americans, we seem convinced that we have nothing to learn from looking abroad. This Article challenges that assumption. In particular, it argues that American courts and scholars have overlooked an important alternative to the dominant interpretation of the division of powers in the United States by ignoring the theory and practice of federalism in the European Union and in Germany

Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law

Even France now values local government. Over the past 30 years, top-down appointment of regional prefects and local administrators has given way to regionally elected councils and a revision of Article 1 of the French Constitution, which proclaims that today the state’s ‘organization is decentralized’. The British Parliament, too, has embraced local rule by devolving powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. And in China, decentralization has reached a point where some scholars speak of ‘de facto federalism’. A systematic study of the distribution of authority in 42 democracies found that over the past 50 years, regional authority grew in 29 countries, remained stable in 11, and declined in only two. And various projections over the past half-century place over 50 percent of the world’s landmass into federal systems in 1964, 40 percent of the world population in federal systems in 1987, and 50 percent (or up to 70 percent if we include China) of the world’s population in federal systems by 2009

Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States

In the debates about whether to take constitutionalism beyond the state, the European Union invariably looms large. One element, in particular, that invites scholars to grapple with the analogy between the European Union and global governance is the idea of legal pluralism. Just as the European legal order is based on competing claims of ultimate legal authority among the European Union and its member states, so, too, the global legal order, to the extent that we can speak of one, lacks a singular, uncontested hierarchy among its various parts. To be sure, some have argued that the UN Charter provides for a basic ordering of the international legal system akin to a constitutional charter. Others urge us to view the World Trade Organization as the foundation for global constitutional order. And yet legal and institutional fragmentation among the various regimes in the international arena broadly persists, as in the unsettled relationship among, say, trade, environmental, and human rights regimes

Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions

Current First Amendment analysis lacks a coherent view of speech in the professions. Classic cases address the street-comer orator, lone pamphleteer, newspaper editor, broadcaster, cable operator, public employee, grant recipient, vendor, corporation, and, most recently, Internet content provider. And an abundance of theory accompanies these speakers along the way. Although some of these actors may be professionals, both theory and practice generally meet their roles as members of a profession with silence. Despite the century-old recognition of the regulation of professions, we still have, for example, no paradigm for the First Amendment rights of attorneys, physicians, or financial advisers when they communicate with their clients