Auctions with Variable Supply: Uniform Price versus Discriminatory

We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volume.sealed bid multi-unit auctions, variable supply auctions, discriminatory and uniform price auctions, subgame perfect equilibria, rationalizable strategies

Long-run Equilibrium Shift and Short-run Dynamics of U.S. Home Price Tiers During the Housing Bubble

We use vector error correction models to examine the interdependence between the high and the low price tiers during the latest housing market boom and bust. For 118 of the 364 US statistical areas analyzed, the tiered price indexes are bound by a long-run relationship. In general, low tier homes appreciated more than high tier homes in the past two decades. In contrast to previous periods of high volatility, however, low tier homes appreciated more during the boom and lost more value during the bust of the market. We find a shift in the long-run equilibrium during the bubble —the cointegration parameter that ties the tiers together is greater in absolute value during the bubble period compared to the periods of more moderate appreciation and depreciation rates. Moreover, the shift in the long-run equilibrium can be explained by differences in subprime originations across housing markets. We also find that short run price dynamics is driven by momentum in both segments of the market

Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.

Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.auctions, experiment, discriminatory, uniform

Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format

Getting on and moving up the property ladder: Real hedging in the U.S. housing market before and after the crisis

Real hedging is the practice of getting onto the property ladder in order to trade up to a larger home in the future. We define the value of the real hedge of home ownership as the difference between the risk premiums of renting and owning and explore how this value depends on local housing price dynamics and household characteristics. Controlling for the potential endogeneity of housing bubble bursts across different U.S metropolitan areas, we find a significantly higher correlation in the appreciation rates across the Standard & Poor's Case-Shiller tiered house price indices in the period after the housing crisis. We conclude that real hedging has become more attractive in the period after the crisis, particularly in markets exhibiting momentum and high volatility in returns

Long-Run Equilibrium Shift and Short-Run Dynamics of U.S. Home Price Tiers during the Housing Bubble

We use vector error correction models to examine the interdependence between the high and the low price tiers during the latest housing market boom and bust. For 118 of the 364 US statistical areas analyzed, the tiered price indexes are bound by a long-run relationship. In general, low tier homes appreciated more than high tier homes in the past two decades. In contrast to previous periods of high volatility, however, low tier homes appreciated more during the boom and lost more value during the bust of the market. We find a shift in the long-run equilibrium during the bubble -the cointegration parameter that ties the tiers together is greater in absolute value during the bubble period compared to the periods of more moderate appreciation and depreciation rates. Moreover, the shift in the long-run equilibrium can be explained by differences in subprime originations across housing markets. We also find that short run price dynamics is driven by momentum in both segments of the market

On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets

Long-Run Equilibrium Shift and Short-Run Dynamics of U.S. Home Price Tiers during the Housing Bubble

We use vector error correction models to examine the interdependence between the high and the low price tiers during the latest housing market boom and bust. For 118 of the 364 US statistical areas analyzed, the tiered price indexes are bound by a long-run relationship. In general, low tier homes appreciated more than high tier homes in the past two decades. In contrast to previous periods of high volatility, however, low tier homes appreciated more during the boom and lost more value during the bust of the market. We find a shift in the long-run equilibrium during the bubble -the cointegration parameter that ties the tiers together is greater in absolute value during the bubble period compared to the periods of more moderate appreciation and depreciation rates. Moreover, the shift in the long-run equilibrium can be explained by differences in subprime originations across housing markets. We also find that short run price dynamics is driven by momentum in both segments of the market