Does Globalization Affect Growth?

The paper presents an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. Using panel data for 123 countries in 1970-2000 the effects of the overall index of globalization as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions on economic growth are analyzed empirically. The results show that globalization promotes growth - but not to an extent necessary to reduce poverty on a large scale. The dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries. Although less robustly, information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect.Globalization, Growth

Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization

Measurement of Globalization, Growth

IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality

In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its conditionality. This paper tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970-2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is only weak evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect. IMF loans have no statistically significant impact. --IMF programs,growth,compliance,conditionality

The Influence of Globalization on Taxes and Social Policy – an Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries

Using panel regression for the period 1970-2000 the paper analyzes whether globalization has influenced the OECD countries’ social and overall spending as well as their tax rates on labor, consumption and capital. Accounting for potential endogeneity of the regressors, the results show that globalization (measured by an index covering 23 variables) did not generally decrease the leeway for independent economic policy. Globalization even increased implicit tax rates on capital (as calculated by Carey and Rabesona 2002) – a result that is mainly driven by economic integration. However, there seems to be competition over tax rates on capital when data based on legislation as suggested by Devereux and Griffith (2003) is employed. Depending on the method of estimation, increasing social integration also influences policies, while political integration does not matter for economic policy in most specifications.globalization, economic policy, government expenditure, social spending, implicit tax rates, dynamic panel, tax competition

IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality

In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its conditionality. This paper tries to separate those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970-2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is also evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect, while the overall impact, however, remains negative. IMF loans have no robust statistically significant impact.IMF programs, growth, compliance, conditionality

Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence

The paper provides a critical review of empirical studies on IMF induced moral hazard. Taken together, there is considerable evidence that the insurance provided by the Fund leads to moral hazard with investors in bond markets, while moral hazard in equity markets has so far not been convincingly tested. Debtor moral hazard has much less frequently been investigated, and the counterfactual is more difficult to construct. There is, however, evidence that debtor governments’ policies are negatively influenced by the insurance. Their policies are more expansive leading to higher probabilities of IMF programs and shorter inter-program-periods.

Do Markets Care About Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets

Central bank governor changes in emerging markets may convey important signals about future monetary policy. Based on a new daily data set, this paper examines the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock market indices and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes. The data cover 20 emerging markets over the period 1992-2006. We find that the replacement of a central bank governor negatively affects financial markets on the announcement day. This negative effect is mainly driven by irregular changes, i.e., changes occurring before the scheduled end of tenure, sending negative signals about perceived central bank independence. Personal characteristics of the central banker, to the contrary, are less important for market reactions. We find no evidence that changes in the central bankers conservatism affect the reactions of the markets. Finally, market reactions are similar in countries with high and low degrees of central bank independence. --central bank governor turnover,monetary policy,emerging markets,risk premium

The Impact of Aid on Growth Revisited: Do Donor Motives Matter?

The typical identification strategy in aid effectiveness studies assumes donor motives do not influence the impact of aid on growth. We call this homogeneity assumption into question, first constructing a model in which donor motives matter and then testing the assumption empirically.Aid; Growth; Politics

The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality

We develop a public choice model of the International Monetary Fund in which credit and conditionality are simultaneously determined by the demand for, and supply of, IMF credit. A graphical analysis illustrates the comparative statics in response to various shocks. We apply the model to explain the main changes in the rules governing conditionality and in the number of conditions per program. We observe a highly significant positive correlation between the number of conditions per program and the prior use of Fund credit relative to quota in 1959-99. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent in 4/1997-2/2003 reveals that the number of conditions depends negatively on international reserves and positively on interest rates in the world capital market, monetary expansion in the borrowing country and the number of World Bank adjustment loans. Finally, the effects of conditionality are analyzed for the first time. Our instrumental-variables estimate shows that the number of conditions does not have a significant effect on any of the five typical instrument and target variables considered. The final section links the analysis of IMF conditionality with the literature on tied transfers in public economics and develops some novel proposals for the reform of IMF conditionality.IMF Conditionality Reform

Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions

In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable economic indicators or, alternatively, whether it is partly driven by its major shareholder, the United States. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries from 4/1997-2/2003 reveals that the number of conditions on an IMF loan depends on a borrowing country’s voting pattern in the UN general assembly. Closer US allies receive IMF loans with fewer conditions especially prior to elections. Countries not allied with the US have to accept more conditions at election time. We believe that these empirical results speak to the current debate on IMF conditionality and contribute to the broader literature on the role and functioning of international institutions in the global economy.IMF, conditionality, elections