63 research outputs found

    Micro/Nano Hierarchical Super-Lyophobic Surfaces Against Gallium-Based Liquid Metal Alloy

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    Against a gallium-based liquid metal alloy, we report super-lyophobic surfaces that have micro/nano hierarchical structures made of polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) and carbon nanotube (CNT) materials. The surface oxidation of the liquid metal is a challenging problem to be utilized for various applications, as it wets most surfaces. However, the micro/nano hierarchical structures of a fabricated-PDMS micro pillar array with dual-scale surface texturing and a grown-CNT surface enable one to minimize a contact area between the liquid metal droplet and the surface. Due to the low contact area, a large static contact angle and a low contact angle hysteresis are achieved, indicating super-lyophobic surfaces. Based on these super-lyophobic surfaces, the gallium-based liquid metal alloy can be more widely utilized for undeveloped applications that rely on the liquid metal’s mobility

    A novel sphingosylphosphorylcholine and sphingosine-1-phosphate receptor 1 antagonist, KRO-105714, for alleviating atopic dermatitis

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    Background Atopic dermatitis (eczema) is a type of inflammation of the skin, which presents with itchy, red, swollen, and cracked skin. The high global incidence of atopic dermatitis makes it one of the major skin diseases threatening public health. Sphingosylphosphorylcholine (SPC) and sphingosine-1-phosphate (S1P) act as pro-inflammatory mediators, as an angiogenesis factor and a mitogen in skin fibroblasts, respectively, both of which are important biological responses to atopic dermatitis. The SPC level is known to be elevated in atopic dermatitis, resulting from abnormal expression of sphingomyelin (SM) deacylase, accompanied by a deficiency in ceramide. Also, S1P and its receptor, sphingosine-1-phosphate receptor 1 (S1P1) are important targets in treating atopic dermatitis. Results In this study, we found a novel antagonist of SPC and S1P1, KRO-105714, by screening 10,000 compounds. To screen the compounds, we used an SPC-induced cell proliferation assay based on a high-throughput screening (HTS) system and a human S1P1 protein-based [35S]-GTPγS binding assay. In addition, we confirmed the inhibitory effects of KRO-105714 on atopic dermatitis through related cell-based assays, including a tube formation assay, a cell migration assay, and an ELISA assay on inflammatory cytokines. Finally, we confirmed that KRO-105714 alleviates atopic dermatitis symptoms in a series of mouse models. Conclusions Taken together, our data suggest that SPC and S1P1 antagonist KRO-105714 has the potential to alleviate atopic dermatitis.This work was supported by a grant from the Korea Research Council for Industrial Science and Technology (KK-1933-20) to HC, under the industrial infrastructure program for fundamental technologies and Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology through the Inter-ER Cooperation Projects (R0002017) which are funded by the Ministry of Trade, Industry & Energy, Korea to YDG

    Cheap Talk and Collective Decision-Making: Voting Rules and Informed Decision Makers

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    Job Market Signaling with Imperfect Competition among Employers

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    Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers

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    We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational superiority to decision makers who vote on a proposal. We show that an expert's simple cheap talk strategy can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their opinions. After observing the expert's cheap talk message, decision makers may ignore their private information and vote according to the expert's interest, even though they know the expert has her own bias. In other words, the expert's cheap talk prevents a voting procedure from aggregating decision makers' private information. We also discuss how our main results extend to a model of Bayesian persuasion.11Nssciscopu

    Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers

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    This paper studies a job market signaling model with imperfect competition among employers. In our basic model, workers are differentiated in productivity and preference over employers, both of which are workers' private information. We conclude that if competition is sufficiently strong, a separating equilibrium exists. We also show that stronger competition among employers intensifies competition between workers; workers invest more in costly education to get attractive jobs, and social welfare decreases. When employers can observe worker's preferences, wage discrimination strengthens competition among employers and makes workers better off.11Nsciessciscopu

    Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers

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