Cointegration and Consumption Risks in Asset Returns

We argue that the cointegrating relation between dividends and consumption, a measure of long run consumption risks, is a key determinant of risk premia at all investment horizons. As the investment horizon increases, transitory risks disappear, and the asset's beta is dominated by long run consumption risks. We show that the return betas, derived from the cointegration-based VAR (EC-VAR) model, successfully account for the crosssectional variation in equity returns at both short and long horizons; this is not the case when the cointegrating restriction is ignored. Our evidence highlights the importance of cointegration-based long run consumption risks for financial markets.

Does the Plaintiff Matter?: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions

With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLR) the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions. A central provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest financial interest in a securities fraud class action should be appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit. The lead plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member with a large financial stake to become the class representative. Congress expected that such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that may arise when class counsel\u27s interests diverge from those of the shareholder class. Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead plaintiff provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly the lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, is a more effective monitor of class counsel in securities fraud class actions continues to be intuitively appealing, but remains unproven. In this study, Professors Cox and Thomas inquire anecdotally and empirically whether the lead plaintiff provision has performed as projected. The anecdotal evidence they uncover is mixed: in some instances demonstrating the virtues of the lead plaintiff provision, while in others showing that the provision has encountered difficulties, including hesitance among institutional lead plaintiffs to take on the burden of serving as lead plaintiff (though recently more institutional investors are taking on the role of lead plaintiff) and allegations of pay-to-play schemes between plaintiffs\u27 law firms and potential lead plaintiffs. Professors Cox and Thomas then conduct a series of statistical analyses of the lead plaintiff provision\u27s costs and benefits. Surprisingly, their results indicate that the ratio of settlement amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions---the most important indicator of whether investors have been compensated for their damages---has been lower since the passage of the PSLRA and that settlement size has not increased since the passage of PSLRA. However, they also find that the presence of an institutional investor increases the dollar amount of settlements in those cases in which they appear, suggesting that the current trend for institutional investors to be lead plaintiffs in securities class actions will positively affect average settlement size in such actions in the future. Their analysis also sheds new light on the relative impacts other types of lead plaintiffs, such as individuals versus an aggregation of individuals, have on the outcome of settlements. They conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of their findings

SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry

This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement actions from 1997 to 2002. We find that the volume of SEC enforcement proceedings is relatively modest. We next examine the scope of the recently enacted Fair Fund provision that authorizes the SEC to designate civil penalties it recovers from defendants to benefit defrauded private investors. We conclude that this provision offers only limited potential relief for private investors. We complete this Part of the Article with an analysis of the serious resource limitations faced by the SEC. The second portion of the Article contains an empirical analysis of the determinants of SEC enforcement actions and the overlap of private fraud suits and SEC enforcement proceedings. Using bivariate analysis, we find that (1) private suits with parallel SEC actions settle for significantly more than private suits without such proceedings; (2) SEC enforcement actions target significantly smaller companies than private actions alone; (3) private cases with parallel SEC actions take substantially less time to settle than other private cases; and (4) private cases with parallel SEC actions have significantly longer class periods than other private actions. Finally, we create a model for estimating damages to compare settlement ratios in cases with parallel SEC actions to those in private actions. We find that one-fourth of all the private class action settlements occurring in suits that yield less than 10 percent of provable losses are settled for less than 2 percent of provable losses, but that there are no private actions with parallel SEC suits with such small settlements. In the final Part of the Article, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of when SEC enforcement actions are filed. We find that the most highly significant determinant of SEC actions is financial distress. Estimated losses do not appear to be a statistically significant factor in the SEC\u27s decision to file these suits

An Empirical Evaluation of the Long-Run Risks Model for Asset Prices

We provide an empirical evaluation of the forward-looking long-run risks (LRR) model and highlight model differences with the backward-looking habit based asset pricing model. We feature three key results: (i) Consistent with the LRR model, there is considerable evidence in the data of time-varying expected consumption growth and volatility, (ii) The LRR model matches the key asset markets data features, (iii) In the data and in the LRR model accordingly, past consumption growth does not predict future asset prices, whereas lagged consumption in the habit model forecasts future price-dividend ratios with an R2 of over 40%. Overall, our evidence implies that the LRR model provides a coherent framework to analyze and interpret asset prices.

Volatility, the Macroeconomy, and Asset Prices

How important are volatility fluctuations for asset prices and the macroeconomy? We find that an increase in macroeconomic volatility is associated with an increase in discount rates and a decline in consumption. We develop a framework in which cash flow, discount rate, and volatility risks determine risk premia and show that volatility plays a significant role in explaining the joint dynamics of returns to human capital and equity. Volatility risk carries a sizable positive risk premium and helps account for the cross section of expected returns. Our evidence demonstrates that volatility is important for understanding expected returns and macroeconomic fluctuations