Does cash induce corruption in DDR programmes? Unpacking the experience from Nepal

Drawing on empirical evidence from fieldwork conducted in Nepal between December 2012 and March 2013, this paper examines the nexus between cash and corruption in the management of the Maoists arms and armies in Nepal. The enquiry reveals that the public resources that funded cantonments and the cash offered to combatants as a retirement package were subject to corruption in the cantonments set up to house the Maoists People's Liberation Army (PLA) fighters. It argues that cash induced corruption in cantonments could be viewed as a typical form of the war economy as well as a phenomenon driven by an opportunity cost of combatants' participation and non-participation in the disarmament and reintegration programme. Finally this paper also discusses the factors which could potentially reduce corruption in cantonments

Economic Dimension of Peacebuilding: Insights into Post-conflict Economic Recovery and Development in Nepal

This article studies economic dimension of peacebuilding, concentrating on post-conflict economic recovery and development (PCERD) in Nepal. The current peace process in Nepal has a historical opportunity to address economic root causes of the armed conflict and lay a foundation for inclusive economic development. However, the economic dimension of peacebuilding has been sidelined by the contentious transitional politics in the Nepali peace process. Taking a maximalist approach to development, this article argues that PCERD in Nepal should be understood as a multiple-faceted long-term process which might incorporate both short-term and long-term priorities. While the short-term priority should target at delivering the economic dividends of peace in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the long-term priority should be geared towards addressing the economic root causes of the preceding armed conflict as well as laying the foundation for an inclusive economic development. It should be accomplished by taking into account a wider range of the social, economic, political, psychosocial, and security related needs and aspirations of the conflict-affected people as well as the wider populace. Making an analysis from a political economy perspective, this article also discusses potential barriers to PCERD and finds that lack of commitment by the key political actors to engage in policy debates and discussions around economic recovery and development and dwindling post-conflict public security are the barriers to economic recovery and development in post-conflict Nepal

Ex-combatants, Security and Post-conflict Violence: Unpacking the Experience from Nepal

As Nepali society has recently received a substantial number of demobilized but not adequately reintegrated Maoist ex-combatants, there is a concern regarding the ex-combatants' re-mobilization and re-engagement in violence. Yet, adequate knowledge and empirical evidences surrounding this are still wanting. Drawing on fieldworks conducted in Nepal between September and December 2011, and again between December 2012 and March 2013, this article studies ex-combatant's current and potential re-mobilization and post-conflict violence in which ex-combatants are or will be involved. Contending that ex-combatants cannot be homogenized, this article identifies three categories of Maoist ex-combatants: socially and economically engaged ex-combatants, (in)formal interest groups and politically active ex-combatants. It shows that each of the three categories of ex-combatants has different responses to security and violence in post-conflict period. It further argues that exploring the interface between various categories of ex-combatants, their re-mobilization vulnerability and the position and interest of re-mobilizing actors can better predict the outcomes of the ex-combatants violence. This article concludes that ex-combatant-led insecurity and violence including petty crimes have occurred increasingly at the micro level while the macro level threats at present are limited to confrontational, disruptive and violent political actions rather than re-mobilization in another insurgency

Sri Lanka's Developmental Path to Reconciliation: Narratives and Counter-Narratives from the Margins

Reconciliation brings adversaries together to find non-violent ways to transform their destructive social relationships through the practice of truth, mercy, justice and peace (Lederach 1997: 29-30). With aims of transforming problematic relationships between individuals and groups and creating a safe environment for war-time victims and perpetrators to work together towards a shared future, reconciliation features elements of conflict prevention as well as conflict transformation (Kelman 2008; Lederach 1997). Since reconciliation involves social and psychosocial dimensions (Abu-Nimer 2001; Charbonneau and Parent 2013) and spiritual, theological and religious dimensions (Galtung 2001: 4), there is often a contention in finding an ideal path and means of moving to reconciliation

Security Dimension of Post-conflict Recovery: Nepal's Experience in Disarmament and Demobilisation of People's Liberation Army Fighters

Disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants often involve politicised sequence of activities, and, in turn, they can affect national and local politics and the peace process in question in one way or other. Understanding the interface between transitional politics, and disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants is, therefore, vital to explore scope and limitation of how ex-combatants are managed as part of post-conflict recovery in a post-conflict society. Building on this proposition, this paper investigates the impacts of transitional politics to disarmament and demobilisation (D&D) of the Maoist ex-combatants as part of management of the Maoist arms and armies in Nepal. Analysing how a consensus-based political culture between major political parties, including the Maoists, which was a driving force behind the peace negotiation, deteriorated over time, and further exploring strategic needs and interests of key political actors towards D&D, this paper shows that disarmament of the Maoists People's Liberation Army followed a "blanket disarmament" approach which had limitations to fully disarm the force. Similarly, demobilisation process appeared to be encampment of the force rather than complete demobilisation. This paper warns that faulty disarmament and demobilisation in Nepal can have serious security implications in future

"Pro-Peace Entrepreneur" or "Conflict Profiteer"? Critical Perspective on the Private Sector and Peacebuilding in Nepal

Focusing on a case study from Nepal, this article argues that as the private sector is a heterogeneous constituency consisting of a variety of actors who can perform in favor of or against peace, generalizing the entire sector as either a builder or spoiler of peace can be deeply misleading. Instead, this article proposes an alternative approach that may help to understand the personal and structural dimensions that make up a business response to peace and conflict. These two dimensions, which can be better understood in terms of a business actor's self-interests, motivations, and the economic incentive structures and mechanisms, are central in shaping businesses' attitudes and responses toward peace and conflict. The personal and structural dimensions may provide an analytical framework that distinguishes between business actors who might want to benefit from political instability and conflict and those who may want to support peace initiatives. In this article, these two categories of the private sector are referred to as "conflict profiteers" and "pro-peace entrepreneurs" respectively. While the business activities of a conflict profiteer may exacerbate conflict dynamics, by contrast a pro-peace entrepreneur can contribute to building peace in Nepal

Dealing with Ex-Combatants in a Negotiated Peace Process: Impacts of Transitional Politics on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Nepal

This paper investigates the implications of transitional politics to the processes and outcomes of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme targeted to the Maoist ex-combatants in Nepal. It shows that the DDR programme in Nepal was unconventional because of (a) following its own context-specific model developed outside of an established DDR framework, (b) being a process led by national actors in the absence of external intervention, and (c) offering no space for non-state actors such as civil society and business to engage in designing and implementing management of the Maoist arms and armies. Highly politicized by conflicting needs and interests of key political actors, the DDR programme was stalled for nearly six years before a resolution about the future of the ex-combatants was forged. Failure of the political actors to forge a common shared outcome of the DDR programme, lack of clarity in the peace negotiation document in terms of processes of rehabilitation and integration of the ex-combatants, and minimal political will of the Maoist to participate in the DDR programme have been identified as key political constrains that have significantly implicated and altered the modality, function and outcome of the DDR programme in Nepal

Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Addressing radicalization and recruitment of youth in violent extremism (VE) has become a principal aim of the policy and programs of what is known as countering violent extremism (CVE). Yet, much of the CVE programs have taken a curative approach with a main focus on addressing consequences of radicalization and extremism once extremist violence is erupted. A preventive approach, which could be cost effective and function as a "threat minimizer," has received less attention by academics and practitioners alike. By understanding the process of radicalization and recruitment of youth into violent extremism as an evolutionary process, preventive mechanisms could be developed and implemented such as community-based early warning and early response systems by engaging local people who bear the brunt of radicalization and extremism in the first place. Because armed conflict and VE share common impetuses of violence such as inequality, socioeconomic exclusion, unemployment, poverty, and lack of security, armed conflicts and VE are increasingly overlapped and at times interconnected. While the nexus between conflict and extremism is a major challenge for practitioners on the ground, preventing violent extremism can, nonetheless, benefit from rich experiences and lessons learned in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding vis-à-vis community-based early warning and early response (EWER) systems. Rather than being overtly prescriptive, however, by offering tools and templates of EWER, I aim to stimulate seminal discussion by focusing on both advantages and challenges of the EWER system when transferring its approaches and ideas from the field of conflict prevention to the CVE domain