A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach

The authors estimate a sample selection model over three distinct regulatory "regimes" when the treatment of bank bondholders (in the event of bank failures) differed substantially. They then estimate their selection model to test the strength of bond market discipline over these three regulatory regimes, finding that bank bond spreads are positively associated with bank risk measures during all three regimes, even during the too-big-to-fail period.Bank assets ; Debt management ; Banks and banking - Ratio analysis ; Deposit insurance

Financial Stability Monitoring

While the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, it limits the types of interventions by financial authorities to address systemic events when they occur. As a result, a broad and forward-looking monitoring program, which seeks to identify financial vulnerabilities and guide the development of preemptive policies to help mitigate them, is essential. Systemic vulnerabilities arise from market failures that can lead to excessive leverage, maturity transformation, interconnectedness, and complexity. These vulnerabilities, when hit by adverse shocks, can lead to fire-sale dynamics, negative feedback loops, and inefficient contractions in the supply of credit. We present a framework that centers on the vulnerabilities that propagate adverse shocks, rather than shocks themselves, which are difficult to predict. Vulnerabilities can emerge in four areas: 1) systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), 2) shadow banking, 3) asset markets, and 4) the nonfinancial sector. This framework also highlights how policies that reduce the likelihood of systemic crises may do so only by raising the cost of financial intermediation in noncrisis periods

The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market

This paper documents “runs on asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007

Shadow Banking and Financial Stability under Limited Deposit Insurance

This paper proposes a new theory of shadow banking that highlights the role of the cap on deposit insurance at traditional banks. Very risk averse investors with large endowments (institutional cash-pools) are looking for the best alternative to insured bank deposits. This is provided by shadow banks that invest exclusively in assets with very low credit risk. In equilibrium, investors face a trade-off between shadow banks with low fundamental risk and commercial banks with low run risk

Public Disclosure, Risk, and Performance at Bank Holding Companies

This paper examines the relationship between the amount of information disclosed by bank holding companies (BHCs) and their subsequent risk profile and performance. Using data from the annual reports of BHCs with large trading operations, we construct an index of publicly disclosed information about the BHCs’ forward-looking estimates of market risk exposure in their trading and market-making activities. The paper then examines the relationship between this index and the subsequent risk and return in both the BHCs’ trading activities and the firm overall, as proxied by equity market returns. The key findings are that more disclosure is associated with lower risk, especially idiosyncratic risk, and in turn with higher risk-adjusted returns. These findings suggest that greater disclosure is associated with more efficient risk taking and thus improved risk-return trade-offs, although the direction of causation is unclear